Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 473. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 385. Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 699. Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate Ouachita, etc., Packet Co. v. Aiken, 121 U. S. 444. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610. A regulation of interstate commerce which would be valid if rested upon the common law of the State is no less valid because made by a State statute. Western Union v. Commercial Milling Co., 218 U. S. 406. Any act of a State interfering in any way with the free traffic between citizens of different States in any article of commerce is an attempted regulation of such commerce and an invasion of the power exclusively conferred upon Congress, whose nonaction with respect to any particular commodity is a declaration of its purpose that the commerce therein shall be free. Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313. Internal commerce.-A State has power to regulate its internal commerce unless what is done amounts to a regulation of interstate and foreign commerce. Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U S. 307. Peik v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 94 U. S. 164. Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283. Covington, etc., Brdg. Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 209. Western Union v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Knight, 192 U. S. 27. The exemption of interstate and foreign commerce from State regulation does not prevent a State from taxing the property of those engaged in such commerce located within the State as the property of other citizens is taxed, nor from regulating matters of local concern which may incidentally affect commerce, such as wharfage, pilotage, and the like. Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S. 649. The effect on interstate commerce of requiring under State authority that an interstate carrier move local freight between private spurs in the same city is so indirect that it can not be deemed to deprive the carrier of rights secured by the commerce clause. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Higdon, 234 U. S. 592. Any State statute which, in its direct result, regulates the interstate transportation of a single individual carrier violates the commerce clause. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Eubank, 184 U. S. 27. U. S. v. Delaware & H. Co., 213 U. S. 366. Hampton v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 227 U. S. 456. Quarantine and health laws.-In giving the commercial power to Congress the States did not part with that power of selfpreservation which must be inherent in every organized community. They may guard against the introduction of anything Sec. 8.-- Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate which may corrupt the morals or endanger the health or lives of their citizens. Quarantine or health laws have been passed by the States, and regulations of police made, for their protection and welfare. Passenger Cases, 7 How. 400. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. 21. Compagnie Francaise, etc., v. Louisiana, 186 U. S. 385. Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 151. Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U. S. 251. Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 471. Kimmish v. Ball, 129 U. S. 220. Rasmussen v. Idaho, 181 U. S. 198. Smith v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 181 U. S. 248. Peete v. Morgan, 19 Wall. 581. The States may provide by law suitable measures to prevent the introduction into the States of articles of trade which, on account of their existing condition, will bring in and spread disease, for such articles are not merchantable, and are not legitimate subjects of trade and commerce. Bowman v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 125 U. S. 465. In Cook v. Marshall County (196 U. S. 272) it was said that the commerce clause was adopted that all the States might have the benefit of the duties collected at the maritime ports, and to relieve them from the embarrassing restrictions imposed on the internal commerce of the country, but the same policy which authorizes the use of this power as a shield to protect commerce from the vexatious interference of the States forbids its employment as a sword to assail measures designed to promote the public health, morals, and comfort. State and Municipal Legislation Affecting Commerce. Adoption of construction given by State courts.-A construction or meaning attributed to the terms of a State statute by the courts of such State will, of course, be adopted by this court when called upon to decide questions arising under such legislation. New York, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 158 U. S. 431. Gatewood v. North Carolina, 203 U. S. 531. Armour Packing Co. v. Lacy, 200 U. S. 226. Machinery Co. v. Gage, 100 U. S. 676. Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485. Peik v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 94 U. S. 178. Olsen v. Smith, 195 U. S. 341. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 42. Constraints of commerce.-No State can endow any of its corporations or any combination of its citizens with authority to Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate restrain interstate or international commerce or to disobey the national will as manifested in legal enactments of Congress. Northern Securities Co. v. U. S., 193 U. S. 350. Evansville Brew. Assn. v. Excise Commission, 225 Fed. 204. Discrimination against foreign products.-Any local regulation which, in terms or by its necessary operation, denies to owners of articles of commerce in other States the right to compete in the markets of the State upon terms of equality with the owners of like articles within the State, "is, when applied to the people and products or industries of other States, a direct burden upon commerce among the States and therefore void." Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 82. Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 351. The specification of a particular asphalt for a municipal improvement, the asphalt being the product of a foreign country and there being other deposits in other States within the United States from which suitable asphalt could be had, is not an interference with, and a regulation of, interstate commerce, in violation of the exclusive right of Congress. Field v. Barber, etc., Co., 194 U. S. 622. Inspection laws.