Amend. 10.-Reserved State Powers. States, and which they had not parted from by that instrument. And any legislation by Congress beyond the limits of the power delegated would be trespassing upon the rights of the States or the people, and would not be the supreme law of the land, but null and void. Gordon v. U. S., 117 U. S. 705. The powers the people have given to the General Government are named in the Constitution, and all not there named, either expressly or by implication, are reserved to the people and can be exercised only by them, or upon further grant from them. Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 295. (Justice Brewer's concurring opinion.) Police Power 1 In General The power of the States to regulate matters of internal police within their limits applies not only to the health, morals, and safety of the public but also to whatever promotes the public peace, comfort, and convenience. Statutes enacted under this power may be harsh and oppressive without violating the Constitution. Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285. Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. S. 311. Keller v. U. S., 213 U. S. 138. Southern Bell Tel. Co. v. Calhoun, 287 Fed. 381. Narcotic Drug Act State law regulating administration, sale, and possession of narcotic drugs, which forbids physicians to supply drug addicts otherwise than through prescriptions, held not in conflict with Federal narcotic drug act. Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U. S. 41. Regulation of Commerce' In general. The police power of the States is limited by the express prohibitions in the Federal Constitution upon a State's action. For instance, the State may regulate fares and freights; but inasmuch as the regulation of interstate commerce is vested in the General Government, the State's police power to regulate fares and freight does not extend to interstate commerce. State v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 32 Fed. 722. See also Lottery case, 188 U. S. 321, as to Federal prohibition against transportation of lottery tickets in interstate commerce. Northern Securities Co. v. U. S., 193 U. S. 197, as to violation of Fed- Dick v. U. S., 208 U. S. 340, as to Federal liquor laws applying to 1 See also same subject, pp. 146, 309, 672, and 726. See also commerce clause, p. 80. Amend. 10.-Reserved State Powers. Federal tax on manufacture and sale of commodities.-An act of Congress imposing taxes on the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine, which provides for the marking of packages used by retail dealers in oleomargarine, does not invade the police power of the State when the principal object of the act is the raising of revenue and not the protection of purchasers. U. S. v. Dougherty, 101 Fed. 439. In re Kollock, 165 U. S. 532. The Child Labor Tax Law (Act of Congress of February 24, 1919), imposing a tax on the income of persons employing child labor was manifestly intended to regulate the employment of child labor, which is a matter reserved to the States under this amendment. Bailey v. Drexel Furn. Co., 259 U. S. 20. White persons on Indian lands.-In connection with making unlawful the settlement of white persons on Indian lands, it was held that the power of the State to make regulations to preserve the peace of the community is absolute and has never been surrendered. New York v. Dibble, 21 How. 368. Federal Interference with State Rights This subject was discussed in Massachusetts v. Mellon (262 U. S. 447) in connection with the constitutionality of the socalled "maternity act." In Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. U. S. (263 U. S. 456) it was held that the recapture clause of the transportation act of 1920, reducing net income from intrastate rates, is not an invasion of States' rights under this amendment. To hold that the fourteenth amendment, which is a mere restriction on the powers of the State, by implication confers on Congress the power to legislate on the prohibited subject would be to violate this amendment. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3. A State could not have been made a party to a bill to enforce a negro's right of suffrage, though it was alleged to have entered into a conspiracy to deprive negroes of such right, the circuit court having no constitutional power to control the State's action by any direct means. Giles v. Harris, 189 U. S. 475. The police power of the State can not be said to be unconstitutionally interfered with by the provisions of act February 20, 1907, section 3, for the deportation of an alien found to be practicing prostitution within three years after her entry into the United States, because it vests in the Federal authorities the power to try an immigrant for a violation of the penal laws of the State of which she has become a resident. Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U. S. 272. Amend. 10.-Reserved State Powers. Section 2 of the supplemental prohibition act of November 23, 1912, in so far as it prevents physicians from prescribing intoxicating malt liquors for medicinal purposes, does not violate the tenth amendment, since it is not an invasion of power reserved to the States. Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U. S. 545. Transportation of Child-Made Goods in Interstate Commerce Act of Congress September 1, 1916, declared unconstitutional. The taxing power of a State is one of the attributes of sovereignty; it exists independently of the Federal Constitution and may be exercised to an unlimited extent upon all property, trades, business, and avocations existing or carried on within the territorial boundaries of the State, except so far as it has been surrendered to the Federal Government, either expressly or by necessary implication. Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 29. See also Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. 82. Ohio Life Ins. Co. v. Debolt, 16 How. 428. Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 76. In re Kollock, 165 U. S. 526. Bank of Commerce v. New York City, 2 Black 620. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533. Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113. Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418. Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491. McCray v. U. S., 195 U. S. 27. Tax of Domestic Corporations The exercise of the authority which every State possesses to tax its corporations and all their property, real and personal, and their franchises, and to graduate the tax upon the corporations according to their business or income or the value of their property, when this is not done by discriminating against rights held in other States, and the tax is not on imports, exports, or tonnage, or transportation to other States, can not be regarded as conflicting with any constitutional power of Congress. Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall. 232. Concurrent State and Federal Power on the Same Subjects Outside of the prohibitions, express and implied, contained in the Federal Constitution, the power of the States to tax for the support of their own governments is coextensive with the subjects within their unrestricted sovereign power, which shows conclusively that the power to tax may be exercised at the same time and upon the same subjects of private property by the United States and by the States without inconsistency and 1 See also same subject, pp. 74, 180, 315, 362, 366, 600, 707, and 728. Amend. 10.-Reserved State Powers. repugnancy. Such a power exists in the United States by virtue of an express grant for the purpose, among other things, of paying the debts and providing for the common defense and general welfare; and it exists in the States for the support of their own governments, because they possessed the power without restriction before the Federal Constitution was adopted, and still retain it, except so far as the right is prohibited or restricted by that instrument. Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 428. Limited by Grants of Federal Power The power of a State to tax its own citizens or their property within its territory can not be used so as to obstruct the free course of the power given to Congress. It can not reach and restrain the action of the National Government within its proper sphere. It can not reach the administration of justice in the courts of the Union or the collection of the taxes of the United States or restrain the operation of any law which Congress may constitutionally pass. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 448. Taxation by Congress of Municipal Revenue The right of the States to administer their own affairs through their legislative, executive, and judicial departments, in their own manner through their own agencies, is conceded by the uniform decisions of this court and by the practice of the Federal Government from its organization. This carries with it an exemption of those agencies and instruments from the taxing power of the Federal Government. U. S. v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 17 Wall. 327. Matters Relating to State Courts The several State legislatures retain all the powers of legislation, delegated to them by the State constitutions, which are not expressly taken away by the Federal Constitution. The establishment of courts of justice, the appointment of judges, and the making of regulations for the administration of justice, within each State according to its laws, on all subjects not intrusted to the Federal Government, is the peculiar and exclusive province and duty of the State legislatures. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 388. Shores of, and Soils Under, Navigable Waters The shores of the navigable waters, and the soils under them, were not granted to the United States in the Constitution, but were reserved to the States, respectively. Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212. 12703°-S. Doc. 157, 68-1-44 AMENDMENT 11.-SUITS AGAINST STATES. The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. Leading Cases In Hans v. Louisiana (134 U. S. 11) the court said: This amendment, expressing the will of the ultimate sovereignty of the whole country, superior to all legislatures and all courts, actually reversed the decision of the Supreme Court. It did not, in terms, prohibit suits by individuals against the States, but declared that the Constitution should not be construed to import any power to authorize the bringing of such suits. In Cohens v. Virginia (6 Wheat. 406) it was held: That its motive was not to maintain the sovereignty of a State from the degradation supposed to attend a compulsory appearance before the tribunal of the Nation, may be inferred from the terms of the amendment. It does not comprehend controversies between two or more States, or between a State and a foreign State. The jurisdiction of the court still extends to these cases; and in these a State may still be sued. In Poindexter v. Greenhow (114 U. S. 287) the court said: It is true that the question whether a suit is within the prohibition of the eleventh amendment is not always determined by reference to the nominal parties on the record. In connection with that case see In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443. Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U. S. 516. Graham v. Folsom, 200 U. S. 248. McNeill v. Southern R. Co., 202 U. S. 543. Murray v. Distilling Co., 213 U. S. 151. Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436. In Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line (200 U. S. 283) the following maxims were established: 1. In view of the prohibitions of the eleventh amendment, a State without its consent may not be sued by an individual in a circuit court of the United States. 2. A suit against State officers to enjoin them from enforcing a tax alleged to be in violation of the Constitution is not a suit against a State within the prohibition of this amendment. This amendment was passed in consequence of the decision of Chisholm v. Georgia (2 Dall. 419), holding that a State could be sued by a citizen of another State in assumpsit. For ratification, see p. 27. See also Art. III, sec. 2, pp. 433 and 459. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419. |