Economic Theories of International Environmental CooperationTo deal effectively with transboundary environmental problems such as climate change, it is important to have an idea of the model for an 'efficient' and 'fair' policy. An understanding of the strategic interactions involved in the international decision-making process is also essential. Carsten Helm uses rigorous theoretical reasoning and applications to address these issues.
This highly topical book will be of great interest to economists and political and environmental scientists, as well as all those involved in the policy and decision making of international environmental agreements. |
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Page 106
... Proposition 11 Given are two countries with quadratic damage and abatement cost functions as specified above ... Proposition 10 it was stated that a country i chooses more emission allowances in the case with trading if d ' ; ( e ) / d ...
... Proposition 11 Given are two countries with quadratic damage and abatement cost functions as specified above ... Proposition 10 it was stated that a country i chooses more emission allowances in the case with trading if d ' ; ( e ) / d ...
Page 109
... Proposition 14 Given are two countries with linear damage cost func- tions , di ( e ) ẞie , and quadratic abatement cost functions . In this case , the welfare effect of allowing emissions trading is always positive for the low - damage ...
... Proposition 14 Given are two countries with linear damage cost func- tions , di ( e ) ẞie , and quadratic abatement cost functions . In this case , the welfare effect of allowing emissions trading is always positive for the low - damage ...
Page 153
... Proposition 18 ap- plies . An obvious condition is that the matrix of transport coefficients A must be non ... Proposition 19 Let A be a non - singular n x n matrix . If all countries are identical and Yi ‡ 0 for all i Є N , then a ...
... Proposition 18 ap- plies . An obvious condition is that the matrix of transport coefficients A must be non ... Proposition 19 Let A be a non - singular n x n matrix . If all countries are identical and Yi ‡ 0 for all i Є N , then a ...
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
An Axiomatic Approach To Fair Burden Sharing | 11 |
A Welfarist Approach to Fair Burden Sharing | 59 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
abatement cost functions Accordingly agents aggregate analysis assume assumption burden sharing business-as-usual chapter ci(ei climate change coalitional game common property resource common resource competition convexity core damage cost functions denote developing countries Economics effect efficiency egalitarian equivalent emis emission allowances emission exporting emission levels emission reductions emissions trading environmental problems envy-freeness equal per capita equation example exists fair division feasible fi(e Furthermore game theory global imperfect competition incentive increase indifference curves individual rationality Kyoto Protocol marginal abatement costs marginal damage costs monetary compensations Moulin Nash equilibrium negotiations non-cooperative game optimal overall emissions Pareto Pareto-efficient particular permit market players pollution stock population monotonicity Proposition ratio equilibrium reduction targets regime resource monotonicity scientific uncertainty Section Shapley Shapley value sions social welfare function solution stage game stand-alone utility strategy Sulphur Protocol thresholds tion tradable transboundary pollution game transfers Walrasian equilibrium WESA allocation WESA mechanism ΕΝ