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50. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-Husband and Wife.When it is clearly proved that a husband assented to his wife's keeping her earnings as her separate prop. erty, a deed to her of land purchased with her earnings will, in the absence of fraud, be upheld as against his subsequent creditors.- Bangs v. Edwards, Ala., 6 South Rep. 764.

51. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE.- The giving of a mort. gage for a larger amount than was loaned thereon, and with a view of covering future loans up to the amount of the mortgage, is not conclusive of fraud, but is open to explanation as to the good or bad faith of the parties to the transaction.-Allen v. Fuget, Kan., 22 Pac. Rep. 725. 52. GRAND JURY-Qualifications. - Although the law may require grand jurors to be registered electors, etc., the fact that one of the grand jurors was illegally regis tered is no ground for quashing an indictment, but is such a defect only as is contemplated by Rev. St. U. S. § 1025, which provides that no indictment shall be deemed insufficient by reason of any defect in matter of form which shall not tend to the prejudice of defendant. United States v. Ewan, U. S. C. C. (Fla.), 40 Fed. Rep. 451. 53. HIGHWAYS. Under Mansf. Dig. Ark. § 5905, providing for the warning required to be given by the road overseer to every person in the district of his appointment to work on the public highways, service cannot be had by leaving the notice with the wife of the person to be warned. Lowery v. State, Ark., 12 S. W. Rep. 563.

54. HUSBAND AND WIFE--Wife's Separate Estate.-The mere recital in a deed from a husband to his wife, of a valuable consideration as paid from money of her statutory separate estate, had by the husband for his own use, does not create in the wife a statutory estate in the land unless the consideration was in fact paid as recited.-Hamaker v. Hamaker, Ala., 6 South. Rep. 754. 55. HUSBAND AND WIFE. Where a wife gives to her husband the use of her farm, and the personalty thereon, hay severed by him from the land before the license is revoked is subject to attachment for his debts.-Plaisled v. Hair, Mass., 22 N. E. Rep. 921.

56. INSURANCE-Conditions.-A policy of insurance on a dwelling house and a house to let, which stood close together, provided that "if the above premises shall become vacant or unoccupied, this policy shall cease,” etc. The insurance was for separate sums, but the consideration paid was a gross sum. The buildings were destroyed when the dwelling-house alone was occupied: Held, that the contract was indivisible, and that the premises were not vacant, within the policy, so as to discharge the company from liability for loss of the other house. McQueeney v. Phoenix Ins. Co., Ark., 12 S. W. Rep. 498.

License. 58. INTOXICATING LIQUORS Revenue Act Ark. 1883, imposing a license on the business of a liquor seller, amended by implication the general license law and became a part thereof; and one carrying on such business in a prohibition district is liable to the penalty of the revenue act, by virtue of the "Drag-Net Proviso" of Act Ark. March 26, 1883, which authorizes a conviction for violation of the license law in prohibition districts. Baird v. State, Ark., 12 S. W. Rep. 566.

59. INTOXICATING LIQUORS- License.-The mere act of taking an order for intoxicating liquors, by the agent of a wholesale dealer, who has no authority to bind the dealer to ship the goods ordered, in a county other than the one in which the dealer is licensed to sell, does not constitute a sale by the agent without license. Newman v. State, Ark., 6 South. Rep. 762.

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60. JUDGMENT-Res Adjudicata.- Code Ala. 1886, § 2714, does not operate to exclude the record of one judg. ment for the plaintiff in ejectment as evidence in an action by the defendant to recover for the crops grown on the land, as the judgment is conclusive between the parties as to the question of title and possession, when collaterally attacked.-Carlisle v. Killebrew, Ala., 6 South. Rep. 756.

61 JURY-Misconduct.

Where one of a jury deliberating upon a verdict makes a statement of circumstances in his own experience to influence the jury in estimating the damages, the verdict should be set aside. Atchison, etc. R. R. Co. v. Bayes, Kan., 22 Pac. Rep. 741.

62. LANDLORD AND TENANT.- A surety on a note given by a tenant for the rental of land cannot dispute the authority of the lessor, when the tenant was given and held full and peaceable possession of the land for the entire term of the lease. Oliver v. Gary, Kan., 22 Pac. Rep. 733.

