Amend. 14.--Rights of Citizens Sec. 1.-Equal Protection-Criminal Prosecutions present in person or in counsel in that court at the time it affirmed the judgment of the trial court and fixed the time for carrying that judgment into execution is not a denial of the equal protection of the laws when the law of that State, as declared by its highest court, is that amendments of record of a court in derogation of a final judgment are not permitted in that State after the expiration of the term at which the judgment was rendered. The State law is applicable to all persons within the jurisdiction of the State. Fielden v. Illinois, 143 U. S. 452. Right to appeal.-There is no denial of the equal protection of the laws because in one district the State is allowed an appeal and such an appeal is not allowed in another district of the same State. Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U. S. 597. Assuming that this clause could apply to the United States, an act of Congress which gives to the United States an appeal to the Supreme Court from a judgment sustaining a demurrer to an indictment and gives an appeal to a defendant to the circuit court of appeals only at the end of the trial, does not deny such defendant the equal protection of the laws. U. S. v. Heinze, 218 U. S. 532. "Habitual criminal" statutes.-A State statute providing that "Whoever has been twice convicted of crime, sentenced and committed to prison, in this or any other State, or once in this and once at least in any other State, for terms of not less than three years each, shall, upon conviction of a felony committed. in this State after the passage of this act, be deemed to be an habitual criminal, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the State prison for twenty-five years," does not deny to anyone the equal protection of the laws, as the aggravated penalty prescribed affects alike all persons similarly situated. McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U. S. 311. Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U. S. 616. Moore v. Missouri, 159 U. S. 678. Effect of pardon for first offense. As applied to one who had previously been convicted in a United States court and had been granted a pardon by the President after he had completed his term of service, a State habitual criminal statute does not deny any rights guaranteed by this amendment. Carlesi v. New York, 233 U. S. 51. Sentence and punishment-In general.-When by a State law, at the time of the trial and sentence of an accused person, the court in which he was tried and sentenced was a court de jure and the judge who tried and sentenced was at least a judge de Amend. 14.-Rights of Citizens Sec. 1.-Equal Protection-Criminal Prosecutions facto, and the sentence itself was valid, such sentence is not a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In re Manning, 139 U. S. 504. Different sentences.-Sentences imposed on a conviction of a common-law offense, more severe than ever before inflicted in the State for a like offense, and giving two of the codefendants longer terms than the third, do not amount to a denial of the equal protection of the laws. Howard v. Fleming, 191 U. S. 135. Excessive punishment.-A sentence of 14 years for the crime of perjury can not be held to be so grossly excessive as to be prohibited by this amendment when it does not exceed the limit prescribed by statute. Collins v. Johnston, 237 U. S. 502. Indeterminate sentence and parole.-An indeterminate sentence and parole act does not deny a person of the equal protection of the laws, who has been twice convicted of felony, because of the provision "that no prisoner who has been twice previously convicted of felony shall be eligible to parole under the provisions of this act." Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U. S. 481. Death sentence for life termers guilty of assault.-A statute providing that "every person undergoing a life sentence in a State prison of this State, who, with malice aforethought, commits an assault upon the person of another with a deadly weapon or instrument, or by any means or force likely to produce great bodily injury, is punishable with death," does not deny the equal protection of the laws as providing an exceptionable punishment for life termers. Finley v. California, 222 U. S. 28. Penalties and forfeitures.-There is no violation of this clause where States impose punitive penalties for loss resulting from neglect to safeguard life and property so long as the statute runs against all of a certain class as, for instance, railroad companies. So held in Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Humes (115 U. S 512), in which the court said (p. 523): And The statutes of nearly every State of the Union provide for the increase of damages where the injury complained of results from the neglect of duties imposed for the better security of life and property. * experience favors this legislation as the most efficient mode of preventing, with the least inconvenience, the commission of injuries. * * The statute makes no discrimination against any railroad company in its requirements. Each company is subject to the same liability. There is no evasion of the rule of equality where all companies are subjected to the same duties and liabilities under similar circumstances Amend. 14.-Rights of Citizens Sec. 1.-Equal Protection-Criminal Prosecutions See on this point, Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, and Soon Hing v. See also Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26. Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123. Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U. S. 322. Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U. S. 270. Yazoo, etc., R. Co. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U. S. 217. Wadley Sou. R. Co. v. Georgia, 235 U. S. 651. Rail & River Coal Co. v. Ohio, 236 U. S. 338. Section 2.-APPORTIONMENT-RIGHT TO VOTE.1 Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. Negroes as Citizens This clause removes the limitation in section 2 of the first article of the Constitution as to the counting of slaves and provides that they shall be counted as part of "the whole number of persons." In Elk v. Wilkins (112 U. S. 94) Justice Gray, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: Slavery having been abolished, and the persons formerly held as slaves made citizens, this clause fixing the apportionment of Representatives has abrogated so much of the corresponding clause of the original Constitution as counted only three-fifths of such persons. 1 This section amends the first sentence of Art. I, sec. 2, cl. 3, as to representation in the House of Representatives. See p. 65. Amend. 14.--Rights of Citizens Indians as Citizens 1 Sec. 2.-Apportionment-Right to Vote Immediately following the sentence quoted above, it was said: But Indians not taxed are still excluded from the count, for the reason that they are not citizens. Their absolute exclusion from the basis of representation, in which all other persons are now included, is wholly inconsistent with their being considered citizens. Reduction of State's Representation in Congress Congress has never exercised the power conferred upon it by this section of reducing the representation of a State in the House of Representatives, but there can be no question of its power or its right to do so. Of its duty to do so, it alone is the judge. The amendment places the responsibility of enforcing its provisions upon that body. (Watson on the Constitution, Vol. II, p. 1653.) See also McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1 U. S. v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375. Section 3.-DISQUALIFICATION OF OFFICERS. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid. or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. This section is now of little importance, as Congress, by the act of June 6, 1898 (30 Stat. 432), removed the disabilities, as it was authorized to do by the last clause of the section. Section 4.-PUBLIC DEBT. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or See also same subject, p. 199. Amend. 14.-Rights of Citizens Sec. 4.-Public Debt emancipation of any slaves; but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void. The object of this section is apparent. There were only a few cases arising under it. Thorington v. Smith, 8 Wall. 1. Hanauer v. Woodruff, 15 Wall. 439. Section 5.-ENFORCEMENT. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropri ate legislation, the provisions of this article. When Congress Can Act Until some State law has been passed, or some State action. through its officers or agents has been taken, adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protected by the fourteenth amendment, no legislation of the United States under said amendment, nor any proceeding under such legislation, can be called into activity. The legislation which Congress is authorized to adopt in this behalf is not general legislation upon the rights of the citizen, but corrective legislation, that is, such as may be necessary and proper for counteracting such laws as the States may adopt or enforce, and which, by the amendment, they are prohibited from making or enforcing, or such acts and proceedings as the States may commit or take, and which, by the amendment, they are prohibited from committing or taking. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 13. See also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 554, U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 549. In U. S. v. Harris (106 U. S. 629) and Baldwin v. Franks (120 U. S. 678), Revised Statutes, section 5519 was held unconstitutional as a provision for the punishment of a conspiracy, by individuals, within a State, to deprive citizens of rights guaranteed by this amendment. Amendment 15.-RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO VOTE. SECTION 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. See p. 80 for ratification. |