49. INTOXICATING LIQUORS-Sale. — A delivery of beer upon an agreement, express or implied, that other beer would be returned in payment for it, constitutes a sale, within the meaning of Pub. St. Mass. ch. 100, forbidding the sale of intoxicating liquors without a license. Commonwealth v. Adams, Mass., 23 N. E. Rep. 53. 50 INTOXICATING LIQUORS - Local Option. The act entitled "An act to further provide against the evils resulting from the traffic in intoxicating liquors by local option in any township in the State of Ohio," passed March 3, 1888, is not in conflict with the constitution, and is a valid law.-Gordon v. State, Ohio, 23 N. E. Rep. 63.

56. JUDGMENT-Scire Facias. Where defendant appeals from a judgment, and pending the appeal he dies, and the judgment is affirmed without the court's having notice of his death, the supreme court will not revive the action, on scire facias, after it is barred by the statute of limitations against the deceased's administrator, the judgment not being void on its face, and the case having ceased to be pending since the rendering of the judgment.- Outlaw v. Cheny, Tenn., 12 S. W. Rep. 725.

57. LANDLORD'S LIEN-Mortgage. - A rented of B and C certain land at two doilars per acre, on which to sow winter wheat, the rent to be paid in cash. It was provided in the lease that the amount due for rent should be a lien on the crop, but the lease was not recorded. Afterwards the lessee executed a chattel mortgage on the crop to one who had no notice of the conditions of the lease: Held, that the lien of the mortgagee was superior to that of the lessor.- Gandy v. Dewey, Neb., 44 N. W. Rep. 106.

58. LANDLORD AND TENANT.-The consent of the landlord to the removal and sale of the tenant's crop is a valid defense to a landlord's attachment. Webb v. Arnold, Ark., 12 S. W. Rep. 707.

62. MASTER AND SERVANT-Judicial Notice.-In an ac tion against a railroad company for personal injury, by a breakman who had struck his head against something while sitting on top of a box-car, going through a tunnel, the negligence charged was in not giving plaintiff noiice of a brick arch in the tunnel which reduced its height to 4 feet 7 inches above the top of the car: Held, that a judgment for plaintiff would be reversed, as the court would take judicial notice that a man could not strike his head against an obstruction that distance above where he was sitting unless he was 9 feet high, and that no man ever was known to be 9 feet high.-Hunter v. New York, etc. Ry. Co., N. Y., 23 N. E. Rep. 9.

63. MASTER AND SERVANT - Negligence. When the rules of a railroad company require baggage masters not to leave their car except when necessary, and then only for as short a time as possible, and forbid their riding on the engine, the company is not liable for injuries sustained by a baggage-master while riding on the engine, though the injury was caused by the negligence of an employee of the company.— Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Wilson, Tenn., 12 S. W. Rep. 720.

64. MECHANICS' LIENS-Attachment.-Under the mechanics' lien law of 1885, providing that the liens "shall be enforced by attachment in manner provided by law,” the reference is to the general attachment law of the State, and not to attachments authorized in special cases. Strong v. Lake, etc. Assn., Fla., 6 South. Rep. 882. 65. MORTGAGES-Record.-A duly recorded mortgage on the interest of a vendee holding a bond for title is valid as against the vendor to whom the land is afterwards surrendered, and his subsequent vendee, though neither had actual knowledge of it.-Davis v. Davis, Ala., 6 South. Rep. 908.

66. MORTGAGE-Subrogation.-One who contracts to sell land, subject to a mortgage, but afterwards pays, the same, and has it satisfied of record, is entitled, when sued for specific performance, to be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee.-Arnold v. Green, N. Y., 23 N. E. Rep. 1.

68. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Gas Companies. · A gas company in a city or village, chartered by an act the legislature passed before the adoption of the present constitution of the State, is subject to the provisions of an ordinance, regulating the price of gas adopted by the council of the city or village, under the authority conferred by section 2478, Rev. St. where the right to fix its own prices is not expressly conferred on the company by the terms of its charter. City of Zanesville Gas Light Co., Ohio, 23 N. E. Rep. 55. 69. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Defective Streets.Under Rev. St. Ohio, § 2640, relating to municipal corporations, and providing that the council shall have the care, supervision, and control of public highways, streets, etc., within the corporation, and shall cause the same to be kept open and in repair and free from nui. sance, where a city has granted permits for the occupation of part of a street for the purpose of depositing building materials, requiring the locality to be indicated by proper lights during the night, its failure to exercise

reasonable diligence in preventing such obstruction as may be dangerous to passers-by will render it liable for any damages that may be sustained by reason of the obstruction.-City of Cleveland v. King, U. S. S. C., 10 S. C. Rep. 90.

70. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - Bonds Sureties. Sureties contract for the conduct of their principal. This contract is not discharged or released by mere laches unaccompanied by fraud.-Mayor v. Stout, N. J., 18 Atl. Rep. 943.

71. MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE - Policemen. Act Cal. April 1, 1878, § 2 (St. Cal. 1877-78, p. 879), directed the treasurer of the city and county to "retain from the pay of each police officer the sum of two dollars per month, to be paid into a fund to be known as the 'Police Life and Health Insurance Fund,'" of which $1,000 was to be paid to the personal representative of any member of the police force upon his death. Held, that as the police officer never received the amount so retained, nor had any power of disposition over the same, he had no property rights in such fund, which was in effect created by the State, until the happening of the contingency upon which the statute provided that part of it should be paid to him, or his representative, and until that time the fund was entirely at the disposal of the State.-Pennie v. Reis, U. S. S. C., 10 S. C. Rep. 149.

72. MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE.-A mutual benefit certificate was payable to insured's wife, E, or to such other person as might be entitled to the insurance. The by-laws of the association declared that its object was to afford financial aid to the widows, orphans, and heirs of deceased members, or to such other person as might be designated by the insured member, and that on the death of a member his widow or designated heirs should receive the insurance. After the death of E, the beneficiary named in the certificate, the insured married plaintiff, but made no change as to the beneficiary. Held that, on the death of insured, plaintiff, and not the children of E, was entitled to the insurance. Riley, Wis., 44 N. W. Rep. 113.

Riley v.

73. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-Pleading -In an action on a promissory note, an answer setting up the special plea of non est factum, and admitting the signing, but alleging certain subsequent unauthorized alterations, is not demurrable, as containing at the same time an admission and a denial of the execution of the note.Willfong v. Schafer, Ind., 23 N. E. Rep. 91.

74. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-Bona Fide Purchaser. -An action cannot be maintained by an indorgee with knowledge, on notes given for the purchase price of a fertilizer sold in violation of Code Ala. 1886, §§ 4153, 4154, which makes it a penal offense to sell a fertilizer without first submitting it to the commisioner of agriculture, and having the parcels tagged, according to law. Johnson v. Hanover Nat. Bank, Ala., 6 South. Rep. 909. 75. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS Indorsers. - An indorser who voluntarily pays a note from which he has been discharged by the negligence of a bank which held it for collection, in not making presentment for pay. ment until a month after its maturity, during which time the makers had become insolvent, cannot recover the amount from the bank.-Oil- Well Supply Co. v. Exchange Nat. Bank, Penn., 18 Atl. Rep. 935.

76. OFFICERS-Illegal Fees. While an officer taking illegal fees is liable to the full penalty of the law, yet the statute, being highly penal in its nature, will not be extended, by construction or implication, beyond the clear import of its language.-Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Bohman, Neb., 44 N. W. Rep. 111.

77. OFFICERS- Assessor. - An assessor who fails to take the general oath of office required by the law is an officer de facto, and his acts are valid when questioned collaterally. Murphy v. Sheppard, Ark., 12 S. W. Rep.

707.

78. OFFICER Qualification.-Where one who has assumed to interfere with the person or property of an. other attempts to justify his act, when sued therefor, on the ground that it was properly done by him as a

public officer, it is for him to show, not merely that he was an officer de facto, but that he was duly and legally qualified to act as such.-Short v. Symmes, Mass., 23 N. E. Rep. 42.

79. PARTIES-Administratrix.-The heirs of a co-tenant of property, who died after the construction of an elevated railroad, the maintenance of which he sought to be enjoined, have "an interest in the subject of the action," within the Code Civil Proc. N. Y. § 446, and are necessary parties in an action to restrain the operation and maintenance of the road, and for damages; and the failure to join them would be a defect available by demurrer.-Shepard v. Manhattan Ry. Co., N. Y., 23 N. E. Rep. 30.