63. LANDLORD AND TENANT-Defective Premises. - In an action by a tenant against his landlord for injuries received through the defective condition of a stairway upon the leased premises, it appeared that the title to the premises was in defendant's wife, but that defendant assumed to be the owner, and conducted himself as such, both before and after the accident, and assumed the position of landlord, and as such contracted with plaintiff: Held, that defendant could not escape Ilability by showing want of title in himself.- Lindsey v. Leighton, Mass., 22 N. E. Rep. 901.

64. LANDLORD AND TENANT.- An action by a landlord against his tenant to recover an agreed forfeiture of crops in case the tenant should "voluntarily or invol. untarily" leave the place, cannot be maintained where it appears that the landlord forced him to leave because he bought goods of persons other than the landlord.-Williams v. Cocke, Miss., 6 South. Rep. 774.

65. LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS. In an action for seduction and breach of promise of marriage, an issue on the statute of limitations is not raised by an allegation in the declaration that plaintiff was 21 years of age, on a certain date, and a plea by defendant that she had attained her majority more than twelve months before suit was brought, and defendant, in addition to such plea, can plead the statute directly.- Graham v. Mc Reynolds, Tenn., 12 S. W. Rep. 547.

67. MASTER AND SERNANT Negligence. Question, upon the facts, of liability of railroad company for injury caused by negligence of co employee in loading Ford v. Luke Shore, etc. R. R. Co., N. Y., 22 N. E.

car.

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Rep 946. 68. MASTER AND SERVANT Negligence. Where an employee of a railway, while engaged in the performance of duty, in running a hand-car, was put in sudden apprehansion of a dangerous collision with a locomotive approaching from an opposite direction, and the threatened collision was due alone to the negligence of the company, whether it was rash or reckless to leap from the car, or whether he should have remained upon it, or left it by means less hazardous than jumping, are questions not clear enough under the facts of the present case, to justify the granting of a nonsuit.Smith v. Wrightsvill & T. R. Co., Ga., 10 S. E. Rep. 361.

69. MASTER AND SERVANT-Pleading.- A plaintiff who declares on the common-law right of a servant to recover for injuries received by reason of defective materials knowingly furnished by his master, will not be

71. MORTGAGES- Redemption. Under Rev. St. Ind. 1881, § 2491, which is § 27 of the statute of descents, giv. ing the widow one-third of the lands of which her husband was seised in fee, during their marriage, and of lands in which he had an equitable interest at his death, she may redeem from a foreclosure, had in his life time, to which she was not a party, of a mortgage given by him alone for the purchase price of land. Barr v. Van Alstine, Ind., 22 N. E. Rep. 965.

72. MORTGAGES-Privity. - A purchase money mort gage, executed when title to land passes, takes precedence of one given to secure a loan with which to make the cash payment, though the latter was recorded first, and was assigned, to one who paid full value, the essignment not being made until after the purchasemoney mortgage was recorded.- Brower v. Witmeyer, Ind., 22 N. E. Rep. 995.

74. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Drains.-The acquisi tion by a city of property on which is located a private drain does not make the drain a public sewer, nor impose upon the city the duty to remove obstructions for the benefit of a licensee.-Kosmak v. Mayor, N. Y., 22 N. E. Rep. 945.

75. NEGLIGENCE- Fires.- A porcelain factory, or a furnace of any kind requiring a great degree of heat in its operation, is dangerous to adjoining properties, and requires a degree of care in its management proportionate to the danger.-Hauch v. Hernandez, La., 6 South Rep. 785.

76. NEGLIGENCE-Defective Highways.-In actions to recover damages under Pub. St. Mass. ch. 52, § 18, which provides that "if a person receives or suffers bodily injury through a defect in or upon a highway he may recover the amount of damage sustained thereby," the injury must have been received solely in consequence of the defect in the highway.-Horrigan v. Inhabitants of Clarksburg, Mass., 22 N. E. Rep. 897.

77. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT - Payee -Limitation of Actions. A promissory note, in the ordinary form, payable to the estate of a named person or order, has a sufficiently certain payee to constitute it a promis. sory note, within the meaning of Pub. St. Mass. ch. 197, §§ 6, 7, providing that an action on a promissory note, signed in the presence of an attesting witness, may be brought within 20 years. Shaw v. Smith, Mass., 22 N. E. Rep. 887.

