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Sec. 9.-Powers Denied to Congress

Cl. 8.-Titles of Nobility

of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign

State.

Congress and the States are equally prohibited from granting any title of nobility.

Legal Tender Cases, 110 U. S. 421.

This prohibition goes to the competency of Congress to grant any title of nobility, and limits its power in legislating for territory acquired by the United States, such as Porto Rico, as well as in legislating for the States.

Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244.

The original draft of the Constitution contained only the prohibition against grants of titles of nobility. The insertion of the remainder of the clause was prompted by a recognition of the "necessity of preserving foreign ministers and other officers of the United States independent of external influence." A United States marshal can not during his tenure of office represent a foreign nation as its commercial agent.

Documentary Hist. Const., Vol. III, pp. 450 and 600.
6 Op. Atty. Gen. 409.

Section 10.-POWERS DENIED TO THE STATES.

Clause 1.-CONTRACTS, TREATIES, ETC.1

No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of nobility.

In General

This section contains an enumeration of the powers that are denied to the States; that is, the powers that were voluntarily given up by the States when the Constitution was made and adopted. It has been said that: "

The Constitution confers no express power upon the States collectively or individually. It confers power upon Congress and each branch thereof, upon the President, and the judiciary, but none upon the States. The reason is apparent. The States, before the adoption of the Constitution, were separate and independent governments. Each exercised the power of a distinct sovereignty, except as it was limited by the narrow provisions of the Articles of Confederation. When the Constitution was adopted, each State surrendered most of its power and conferred it upon the General Government, which was the United States. There was no occasion therefore to enlarge the powers of the States, but on the contrary they were lessened; hence, there is no power conferred upon them by the

This clause is usually referred to as the "Contracts Clause."

This inhibition is repeated in clause 3 of this section, p. 369.

Watson on the Constitution, p. 763. See also Art. II, sec. 1, cl. 2, p. 380.

12703°-S. Doc. 157, 68-1-21

Sec. 10.-Powers Denied to States.

Constitution. The nearest approach to it
of each State to appoint electors.

Cl. 1.-Treaties is the duty required

Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation

Nature of State Governments

A State, in the sense of the Constitution, is a political community of free citizens occupying definite territory and organized under a government sanctioned and limited by a written constitution, and the union of such States, under the Constitution forms the United States. With respect to the General Government the States are not sovereign powers but members of the Union, whose Constitution is supreme, but as respects their local government they are sovereign within their own limits and foreign as to each other. The sovereignty of the States in their relations with one another, however, is qualified; they have surrendered their treaty-making powers to the General Government, and they can not declare war or authorize reprisals on other States.

Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 721.

Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 136.
Buckner v. Finley, 2 Pet. 591.
Mahon v. Justice, 127 U. S. 705.
Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 571.
See also-

U. S. Bank v. Daniel, 12 Pet. 54.

U. S. v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 412.

There is nothing in the Constitution which forbids the legislature of a State to exercise judicial functions.

Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 380.

The prohibitions raise an obligation on the States not to legislate on the subjects specified.

Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 349.

Surrender of Treaty-Making Power

By this clause and section 2 of Article II the States have surrendered the treaty-making power to the General Government and have vested it in the President and Senate.

In re Parrott, 1 Fed. 481.

No power under the Government can make "any treaty, alliance, or confederation" entered into by a State valid or dispense with the constitutional prohibition.

Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 724.

The Confederate States of America

By reason of this clause the confederation formed by Virginia and other States, called the Confederate States of America, could not be recognized as having any legal existence.

Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 183.

Lamar v. Micou, 112 U. S. 476.

Sec. 10.-Powers Denied to States.

Cl. 1.-Treaties

The States had no right to secede from the Union, and at no time were they out of the Union. Their attempt to separate themselves from the Union did not destroy their identity as States nor free them from the binding force of the United States Constitution; their rights under the Constitution were suspended, not destroyed; but their constitutional duties and obligations remained the same.

White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 651.
Keith v. Clark, 97 U. S. 461.

Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 725.

Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U. S. 418.

Taylor v. Thomas, 22 Wall. 490.

For other cases concerning the Confederate States of America see

Mauran v. Alliance Ins. Co., 6 Wall. 13.

White v. Cannon, 6 Wall. 450.

Hickman v. Jones, 9 Wall. 200.

Dewing v. Perdicaries, 96 U. S. 195.

Sprott v. U. S., 20 Wall. 464.

U. S. v. Koehler, 9 Wall. 86.

Thorington v. Smith, 8 Wall. 10.

Ford v. Surget, 97 U. S. 605.

Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 253.
Hanauer v. Woodruff, 15 Wall. 442.

Hanauer v. Doane, 12 Wall. 345.

Clark v. Keith, 106 U. S. 465.