80. PARTITION-Sale.-A sale in partition will not be vacated for want of compliance with a modified order directing payment of the purchase money to a depositary instead of the referee, of which neither the purchaser nor the depositary had notice, where it appears that the money was paid to the referee with the consent of the attorneys of all the parties Interested, and after the transaction had been closed up the modified order was set aside on consent of all the parties.-Foster v. Roche, N. Y., 23. N. E. Rep. 32.

81. PARTITION-Receivers.-On motion for the appointment of a receiver of rents and profits pending an action for partition of real estate, a party defendant served with notice of the motion, and appearing, cannot object that other parties are not brought in.-Rapp v. Roehling, Ind., 23 N. E. Rep. 68.

82. PARTNERSHIP-What Constitutes.- An agreement stating that a firm composed of two members has "taken into partnership" a third person, and providing that their entire stock of merchandise shall be turned over to him, and sold under his supervision, in a specified new firm name; that he shall have entire control of the business, and shall open "a new set of books," showing the business of the "new concern;" that the merchandise turned over shall constitute the capital stock; that the profits and losses shall be shared among all three in certain proportions; and that "the partnership only pertains to that of merchandising, and has no connection" with outside business of the two original partners -constitutes the third a joint owner, as a partner, of the stock of merchandise, though he put neither goods nor money into the concern.-Paul v. Cullum, U. S. S. C., 10 S. C. Rep. 151.

83. PARTNERSHIP- Notice. Defendants' attorney, in negotiating a compromise of a debt due plaintiffs, stated that defendants' assets were only sufficient to pay 60 per cent. of their indebtedness, and that in regard to the liability of one of defendants, supposed to be a special partner in the firm, for the debts of the firm, he was uninformed, but that plaintiffs might investigate the matter for themselves: Held, that this suggestion was sufficient to put plaintiffs upon inquiry as to such partner's liability. Cleveland v. Richardson, U. S. S. C., 10 S. C. Rep. 100.

84. PLEADING-Uncertainty. In an action for malpractice a complaint is not demurrable for failure of plaintiff to set forth in what particular defendant was negligent in the performance of his duties as physician and surgeon, as the remedy for uncertainty is by motion to make more specific.-De Hart v. Etnire, Ind., 23 N. E. Rep. 77.

85. PLEADING-Money Had and Received.-In an action for money collected by defendant as agent for, and for the use and benefit of, the plaintiff, a general denial will not admit evidence of matter in discharge of the duty to pay the money incurred by collecting the money as agent for plaintiff. — Jackson v. Kansas City Packing Co., Minn., 44 N. W. Rep. 127. 86. PRACTICE IN CIVIL CASES Dismissal. After the introduction of the testimony of the plaintiff to a jury impaneled to try a cause, the court has no authority to dismiss the case and discharge the jury without a verdict upon the merits.-Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Richardson, Neb., 44 N. W. Rep. 103.

87. PRACTICE IN CIVIL CASES-Remittitur. Where a remittitur does not appear on the record to have been made in open court, as required by statute, the court has power at the same term, before a writ of error is sued out, to amend the record according to the fact.— Pacific Exp. Co. v. Malin, U. S. S. C., 10 S. C. Rep. 166.

88. PRINCIPAL AND SURITY.-The obligations of a surety are stricti juris, and must be rigidly construed. A surety cannot be subjected to more onerous conditions than the principal. A surety may set up effectually a defense of payment which his principal, if sued, could have successfully pleaded. Stewart v. Levis, La., 6 South. Rep. 898.

89. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.-One, who, after refusing to sell goods to defendants, sells them on credit to a third person, who represents that he is buying for himself, can, on discovering that defendants directed the actions of the purchase, and that the goods were purchased for, and delivered to, them, hold them liable for the unpaid purchase money, as undisclosed princi. pals.-Kayton v. Barnett, N. Y., 23 N. E. Rep. 24.

90. QUIETING TITLE. A complaint averring that plaintiff ownes the fee in certain land; that defendants claims title thereto; and that he has no interest in the land-is one to quiet title, though it avers that plaintiff has been damaged by defendant's false statement.Bisel v. Tucker, Ind., 23 N. E. Rep. 81.

91. QUO WARRANTO-Appeal.-Where in quo warranto proceedings the chancellor decrees against defendants, and rules the election under which they claim title to their offices void upon all the grounds alleged in the bill, except the voting of non-residents, and the defend. ants do not appeal, the complainants cannot appeal, and have the right of said voters adjudged, because the question may arise at some future election.-State v. Wagoner, Tenn., 12 S. W. Rep. 721.