78. PARENT AND CHILD. -In the absence of written acknowledgment, attested by competent witnesses, an illegitimate child can be adopted by, and given a right of inheritance in the estate of, the father, only by the father's "publicly acknowledging it as his own, receiv ing it as such, with the consent of his wife, if he is married, into his family, and otherwise treating it as if it were a ligitimate child." "Public acknowledgment" requires that he should have held the child out to his relatives, friends, acquaintances, and the world as his child. In re Jessup's Estate Cal., 22 Pac. Rep. 742.

79. PARTNERSHIP-What Constitutes.-Held, that ap

plying the test to the agreement entered into there was a partnership as to third persons.-Hackett v. Stanley, N. Y., 22 N. E. Rep. 745.

80. PAYMENT- Accounts. In an action against the maker of a note by one who came into possession of it after it was due, where defendant pleads payment to the original payee, he is not compelled to produce in evidence the whole of an account between him and such payee, but may produce only so much thereof as will make out his defense.-Lawton v. Blitch, Ga., 10 S. E. Rep. 353.

81. POOR LAWS-Promise to Repay.-A person who receives aid from the officers of the poor of a city with. out having made application therefor, or representations as to his responsibility or physical condition, is not liable for the amount expended by the city in his support.-City of Albany v. McNamara, N. Y., 22 N. E. Rep. 931.

82. PRACTICE-Publication. -Mansf. Dig. Ark. § 4359, provides that the affidavit of any editor, publisher, or proprietor of any newspaper authorized to publish legal advertisements, to the effect that an advertisement has been published in his paper for the length of time, etc., shall be evidence of the publication thereof: Held, that an affidavit of a person that the advertisement was published in a certain paper, without showing his connection with the paper, or his right to make the affidavit, is not proof of legal publication. -Cross v. Wilson, Ark., 12 S. W. Rep. 576.

83. PRACTICE-Appearance.-A special appearance to contest the jurisdiction of the court does not give the court jurisdiction of the defendant.-Green v. Green, Kan., 22 Pac. Rep. 730.

84. PINCIPAL AND SURETY-Contribution.-Where one of two sureties pays one-half the common liability he is not entitled to contribution from his co-surety, unless the payment was accepted in satisfaction of the claim against both.-Pegram v. Riley, Ala., 6 South Rep. 753.

85. PUBLIC LANDS-Timber.-The defendant, a railroad corporation, purchased for use upon its locomotives and cars, wood severed from the public mineral lands: Held, that such purchase and use was unlawful, and that the United States could recover from defendant the value of the wood so severed and purchased by it.United States v. Eureka, etc., R. Co., U. S. C. C. (Nev.), 40 Fed. Rep. 419.

86. RAILROAD COMPANY- Negligence.-In an action against a street railroad company for injuries sustained by being run over by defendant's car after plaintiff had fallen on the track, where it is undisputed that the track at that place was icy and slippery, evidence that there had been no storm for two days before the accident is inadmissible for any purpose.—Silberstein v. Houston, etc. R. Co., N. Y., 22 N. E. Rep. 951.

87. RAILROAD COMPANIES-Lease-Ultra Vires.-Under R. L. Vt. § 3303, authorizing railroad companies to lease and operate the roads of other companies, a contract of lease by which the lessee guaranties the payment of the interest on bonds given in payment for the construction of the road, the interest being the same amount, and payable at the same times as the agreed rent, is valid.-Eastern Townships Bank v. St. Johnsbury, etc. R. Co., U. S. C. C. (Vt.), 40 Fed. Rep. 423.

88. RECEIVERS Service of Progress. Act. Cong. March 3, 1887, §§ 2, 3 (24 U. S. St. 554), provide that receivers in possession of property shall manage it according to the laws of the State where it is situated, and may be sued without leave of the court by whom they were appointed. In Arkansas service of process on the clerk or station agent of a railroad company is good service on the company: Held, that, where receivers of a railroad running through Arkansas, who were ap pointed in that State, had removed into another State, the court would authorize them to be sued in the State courts of Arkansas by service on their station agents or clerks therein.-Central Trust Co. v. St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co., U. S. C. C. (Ark.), 40 Fed. Rep. 426.

89. REMOVAL OF CAUSES.-Rev. St. U. S. § 639, subd. 3, providing for the removal of suits between citizens of different States from State to federal courts, is repealed by the removal act of March, 3, 1887, which repeals all conflicting laws.-Minnick v. Union Ins. Co., U. S. C. C. (Mich.), 40 Fed. Rep. 369.

