Sec. &-Powers of Congress Wabash R. Co. v. Hayes, 234 U. S. 86. Cl. 3.-Commerce New York Central R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147. North Carolina R. Co. v. Lee, 260 U. S. 16. Over Telegraphs and Telephones A telegraph company occupies the same relation to commerce as a carrier of messages that a railroad company does as a carrier of goods. Both companies are instruments of commerce, and their business is commerce itself. They do their transportation in different ways, and their liabilities are in some respects different, but they are both indispensable to those engaged to any considerable extent in commercial pursuits. A State can not grant the exclusive right to maintain telegraph lines so as to exclude from its limits a corporation organized under an act of Congress. The subject of the hours of labor of employees of interstate railways using the telegraph or telephone in connection with trains is so far removed from State legislation by the hours of service act as to invalidate a State law on the same subject. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 464. Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 1. Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S. 646. Essex v. New England Tel. Co., 239 U. S. 313. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 195 U. S. 540. Erie R. Co. v. New York, 233 U. S. 671. Delegation of Power To District of Columbia Congress can not delegate to the District of Columbia power to regulate commerce between the District and the States. Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141. To Interstate Commerce Commission Congress has authority under its sovereign and exclusive power to regulate commerce, to create a commission for the purpose of supervising, investigating, and reporting upon matters or complaints connected with or growing out of interstate and foregn commerce. The powers and duties of the commission are prescribed by Congress, and it performs for the Federal Government, in respect to that commerce committed by the Constitution to the exclusive care and jurisdiction of Congress, the same functions which State commissioners exercise in respect to local or intrastate commerce, over which the States appointing them have exclusive control. Their validity in their respective spheres of operation stands upon the same footing. Kentucky, etc., Brdg. Co. v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 37 Fed. 567. U. S. v. Great Northern R. Co., 157 Fed. 288. Sec. 8.--Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce As to the effect of the delegation of power to the Interstate Commerce Commission, see Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Larabee (211 U. S. 612), in which it was said that Congress has already acted, has created the Interstate Commerce Commision, and given to it a large measure of control over interstate commerce. But the fact that Congress has entrusted power to that commission does not, in the absence of action by it, change the rule which existed prior to the creation of the commission. Congress could always regulate interstate commerce, and could make specific provisions in reference thereto, and yet this has not been held to interfere with the power of the State in these incidental matters. A mere delegation by Congress to the commission of a like power has no greater effect, and does not of itself disturb the authority of the State. It is not contended that the commission has taken any action in respect to the particular matters involved. It may never do so, and no one can in advance anticipate what it will do when it acts. Until then the authority of the State in merely incidental matters remains undisturbed. See also Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Harris, 234 U. S. 412. The powers and duties of the commission have been greatly enlarged, since the above decisions, by amendments to the act to regulate commerce, and by the transportation act, q. v. See also "Interstate Commerce" (4 Fed. Stat. Ann. [2d ed.] p. 331). The part of the act of Congress of August 24, 1912, known as the Panama Canal act, especially section 11, which amends section 5 of the interstate commerce act of 1887, and which, in effect, provides that even if the Interstate Commerce Commission shall find that competition, or the possibility of competition, exists between a particular carrier by water under common control, the service by water may still be continued if the commission shall be of opinion that the convenience and commerce of the people will be promoted thereby, is not invalid as delegating a legislative function to the commission. Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. U. S., 234 Fed. 682. To States In general. It is within the power of Congress to permit the exercise of the power to regulate interstate commerce by the States. In sections 4278 and 4279 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, relating to nitroglycerine and other explosives, Congress gives directly to any State, Territory, District, city, or town the right to prohibit the introduction of such substances into its limits for sale, use, or consumption therein. Ex parte Jervey, 66 Fed. 960. Imported liquors. In pursuance of the decision in Leisy v. Hardin (135 U. S. 100), and in recognition of the conditions in certain localities, Congress provided, in the act of August 8, 1890 (26 Stat. 313): That all fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquors or liquids transported into any State or Territory or remaining therein for use, consumption, sale, or storage therein shall, upon arrival in such State or See also "Intoxicating Liquors," pp. 174, 605, 685, 734, and Amendment 18, p. 747. Sec. 8.--Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce Territory, be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such State or Territory enacted in the exercise of its police powers to the same extent and in the same manner as though such liquids or liquors had been produced in such State or Territory, and shall not be exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original packages or otherwise. The act cited above was held to be a valid and constitutional exercise of the legislative power conferred upon Congress in In re Rahrer (140 U. S. 561), in which the court said: Congress has not attempted to delegate the power to regulate commerce, or to exercise any power reserved to the States, or to grant a power not possessed by the States, or to adopt State laws. It has taken its own course and made its own regulation, applying to these subjects of interstate commerce one common rule, whose uniformity is not affected by variations in State laws in dealing with such property. * * No reason is perceived why, if Congress chooses to provide that certain designated subjects of interstate commerce shall be governed by a rule which divests them of that character at an earlier period of time than would otherwise be the case, it is not within its competency to do so. See also Laughter v. M'Lain, 229 Fed. 280. Evansville Brewing Assn. v. Excise Commrs., 225 Fed. 204. A State may prohibit the shipment into the State to agents of the shipper of intoxicating liquors for the purpose of being stored and sold therein in original packages. Vance v. Vandercook Co. (170 U. S. 451), in which the court said: But the weight of the contention is overcome when it is considered that the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution guarantees the right to ship merchandise from one State into another and protects it until the termination of the shipment by delivery at the place of consignment; and this right is wholly unaffected by the act of Congress which allows State authority to attach to the original package before sale but only after delivery. See also Pabst Brewg. Co. v. Crenshaw, 198 U. S. 17. Phillips v. Mobile, 208 U. S. 472. Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Cook Brewg. Co., 223 U. S. 70. Adams Exp. Co. v. Kentucky, 214 U. S. 218; 238 U. S. 190; 206 U. S. 129. Delamater v. South Dakota, 205 U. S. 93. Kirmeyer v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 568. Foppiano v. Speed, 199 U. S. 501. The Webb-Kenyon Act of March 1, 1913, which in substance prohibits the shipment or transportation from one State to another of intoxicating liquors in violation of any law of such State, is a valid exercise of the power of Congress. Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. R. Co., 242 U. S. 326. Commerce with Foreign Nations In General The power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, being an enumerated power, is complete in itself, acknowledging no Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Foreign limitations except those prescribed in the Constitution, and authorizing Congress, in the exercise of the police power, to exclude any particular goods from importation. As was said in the State Tonnage Tax Cases (12 Wall. 214): It is well settled law that the word "commerce," as used in the Constitution, comprehends navigation, and that it extends to every species of commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign nations and to all commerce in the several States, except such as is completely internal. See also Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat, 419. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470. Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 574. Commerce with foreign nations means trade and intercourse. It means commercial intercourse between nations and parts of nations in all its branches. Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 270. U. S. v. Holliday, 3 Wall. 417. The Brig Wilson v. U. S., 1 Brock. (U. S.) 423. Philadelphia, etc., S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326. Shipment of freight under local bill of lading from interior point in Louisiana to New Orleans, to be delivered to the shipper's or consignee's order, but intended for export, held foreign commerce, governed as to the intrastate transportation in Louisiana by the tariffs on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission. Louisiana v. Texas, etc., R. Co., 229 U. S. 336. Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co., 227 U. S. 111. Foreign Vessels Entering United States Ports Congress may unquestionably, under the commerce clause, prohibit any foreign ship from entering our ports, which, in its construction or equipment, uses any improvement patented in this country, or may prescribe the terms and regulations upon which such vessel shall be allowed to enter. Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 198. The objection that a vessel owned, possessed, manned, and operated by a foreign State, but engaged in ordinary commerce under charter to a private trader, is immune to libel for services and supplies, can not be raised by her master who, although a naval officer is not functioning as such, and is not shown to have authority to represent his sovereign in making the objection. The "Gul Djemal," 264 U. S. 90. Exclusion of Aliens Under this clause Congress has full power over the exclusion of aliens. It may exclude some and admit others, and has the right to make that exclusion effective by punishing those who assist in introducing aliens in violation of its prohibition. Lees v. U. S., 150 U. S. 480. Lem Moon Sing v. U. S., 158 U. S. 547. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Lapina v. Williams, 232 U. S. 78. Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585. Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 97. Cl. 3.-Commerce-Foreign The right to exclude undesirable persons from coming to the United States is as fundamental as the right to receive desirable ones. The Nation can protect itself as well as benefit itself. The power of excluding foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the Government as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when in its judgment the interests of the country require it, cannot be surrendered by the treatymaking power. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S. 581. On the grounds of public policy and by congressional enactment, the United States can prevent aliens or classes of aliens from landing within its borders, and can also expel aliens from the territory of the United States, and can, that such decree may be made effectual, devolve the power and duty of identifying and arresting persons embraced in such decree, and causing their deportation, upon the executive or subordinate officers of the Government. But when Congress chooses to exercise such a policy by subjecting the persons of those whom it would exclude from the United States to infamous punishment at hard labor, or by confiscating their property, such legislation should provide for a judicial trial in order to be constitutional. Wong Wing v. U. S., 163 U. S. 228. Fong Yue Ting v. U. S., 149 U. S. 698. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457. This power is vested in the National Government, to which the Constitution has committed the entire control of international relations, in peace as well as in war. It belongs to the political department of the Government and may be exercised either through treaties or through Congress. Nishimura Ekiu v. U. S., 142 U. S. 651. This power is well established, whether it be based on the inherent power of sovereignty or upon the commerce clause. Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279. But Congress may not control all the dealings of citizens with resident aliens. Keller v. U. S., 213 U. S. 138. Immigration State law requiring masters of vessels arriving at New York to make report of the names, etc., of foreign passengers, etc., is not an interference with foreign commerce. New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102. |