92. RAILROAD COMPANY-Right of Way.-A right of way through land, about midway between stations two or three miles distant, was granted by a deed which provided that if "it should cease to be used and operated as a railroad this release shall cease to be operative, and the right of way granted thereunder shall terminate." The grantee consolidated with a company whose track ran between the stations referred to by a different route, and thereafter the grantee's track was used only for storing cars: Held, that the right of way was forfeited.-Hickox v. Chicago & C. S. Ry. Co., Mich., 44 N. W. Rep. 143.

93. RAILROAD COMPANIES-Negligence-Trespassers.In the absence of statutory requirements, the engineer of a railroad company is under no obligation to blow the whisle on approaching villiages, or other collections of houses, adjacent to the track.—Carrington v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., Ala., 6 South. Rep. 910. 94. RECORD-Notice. The record of a contract to convey real estate, there being nothing of record to show that it had been enforced or performed, or the right to enforce it extended. ceases to be notice of the vendee's rights under it, or of anything done pursuant to it, when, according to the record, the statute of limitations has barred the right to enforce it; and any one seeing the record may in such case assume that the contract was abandoned by the parties interested in it. -Byers v. Orensstein, Minn., 44 N. W. Rep. 131.

95. SALE-Parol Evidence.- A written order for goods to be sent to the subscriber, considered as not being in itself a contract for the purchase of the goods, and hence as not precluding parol proof going to show that the goods, which were subsequently sent to the subscriber, were not sent merely upon that order, but pursuant to a contract for the sale of the goods to other parties. Boynton Furnace Co. v. Clark, Minn., 44 N. W. Rep. 121.

96. SCHOOL DISTRICTS-Villages.- A village constituting a part of an independent school-district is not authorized, at its own election, to withdraw therefrom, and to organize as a separate independent school-district. State v. Independent School-dist., Minn., 44 N. W.

Rep. 120.

97. SHERIFF Fees. An ex-sheriff has no right to arbitrarily fix his own price for the custody of property taken into his possession under attachment during his term of office, and retain possession of the property until his charges are paid, but he should make out his bill, and present it to the proper taxing officer for taxation; or, if his charges are not allowed by statute, he should apply to the court for their allowance, upon motion and notice to the parties interested. -Fletcher v. Morrell, Mich., 44 N. W. Rep. 133.

98. STARE DECISIS.-"Stare decisis" means that when a point has been once settled by judicial decision it forms a precedent for the guidance of courts in similar cases; but precedents may be departed from when necessary to vindicate plain and obvious principles of law, or to remedy a continued injustice. The Madrid, U. S. C. C.

(La.), 40 Fed. Rep. 676.

99. SEDUCTION-Pleading.-In an action for damages for seduction, it is unnecessary to allege in the complaint, in direct terms, that the promises of the defendant were relied on.-McCoy v. Trucks, Ind., 23 N. E. Rep. 93.

100. TENANTS IN COMMON.-Where one tenant in common, under color of title and in good faith, takes possession of the land, believing that he is the sole owner, and makes valuable improvements, he is only accountable to his co-tenant for the fair rental value of the land in the condition in which it was when he took possession.-Hannah v. Carver, Ind., 23 N. E. Rep. 93.

101. VENDOR AND VENDEE― Contract.- Where a contract for the sale of land stipulates that the vendor is "to make a good title and give a general warranty deed," but fails to "make time of the essence" of the contract, a delay of two months in tendering the general warranty deed is not unreasonable and unnecessary, where the vendor did not have the legal title at the time of the contract. Tapp v. Nock, Ky., 12 S. W. Rep. 713.

102. VENDOR AND VENDEE Covenants. Where the vendor, in a contract for the sale of land, agrees to execute a deed "clear of all incumbrances," the vendee is entitled to have a covenant against incumbrances incorporated in the deed. Bryant v. Wilson, Md., 18 Atl. Rep. 916.

103. VENDOR AND VENDEE -Description.-It is not essential to the validity of a contract for the sale and conveyance of real property that the particular tract of land to be conveyed be described with precision, provided the writing furnishes the means, or points out the method, by which, without further agreement of the parties, the description may be ascertained. Burgon v. Cabanne, Minn., 44 N. W. Rep. 118.