90. SALE-Warranty.-In the sale of goods by words of description, which comprehend quality as well as variety, the descriptive words may be trusted by the purchaser as a warranty of both, and, though inspec tion by him before acceptance will exclude from the warranty all patent defects, it will have no influence on those which are latent. Miller v. Moore, Ga., 10 S. E. Rep. 360.

91. TAXATION OF RAILROAD COMPANIES. -Code Miss. §§ 607, 608, as amended, provide that, on payment of a privilege tax, a railroad company shall be exempted from all State and county taxes, except taxes on land owned by the company, and not used in operating the road: Held, that land separated by the track from the buildings of the road, and not used for railroad purposes, or necessary to the operation of the road, is taxable. Lewis v. Vicksburg, etc. R. Co., Miss., 6 South.

Rep. 773.

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93. TAXATION Assessment. Under Act La. 1882, No. 96, § 8, requiring each tax assessor to ascertain the taxable property in his district, both by examination of the records of conveyances and by inquiries, etc., an assessment in the name of former owners, whose title has been divested by bankruptcy sale, and who are not in possession, and an adjudication of the land to the State for non-payment of taxes, are void.-New Orleans, etc. R. Co. v. Negrotto, U. S. C. C. (La.), 40 Fed. Rep. 428.

94. TOWNSHIP-Parol Evidence. Where only a brief abstract of the proceedings of a township board are entered of record, and the question arises as to what the action of the board was, parol evidence is compe. tent to supplement the record, and to show all their acts and proceedings.-Rock Creek Tp. v. Coddging, Kan., 22 Pac. Rep. 741.

95. TRUSTS Mortgages. A decree authorizing a trustee to mortgage the estate to secure a loan for a term of years at 8 per cent. per annum, and to waive homestead in the mortgaged property, does not give the trustee power to stipulate in the mortgage for the pay. ment of semi-annual interest on the loan, and that, in default of interest, taxes, or insurance, the whole debt should become due, and 10 per cent. attorney's fee be allowed for its collection by law. Bolles v. Munnerlyn, Ga., 10 S. E. Rep. 365.

96. TRUSTS-Power.-Where property is conveyed to a trustee, to the use of a person for life, with a power of appointment by will, and the cestui que trust exercises the power, the property does not thereby become subject to his debts, where the will was thus made only to insure title to one who had previously, in good faith, purchased the property, when it was sold under a decree of court. Patterson v. Lawrence, Ga., 10 S. E. Rep.

designates the dry land in each subdivision as a fractional subdivision or lot, the purchaser from the government of such lots acquires title to all that portion of the bed of the lake included in the whole subdivision. -Stoner v. Rice, Ind., 22 N. E. Rep. 968.

99. WILLS-Perpetuities. A bequest of all testator's property to his wife, in trust, to hold the same, and use so much of the income and principle as may be neces sary for the support of herself and children "until the youngest child now living attains the age of 21 years, or would arrive at that age if living," at which time the estate is to go as it would under the intestate laws, creates a trust for a term of years, and is invalid, in violation of 1 Rev. St. N. Y. p. 723, § 15, providing that the absolute power of alienation shall not be suspended by any limitation or condition whatever for a longer period than during the continuance of not more than two lives in being at the creation of the estate.-Haynes v. Sherman, N. Y., 22 N. E. Rep. 938.

100. WILLS-Trusts.- A testatrix devised her estate in trust to her executors, during the lives of her son-inlaw and her youngest grandchild then living, naming them, to invest the rents and profits thereof for the benefit of her grandchildren living at her death or born thereafter, during their respective minorities; and, on the arrival of age of her youngest grandchild and the death of her son-in-law, she devised all the land of which she died seized, and that to be bought by the executors, with the rents and profits, to her grandchildren then living: Held, that the will would be construed to support the validity of the trust, limiting the same on the life of the youngest grandchild being at the time of its creation, and named by testatrix. — Roe v. Vingut, N. Y., 22 N. E. Rep. 933.