While the Government of the United States is not bound to recognize as valid any action by a State engaged in rebellion, yet laws were upheld so far as they did not tend to impair the supremacy of the National Government or the constitutional -ights of citizens, for example, statutes necessary for the protection of persons and property; laws for the regulation of business transactions; statutes regulating the creation of corporations; and statutes in aid of railroad corporations.

Horn v. Lockhardt, 17 Wall. 580.
Huntington v. Texas, 16 Wall. 413.
Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 733.

Thomas v. Richmond, 12 Wall. 357.

U. S. v. Insurance Cos., 22 Wall. 103.
Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 225.

Letters of Marque and Reprisal

To grant letters of marque and reprisal would lead directly to war, the power of declaring which is expressly given to Congress.

Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 249.

No State shall * ** emit bills of credit

In General

This clause of the Constitution first came before the Supreme Court in the case of Craig v. Missouri (4 Pet. 425), in which it was held that the State of Missouri could not issue the so-called

Sec. 10.-Powers Denied to States

Cl. 1-Bills of Credit

"certificates of indebtedness" in issue in that case, and the court said:

Bills of credit signify a paper medium, intended to circulate between individuals, and between Government and individuals, for the ordinary purposes of society. Such a medium has been always liable to considerable fluctuation. Its value is continually changing, and these changes, often great and sudden, expose individuals to immense loss, are the sources of ruinous speculations, and destroy all confidence between man and man. To cut up this mischief by the roots, a mischief which was felt through the United States, and which deeply affected the interest and prosperity of all, the people declared in their Constitution that no State should emit bills of credit. If the prohibition means anything, if the words are not empty sounds, it must comprehend the emission of any paper medium by a State government for the purpose of common circulation.

State Bank Issues

Bills issued by State banks are not bills of credit, although the State guarantees their payment. The fact that the State is the sole stockholder in the bank, whose officers are elected by the State legislature, is immaterial; a State, by becoming interested with others in a corporation, or by acquiring all the capital stock, does not impart to the corporation any of its attributes of sovereignty.

Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 318.

Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 318.

Darrington v. Bank of Alabama, 13 How. 16.

See also

Wesley v. Eells, 177 U. S. 370.

Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 552.

Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. 81.

Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 232.

To come within the prohibition a bill must be issued by a State, on its faith and credit, and be designed to circulate as money; but this clause does not forbid the States to execute instruments binding themselves to pay money at a future day for services rendered or for money borrowed.

Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 318.

Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet. 433.

See also

Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 270.

Chaffin v. Taylor, 116 U. S. 567.

Woodruff v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 299.

Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 83.

Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 205.

Byrne v. Missouri, 8 Pet. 40.

Power of Congress to Emit Bills of Credit

The several States are prohibited from emitting bills of credit, but no intention can be inferred from this to deny to Congress this power.

Legal Tender Case, 110 U. S. 446.
Barings v. Dabney, 19 Wall. 10.

Hagood v. Southern, 117 U. S. 52.

Sec. 10.-Powers Denied to States

Cl. 1.-Coinage and Tender

No State shall coin money; or make anything but gold and silver

coin a tender in payment of debts

In General

The act of coining money, being prohibited, can not be done by
a State, either directly or indirectly. The term "money" means
gold, silver, and copper coins, and to "coin money" is to mold
into form a metallic substance of intrinsic value. The power to
coin money was denied to the States and vested in Congress in
order to create and preserve the uniformity and purity of a stand-
ard value, and to prevent the irregularities and confusion inci-
dent to different views of policy on the part of the several States
Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 318.
Maynard v. Newman, 1 Nev. 271.
Griswold v. Hepburn, 63 Ky. 20.
U. S. v. Marigold, 9 How. 567.
Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 606.
Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 206.

U. S. Bank v. Bank of Georgia, 10 Wheat. 347.
Paup v. Drew, 10 How. 217.

Necessity for Uniformity of Standard

The clause declares that "no State shall coin money, emit bills of credit, make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts." These prohibitions, associated with the powers granted to Congress "to coin money, to regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin," most obviously constitutes members of the same family, being upon the same subject and governed by the same policy. This policy was to provide a fixed and uniform standard of value throughout the United States by which the commercial and other dealings between the citizens thereof should be regulated.

Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 265.

See also

Gwin v. Breedlove, 2 How. 38.
Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 552.
Legal Tender Case, 110 U. S. 446.
Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 249.

Griffin v. Thompson, 2 How. 244.

A contract to pay a certain sum of money is legally performed if paid in currency, which is lawful money at the time payment becomes due or is demanded, and therefore act of Congress of February 25, 1862, making Treasury notes a legal tender is valid, although applied to obligations existing before that time.

Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457.

The laws of Oregon provided that "the sheriff shall pay over to the county treasurer the full amount of the State and school taxes in gold and silver coin," and that "the several county treasurers shall pay over to the State treasurer the State tax in gold and silver coin." It is certainly a legitimate, if not a neces

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