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Sec. 10.-Powers Denied to States

Cl. 3.-Agreement or Compact

lished is so run as to cut off an important and valuable portion of a State, the political power of the State enlarged would be affected by the settlement of the boundary; and to an agreement of such a boundary, or rather its adoption afterwards, the consent of Congress may well be required. But if the running of a boundary may have no effect upon the political influence of either State, and may simply serve to mark and define that which actually existed before but was indefinite and unmarked, an agreement for the running of the line or its actual survey would in no respect displace the relation of either of the States to the General Government.

Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U. S. 520.

North Carolina v. Tennessee, 235 U. S. 1.
Florida v. Georgia, 17 How. 491.

Poole v. Fleeger, 11 Pet. 185.

Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 724.

A legislative declaration following the line designated as the boundary between two States, that it is correct and shall thereafter be deemed the true and established line, does not impair, by itself, a contract or agreement with an adjoining State. It is the legislative declaration which the States and individuals affected by the recognized boundary line may invoke against the State as an admission, but not as a compact or agreement.

Monongahela Nav. Co. v. U. S., 148 U. S. 312.

The compact entered into between Virginia and Maryland, in 1785, which provided, inter alia, that the Potomac River should be a common highway for purposes of navigation and commerce to the citizens of both States, etc., did not settle the question of boundary between the States.

Troops

Marine R. Co. v. U. S., 257 U. S. 47.

The States can not, without the consent of Congress, levy war, or make peace, or enter into a compact with any other State. The organization and maintenance of an active State militia is not a keeping of troops in time of peace within the prohibition of this clause. This clause contemplates the use of the State's military power to put down an armed insurrection too strong to be controlled by civil authority, and the State concerned must determine what degree of force the crisis demands.

New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U. S. 76.

Dunne v. People, 94 Ill. 120.

Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 45.

State v. Wagener, 77 N. W. 424.

Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252.

Alabama Great Sou. R. Co. v. U. S., 49 Ct. Cl. 522.

ARTICLE II

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

ARTICLE II-EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.

Section 1.-THE PRESIDENT.

Clause 1.-TERM OF OFFICE.

The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows:

Leading Cases

Kendall v. U. S. (12 Pet. 610), holding that as far as his power is derived from the Constitution the President is beyond the reach of any other department of the Government with the single exception prescribed by the Constitution for his impeachment.

Marbury v. Madison (1 Cranch 166), in which it was held that

Where the heads of departments are the political or confidential agents of the Executive, merely to execute the will of the President, or, rather, to act in cases in which the Executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.

Runkle v. U. S. (122 U. S. 557), holding that in the exercise of his Executive powers under the Constitution the President may act through the heads of the appropriate executive departments, and their official acts done in the regular course of official business are presumed to be his acts.

Executive Powers

In General

Under the Constitution certain political powers are vested in the President which are to be exercised by him in his discretion without any hindrance or control on the part of the judiciary, and in the performance of any act involving the exercise of discretion the Executive is exempt from mandamus or injunction. Nor is the President subject to the writ of habeas corpus.

Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 169.

Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 500.

In re Keeler, Hemp. 306.

See also

In re Kaine, 14 How. 119.

Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U. S. 541.

Craig v. Leitensdorfer, 123 U. S. 211.

Quackenbush v. U. S., 177 U. S. 25.

Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 77.

Boynton v. Blaine, 139 U. S. 319.

Keim v. U. S., 177 U. S. 293.

Sec, 1-The President

Cl. 1.-Term of Office

The President properly acts through the heads of the several departments of the executive branch of the Government in relation to the subjects appertaining to their respective duties, and the acts of such department heads are deemed to be the acts of the President himself. The discretionary acts of executive departments are exempt from judicial control.

Williams v. U. S., 1 How. 298.

Wilcox v. McConnel, 13 Pet. 513.
Bartlett v. Kane, 16 How. 272.

See also

Runkle v. U. S., 122 U. S. 557.
U. S. v. Farden, 99 U. S. 19.
Hegler v. Faulkner, 153 U. S. 117.
U. S. v. Bashaw, 152 U. S. 443.

Carrick v. Lamar, 116 U. S. 426.

Instances of acts which the courts have held to be discretionary are to be found in:

Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 517.
Brashear v. Mason, 6 How. 101.

Reeside v. Walker, 11 How. 290.

U. S. v. Seaman, 17 How. 230.

U. S. v. Guthrie, 17 How. 304.

Commissioner of Patents v. Whiteley, 4 Wall. 534.

Gaines v. Thompson, 7 Wall. 350.

Secretary v. McGarrahan, 9 Wall. 312.

U. S. v. Black, 128 U. S. 45.

U. S. v. Lynch, 137 U. S. 286.

Redfield v. Windom, 137 U. S. 643.

A distinction is to be made between those acts which involve the exercise of judgment or discretion, and those in which the duty is merely ministerial. In the latter class of acts the duty is one "imposed by law, peremptorily and plainly defined." When these acts are in question the officer is required to abandon his right to exercise his personal judgment, and the performance of the act may be compelled or forbidden as the right appears to the court.

Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 173.

Knox County v. Aspinwall, 24 How. 376.

International Contracting Co. v. Lamont, 155 U. S. 308.

Gaines v. Thompson, 7 Wall. 352.

U. S. v. Schurz, 102 U. S. 395.

Noble v. Union, etc., R. Co., 147 U. S. 171.

Political Questions

Political questions are always matters of discretion, and as to these the courts dislaim any right of control, and when the executive department has not parted with its power over a political matter the intervention of the judicial department can not be invoked. Of a political nature are questions relating to the recognition of the existence of an Indian tribal relation; the public character of a person claiming to be a foreign minister;

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