102. WILLS- Construction. Under a will giving the residue of testator's property to his executor in trust, with directions to invest it, and use so much as the trustee shall deem necessary for the proper care and maintenance of testator's son during his life, the son is entitled to support according to his condition in life, though he is able to support himself, and the trustee is to exercise his discretion as to whether he shall deliver the money to the son, or provide necessaries for him.Holden v. Strong, N. Y., 22 N. E. Rep. 960.

103. WILLS-Testamentary Capacity. In a suit to set aside a will for incapacity, and undue influence, statements made by testatrix before its execution, and relative thereto, are competent to prove the previous state of her mind and affections.- Thompson v. Ish, Mo., 12 S. W. Rep. 510..

104. WITNESS-Transactions with Decedents. - Under Code Ala. § 2765, in a suit to set aside a mortgage as fraudulent the defendant mortgagor is not competent to testify against a bank, his mortgagee and co-defendant, as to transactions had with the deceased cashier of such bank, though a decree pro confesso has been entered against the mortgagor, as he still remains a necessary party on the record. Mobile Sav. Bank v. McDonnell, Ala., 6 South. Rep. 703.

105. WITNESS-Credibility. Mansf. Dig. Ark. §§ 2902, 2903, provide that a witness may be impeached by the party against whom he is produced by showing that he has made statements different from his testimony, but, in order to so impeach him, he must be asked if he has made the statement assumed, and the examination must indicate the time when and the person to whom it was made: Held, that proof of such contradictory statements may be made as well where he testifies that he does not remember them as where he denies them.Billings v. State, Ark., 12 S. W. Rep. 574.

ST. LOUIS, FEBRUARY 7, 1890.

THE more we study the opinions of the dissenting judges of the New York Court of Appeals, in People v. Budd and People v. Walsh, recently decided by that court, the stronger becomes our belief in the correctness of their conclusions. Those cases, it will be remembered, turned on the question of the right of the State of New York to regulate charges by grain elevators, and the majority of the court sustained such an exercise of power (29 Cent. L. J. 401), grounding their opinion principally upon the Munn case wherein the United States Supreme Court held valid a statute of the State of Illinois fixing a maxium charge for the elevation and storage of grain in warehouses. Whether or not, in contesting a clause in a State constitution, similar to one in the federal instrument, the State: court should follow the interpretation of such clause as given by the federal court, which interpretation compels the State court to deny relief, which seems otherwise justly asked, is a question upon which many will differ. But to our mind there is much reason in the contention of Judge Peckham, who wrote the opinion of the dissenting judges, that though where any right, privilege or immunity claimed under the federal constitution or laws be in issue, it is the duty of the State court to follow in the footsteps of the federal court and be guided by its decisions; yet, where the privilege or immunity is claimed under a State constitution, and the court of that State believes that it is rightfully and legally claimed, although the claim rests upon a clause which is similar to the one in the federal instrument, under which it has been denied by the federal court, the State court ought to give expression to its own judgment and declare the law, as they believe it to exist, notwithstanding it differs with the conclusions arrived at by the federal court. In so doing they decide against no right, privilege or immunity claimed under the federal constitution, but as a State court decide in a matter over which it has full VOL. 30 No. 6.

to be given to the fundamental law of the State. In that view, the New York court would have been justified in breaking loose from the Munn case, even though in so doing they went absolutely contra to its teachings.

The

BUT as a matter of fact the Munn case proceeded upon the principle that the parties had devoted their property to a public use, and hence, that its regulation was within the power of the statute, which is the same principle invoked in the New York case. distinction between the two cases however, lies in the application of the principle and meaning of the phrase "devoting one's property to a public use." Judge Peckham follows the lead of Justice Field, who dissented in the Munn case, in saying that such devotion or dedication is made when by reason of it the public thereafter have a legal right to resort to the property, and to use it for a reasonable compensation, or for such as the law provides, or else where some privilege or right is granted by the government, in which case the right of limitation is based upon and is really a part consideration for the grant. In the one case the legal right to resort to and use the property by the public, so long as the owner chooses to remain in the business, springs from this dedication, and it is the criterion that is to decide the question whether the property has or has not been thus dedicated; and this right does not spring into existence merely because the business is such as interests a great number of the public, or because it is of large extent, or because there is no other property at that place which is or conveniently may be devoted to the same kind of business, while, in the other case, the right of limitation exists because some privilege or franchise has been granted to the owner by the sovereign power, an acceptance of which carries with it the burden of submitting to the demand for the service. The right to make use of the owner's property, by reason of a dedication, has been held to have been created in the exceptional cases of a common carrier, the keeper of a common inn, and a common or public wharfinger, and perhaps in some others. These are exceptional cases, for they trench upon the well-grounded principle that no man can be compelled to enter into business relations

