Economic Theories of International Environmental CooperationTo deal effectively with transboundary environmental problems such as climate change, it is important to have an idea of the model for an 'efficient' and 'fair' policy. An understanding of the strategic interactions involved in the international decision-making process is also essential. Carsten Helm uses rigorous theoretical reasoning and applications to address these issues.
This highly topical book will be of great interest to economists and political and environmental scientists, as well as all those involved in the policy and decision making of international environmental agreements. |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
An Axiomatic Approach To Fair Burden Sharing | 11 |
A Welfarist Approach to Fair Burden Sharing | 59 |
Copyright | |
6 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
abatement cost functions Accordingly agents aggregate analysis assume assumption burden sharing business-as-usual chapter ci(ei climate change coalitional game common property resource common resource competition convexity core damage cost functions denote developing countries Economics effect efficiency egalitarian equivalent emis emission allowances emission exporting emission levels emission reductions emissions trading environmental problems envy-freeness equal per capita equation example exists fair division feasible fi(e Furthermore game theory global imperfect competition incentive increase indifference curves individual rationality Kyoto Protocol marginal abatement costs marginal damage costs monetary compensations Moulin Nash equilibrium negotiations non-cooperative game optimal overall emissions Pareto Pareto-efficient particular permit market players pollution stock population monotonicity Proposition ratio equilibrium reduction targets regime resource monotonicity scientific uncertainty Section Shapley Shapley value sions social welfare function solution stage game stand-alone utility strategy Sulphur Protocol thresholds tion tradable transboundary pollution game transfers Walrasian equilibrium WESA allocation WESA mechanism ΕΝ