-This provision does not prohibit a State from establishing inspection, quarantine, health, and other regulations to govern the ports of the State. Foster v. New Orleans, 94 U. S. 246. Red "C" Oil Co. v. North Carolina, 222 U. S. 380. Arbuckle v. Blackburn, 191 U. S. 414. Pittsburg, etc., Co. v. Louisiana, 156 U. S. 597. Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501. Vance v. Vandercook Co., 170 U. S. 455. Turner v. Maryland, 107 U. S. 55. Standard, etc., Co. v. Wright, 225 U. S. 540. Hinson v. Lott, 8 Wall. 148. Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58. Pabst Brewing Co. v. Crenshaw, 198 U. S. 17. Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio, 236 U. S. 230. It is competent for a State to enact a statute providing for the inspection of fertilizing materials in order to prevent the practice of imposition on the people of the State, and to provide for the charge of a certain price per ton merely to defray the cost of such inspection. Patapsco Guano Co. v. North Carolina, 171 U. S. 345. Pure Oil Co. v. Minnesota, 248 U. S. 158. Standard Oil Co. v. Graves, 249 U. S. 389. 1 See also Art. I, sec. 10, cl. 2, p. 364. Sec. 8-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate Railroads and express companies-In general.-Until Congress acts in reference to the relations of the railroad companies to interstate commerce, it is within the power of the State to regulate its affairs, so far as they are of domestic concern. Peik v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 94 U. S. 164. New York, etc., R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628. Erb v. Morasch, 177 U. S. 584. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U. S. 559. Where a railroad extends through several States and is incorporated in each, it is, as far as concerns the regulation of its business within the State, a domestic corporation; and the establishment of a board of railroad commissioners with power to regulate traffic, fix charges, and prevent discriminations, but prohibited from interfering with charges for transportation of persons or property interstate, is not invalid as being a regulation of interstate commerce. Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 307. Consolidation of railroads.-A State law prohibiting the consolidation of parallel and competing roads does not conflict with the commerce clause. Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Mississippi, 210 U. S. 187. Contracts of carriage.-A statute providing that "when a common carrier accepts for transportation anything directed to a point of destination beyond the terminus of his own line or route, he shall be deemed thereby to assume an obligation for its safe carriage to such point of destination, unless at the time of such acceptance such carrier be released or exempted from such liability by contract in writing signed by the owner or his agent; and although there be such contract in writing, if such thing be lost or injured, such common carrier shall himself be liable therefor, unless, within a reasonable time after the demand made, he shall give satisfactory proof to the consignor that the loss or injury did not occur while the thing was in his charge," does not attempt to substantially regulate or control contracts as to interstate shipments, but simply establishes a rule of evidence ordaining the character of proof by which a carrier may show that, although it received goods for transportation beyond its own line, nevertheless, by agreement, its liability was limited to its own line. Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Patterson Tob. Co., 169 U. S. 312. Solicitation of freight.-A State statute which provides that any foreign corporation having an agent in the State for the solicitation of freight and passenger traffic over lines outside the State may be served with summons by delivering a copy thereof Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate to such agent imposes an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce and is void under this clause as applied to an action brought against a railroad company which neither owns nor operates a railroad within the State by a plaintiff who does not and did not reside there, upon a cause of action which arose elsewhere. Davis v. Farmers' Cooperative Co., 262 U. S. 312. Effect of Carmack amendment.-The so-called Carmack amendment to the act to regulate commerce supersedes State statutes invalidating contracts limiting recovery for loss or injury to goods in transportation to an agreed or declared value. Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Harold, 241 U. S. 371. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Cramer, 232 U. S. 490. Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Miller, 226 U. S. 513. The Carmack amendment also supersedes State statutes invalidating a stipulation in a shipping contract limiting the time within which an action may be brought after damages sustained. Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Harriman, 227 U. S. 657. Rates of transportation.—(a) Power of States to prescribe intrastate rates.-A State has power to limit the amount of charges by railroad companies for the transportation of persons and property within its own jurisdiction, unless what is done amounts to a regulation of interstate or foreign commerce. Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 307. A railroad corporation organized under the laws of the United States is subject to the control of the State in all matters of taxation, rates for transportation, and other police regulations when there is nothing in the act of Congress creating it which indicates an intention on the part of Congress to remove it in all its operations from the control of the State, and there is nothing prescribed by State statute which will disable the corporation from discharging all the duties and exercising all the powers conferred by Congress. Reagan v. Mercantile Trust Co., 154 U. S. 416. Congress has not interfered with the power of the States to regulate intrastate rates in the interstate commerce act and its amendments. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352. Ohio v. Worthington, 225 U. S. 101. But see Houston, etc., R. Co. v. U. S. (234 U. S. 342), in which it was held that State-made rates must yield where they conflict with interstate rates and are a burden to interstate commerce. |