104. WILLS-Devise.-A bequest of slaves to testator's daughter "and heirs of her body, or issue," creates an estate tail at common law, and she takes the absolute property in the slaves, under Code Ala. § 1825, providing that every estate in real or personal property in feetail, now or hereafter created, becomes an estate in fee-simple, etc.-Smith v. Greer, Ala., 6 South. Rep. 911.

105. WITNESS - Impeachment. The defendant in a criminal aciion became a witness in his own behalf. Thereupon, in rebuttal, for the purpose of affecting his credibility, the State offered, and, under objection, the court received, record evidence of the conviction of the defendant witness of the crime of assault and battery several years previous: Held, that said record was admissible, under the provisions of § 581 Pen. Code. -State v. Sauer, Minn., 44 N. W. Rep. 115.

106. WITNESS - Impeachment. On a fourth trial, where defendant introduces in evidence the deposition of a deceased witness, a deposition previously made by him in a suit between different parties, and containing statements inconsistent with the former, is not admissible to rebut it, where it has been used on three former trials during the witness' life, in each of which plaintiff cross-examined him, and did not refer to the previously made deposition. Ayers v. Watson, U. S. S. C., 10 S. C. Rep. 116.

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ST. LOUIS, MARCH 7, 1890.

THE Court of Appeal in England has recently, in the case of Re Missouri Steamship Company, expressed strong disapproval of the growing practice of citing American decisions as authorities on that side of the Atlantic. In that case it was laid down that when a contract made in one country, is to be performed in another, it is prima facie to be construed and enforced according to the lex loci contractus; but that the court will look at all the circumstances to ascertain by the law of which country the parties intended the contract to be governed, and will enforce the contract accordingly, unless it should contain stipulations contrary to morality or expressly forbidden by positive law. Lord Justice Fry, however, took occasion to say that he was "glad to find that he was in entire accordance with the law laid down in the American courts," which prompts the London Law Times to remark that there is no doubt that reference to English authorities by American courts, and to American authorities by English courts, are both frequently and beneficial, calling attention, as an instance, of such beneficial use of English authorities, to the case of Norrington v. Wright, 115 U. S. 189, in which the supreme court exhaustively discussed the English cases of Hoare v. Rennic, Simpson v. Crippen and Houck v. Miller, and pointed out that Simpson v. Crippen, in which it was held that a contract to supply some 6,000 tons of coal to be delivered into buyer's wagons in equal monthly quantities for twelve months, was not justifiable cancelled on the ground of the buyer taking only 158 tons in the first month, is bad law. And in the famous case of Readhead v. Midland Railway Company, the then conflicting cases in the American courts, on the point whether or not railway companies are liable to passengers as insurers, will be found examined with very great care by the Exchequer Chamber. "The English Courts," it is there said, "are desirous to treat the American decisions with VOL. 30-No. 10.

must mainly depend on the reasons on which they are founded, we have felt bound to examine the reasons on which this decision" (Alden v. New York Central Railway Co., 12 Smith, 102), "was based, with the result of disagreeing with its principle, and pronouncing against a contract of insurance."

It strikes us that the view taken by the English Court of Appeal, is narrow minded to say the least. In the consideration of close questions of law it would seem that the examination and discussion of adjudicated cases, of course each having its relative weight in proportion to its source and soundness, no matter from where they come, might be made not only with propriety but frequently with good result. Certainly no harm can come of it, and the spectacle of one of the highest courts of England, discouraging the use of imported reason and authority, is unique in the extreme.

We have read with great pleasure the very interesting address of General John McNulty, delivered before the Illinois State Bar Association, on the "Interstate Commerce Law." Few men are as well fitted by experience to speak of the practical workings of that law, and his clear exposition of its operation will help to remove some misconceptions. Most people who regard the effect of the interstate commerce law and the work of the commission created by it in a disinterested spirit, are now substantially agreed that the law has been on the whole a good thing. It has not eradicated the abuses against which it was aimed, but it has rendered some of them less flagrant, and perhaps little more has been expected by those best qualified to judge. There are some amendments which might with good effect be added, and especially one referred to by General McNulty, to provide for interstate carriers engaged exclusively in interstate traffic controlled solely by federal law. The irreconcilable conflict between State and federal authority which is liable every day to arise, renders such an amendment of great importance. There are some who regard the entire interstate commerce law as pernicious in its effects, and

who desire its repeal. Indeed, bills have been introduced in congress, one providing for the repeal of the law as a whole, and the other providing for the repeal of the long and short haul and anti-pooling sections. Whatever may be thought of the proposition to repeal the special sections referred to, it is quite unlikely that a majority of either house will consent to the repeal of the law as a whole.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