with another unless the party carrying on the the business shall have received some privilege, right, or franchise from the sovereign power, when such compulsion may be annexed to the grant. The principle should not be extended. To include within its grasp the case of a warehouseman, who has no privilege from the sovereign power, but simply builds his warehouse on the shores of a navigable stream, and upon his own property, would be to overturn cases adjudged in many courts and regarded as the law for many years past. The same is true of the owner of an elevator, who receives nothing from the State. In most of the cases cited by the court in the Munn case the right of limitation springs from a license or privilege awarded by the government, and this right of limitation or regulation is ingrafted in or inheres in such license as a condition of the exercise of such principle.

We trust that the Supreme Court of Indiana has, at last, in the recent decisions of State v. Hyde and State v. Peelle, got through with the series of constitutional contentions which have for the past year been waged in that State, involving questions of legislative power, and which seem to have been prompted by a spirit of rivalry between the executive and legislative departments. And in expressing satisfaction at its termination we do not wish to convey the idea that we have not been interested in many of the questions presented, or the conclusions reached. But we confess to a very large share of indifference whether, under the peculiar statutory enactments of that State, the trustees for the blind asylum or the inspector of mineral oils are appointed by the legislature or the executive, or whether the metropolitan police or the fire department of certain cities are under State or municipal control, and a large part of the opinion of the court in each case is taken up with the consideration of abstract questions of that kind. Notwithstanding this, there will be found in all of the decisions here referred to considerable of interest and value, bearing on the question as to the powers and limitations of legislatures in general, and the case of State v. Peelle, the latest exposition of

the law pertaining to that subject, contains a vigorous and able discussion of the questions, first, what is a legislative as distinct from a State office; second, the right of the legislature under the constitution to create a State office and fill it by the general assembly electing the officer.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

A PRIOR unrecorded deed is valid as against an attaching creditor who has not parted with value on the faith of the record title, and whose deed, on a sale under the attachment, is not recorded before the recording of the prior deed. This conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court of Indiana, in Shirk v. Thomas, 22 N. E. Rep. 976, notwithstanding Rev. Stat. Ind. 1881, § 2931, providing that an unrecorded deed shall be void "as to any subsequent purchaser, lessee or mortgagee in good faith and for a valuable consideration." The court says:

The source of the appellee's right is the statutory charge, and no claim can be successfully urged by him which rises higher than the source of all the right he has; so that it is quite clear that, if his right is founded solely on the lien of the judgment or of the attachment, it is subordinate to that of a purchaser in good faith. This conclusion is inevitable, if the line of principle is traveled; and there is no reason sufficient to even constitute an apology for wandering from the true line. Our decisions have for the most part kept to the true course. Pursuing this course, it has been often held that a deed or mortgage may be reformed, as against a judgment creditor. White v. Wilson, 6 Blackf. 448; Sample v. Rowe, 24 Ind. 208; Busenbarke v. Ramey, 53 Ind. 499-501; Figart v. Halderman, 75 Ind. 564-568; Boyd v. Andersson, 102 Ind. 217, 1 N. E. Rep. 724. In direct point is the reasoning of the court in the case last cited. "It is the settled law in this State," said the court, "that judgment creditors are in no sense purchasers; that their judgments are simply general liens upon whatever interest the judgment defendants may have in the land." If the interest which Thomas acquired under the sale made on the judgment obtained by him had been perfected by the execution and delivery of a deed, he could not defeat the appellees. If he had changed positions, and parted with value, without notice and on the faith that the title to the land remained in' Albert H. Tyner, it would, perhaps, be different; but he did not change position. He was throughout simply a creditor endeavoring to enforce collection of an antecedent debt. The law is well established in this State, and so it is generally held elsewhere, that a creditor holding a claim for a pre-existing debt is not a bona fide purchaser, within the meaning of our registry law. Brower v. Witmeyer, supra; Petry v. Ambrosher, 100 Ind. 510-514; Wert v. Naylor, 93 Ind. 431; Busenbarke v. Ramey, supra. No lien was released,