THOSE interested in the subject of "pools," "trusts," "combinations," etc., will find an exhaustive discussion of the law pertaining thereto and a thorough collection of the authorities in the case of Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Southern Pacific Ry. Co., 6 South. Rep. 888, decided by the Supreme Court of Louisiana. There it was declared that all contracts which have a tendency to stifle competition, or to create or foster monopolies, with a view to unreasonably increase the market value of commodities, are against public interest, and contrary to public policy; and hence such contracts can confer to the parties thereto no rights which courts of justice can recognize and enforce. Two railroad companies which have each a through and separate line of communication between two given points, are held to be competing companies for all traffic between such points, and an arrangement by which they agree to divide their earnings for traffic between given points, for which they were previously competitors, is against public interest, contrary to public policy, and cannot be judicially enforced. In disposing of such cases, courts will not decree the nullity of the contract sought to be enforced. They simply abstain from dealing with it, or adjudicating any rights arising thereunder, or giving their aid for the division of results, although ascertained, between the parties thereto. The court says:

We have been at great pains, and have devoted long and tedious labor, to examine all the authorities, con. sisting mainly of decisions rendered on the point by courts of last resort in this country, which were submitted to us by counsel in the case, and we reach the conclusion that American jurisprudence has firmly settled the doctrine that all contracts which have a palpable tendency to strifle competition, either in the market value of commodities or in the carriage or transportation of such commodities, are contrary to

public policy, and are therefore incapable of conferring upon the parties thereto any rights which a court of justice can recognize or enforce. A reference to some of the leading and most pointed authorities on the subject may not be out of place in this opinion, notwithstanding its already formidable length.

In the case of Hooker v. Vandewater, 4 Denio, 349, the court had to consider a contract between the proprietors of several lines of canal-boats, who had agreed to establish fixed rates of freight and passage for a certain season, and to divide the net earnings among themselves according to fixed rules. The attempt of one of the contracting parties to enforce the agreement against a recalcitrant member of the combination was discountenanced. True, the contract fell under the ban of a special statute of the State; but the court nevertheless took occasion to sanction the general principle which underlies our conclusions in this case. The court said: "It is a general proposition that an agreement to do an unlawful act cannot be supported at law-that no right ot action can spring out of an illegal contract; and this rule applies, not only when the contract is expressly illegal, but whenever it is opposed to public policy, or founded on an immoral consideration, the maxim being, ex turpi causa non orritur actio."

In the case of Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio, 434, the court refused its aid to enforce the payment of a promissory note growing out of transactions predicated on a similar contract, on the ground that such a contract cannot receive judicial sanction. We cull the following language from that opinion: "Though the branch of the law relating to public policy is liable to be misunderstood and extended beyond its proper dimensions, still it must not on that account be neglected or disparaged. The rule that contracts and agreements are void when contrary to public policy, when properly understood and applied, is one of the great preservative principles of a State." And, referring to the case herein previously quoted, the court said: "That decision being conclusive on the main point in the present case, I might have rested upon that authority alone, if I had not supposed that the occasion called for an opinion as to the legality of such an association upon the principles of the common law."

In Ohio an association of salt manufacturers entered into a combination for the purpose of selling and transporting that commodity. The court refused its aid to enforce its conditions, saying, among other things: "The clear tendency of such an agreement is to establish a monopoly, and to destroy competition in

trade; and, for that reason, on grounds of public policy, courts will not aid in its enforcement. It is no answer to say that competition in the salt trade was not in fact destroyed, or that the price of the commodity was not unreasonably advanced. Courts will not stop to inquire as to the degree of injury inflicted upon the public. It is enough to know that the inevitable tendency of such contracts is injurious to the public." Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666.

The doctrine finds additional support and sanction from the following authorities: Gibbs v. Gas Co., 130 U. S. 408, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 553, in which the court took occasion to set down a rule peculiarly applicable to pooling arrangements between competing railroad companies, which are universally recognized and treated in jurisprudence as quasi public corporations. The learned chief justice, as the organ of the court, said, with great clearness and terseness: "Hence, while it is justly urged that those rules which say that a given contract is against public policy should not be