visit its displeasure both upon the filibustering leaders individually, and on the whole of the party compromised. However hot party spirit may be, there is always a margin of moderate men in both parties whom the unjustifiable use of legally permissible modes of opposition will alienate. Since such men can make themselves felt at the polls when the next election arrives, respect for their opinion cools the passion of congressional politicians. Thus the general feeling is that as the power of filibustering is in extreme cases a safeguard against abuses of the system of closure by "previous question," so the good sense of the community is in its turn a safeguard against abuses of the opportunities which the rules still leave open. One exSpeaker, who had had large experience in leading both a majority and a minority of the House, observed to me that he thought the rules, taken all in all, as near perfection as any rules could be. This savours of official optimism. We all know the attachment which those who have grown old in working a system show to its faults as well as to its merits. Still, true is it that congressmen generally complain less of the procedure under which they live, and which seems to an English observer tyrannical, than do members of the English House of Commons of the less rigid methods of their own ancient and famous body. I know no better instance of the self-control and good humour of Americans than the way in which the minority in the House generally submit to the despotism of the majority, consoling themselves with the reflection that it is all according to the rules of the game, and that their turn will come in due course. use the power of closing debate as stringently at Westminster as it is used at Washington would revolutionize the life of the House of Commons. But the House of Representatives is an assembly of a very different nature. Like the House of Commons it is a legislating, if hardly to be deemed a governing, body. But it is not a debating body. It rules through and by its committees, in which discussion is unchecked by any closing power; and the whole House does little more than register by its votes the conclusions which the committees submit. subject alone, the subject of revenue, that is to say, taxation and appropriation, receives genuine discussion by the House at large. And although the power of limiting debate is often applied to expedite such business, it is seldom applied till oppor tunity has been given for the expression of all relevant views.

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The rules regarding the procedure in committee of the whole House are in the main similar to those of the British House of Commons; but the chairman of such a committee is not (as usually in England) a permanent chairman of Ways and Means, but a person nominated by the Speaker on each occasion. A rule, not duly observed, forbids any member to speak twice to any question, until every member desiring to speak shall have spoken.1 The House has a power of going into secret session whenever confidential communications are received from the President, or a member informs it that he has communications of a secret nature to make. But this power seems to have been rarely used, certainly never of late years. Every word spoken is reported by official stenographers and published in the Congressional Record, and the huge galleries are never cleared.

The number of bills brought into the House every year is very large, averaging over 7000. In the thirty-seventh Congress (1861-63) the total number of bills introduced was 1026, viz. :613 House bills, and 433 Senate bills. In the forty-sixth it had risen to 9481, of which 7257 were House bills, 2224 Senate bills, showing that the increase has been much larger in the House than in the Senate. In the forty-ninth Congress (188587) the number was rising still further, the number up to July 1886 being 12,906, exclusive of 277 joint resolutions. In the British House of Commons the total number of bills introduced was, in the session of 1885, 481, of which 202 were public and 279 private bills. America is, of course, a far larger country, but the legislative competence of Congress is incomparably smaller than that of the British Parliament, seeing that the chief part of the field both of public bill and private bill legislation belongs in America to the several States. By far the larger number of bills in Congress are what would be called in England "private" or "local and personal" bills, i.e. they establish no general rule of law but are directed to particular cases. Such are the numerous bills for satisfying persons with claims against the Federal Government, and for giving or restoring pensions to individuals alleged to have served in the Northern armies during the War of Secession. It is only to a very small extent that bills can attempt to deal with ordinary private law, since nearly the whole of that topic belongs to State legislation. It is need

1 Proceedings in Committee of the Whole are expedited by limiting (by a vote of the House) discussion in Committee to a certain fixed period.

less to say that the proportion of bills that pass to bills that fail is a very small one, not one-thirtieth.1 As in England so even more in America, bills are lost less by direct rejection than by failing to reach their third reading, a mode of extinction which the good-nature of the House, or the unwillingness of its members to administer snubs to one another, would prefer to direct rejection, even were not the want of time a sufficient excuse to the committees for failing to report them. One is told in Washington that few bills are brought in with a view to being passed. They are presented in order to gratify some particular persons or places, and it is well understood in the House that they must not be taken seriously. Sometimes a less pardonable motive exists. The great commercial companies, and especially the railroad companies, are often through their land grants and otherwise brought into relations with the Federal Government. Bills are presented in Congress which purport to withdraw some of the privileges of these companies, or to establish or favour rival enterprises, but whose real object is to levy blackmail on these wealthy bodies, since it is often cheaper for a company to buy off its enemy than to defeat him either by the illegitimate influence of the lobby, or by the strength of its case in open combat. Several great corporations have thus to maintain a permanent staff at Washington for the sake of resisting legisla tive attacks upon them, some merely extortionate, some intended to win local popularity.

The title and attributions of the Speaker of the House are taken from his famous English original. But the character of the office has greatly altered from that original. The note of the Speaker of the British House of Commons is his impartiality. He has indeed been chosen by a party, because a majority means in England a party. But on his way from his place on the benches to the Chair he is expected to shake off and leave behind all party ties and sympathies. Once invested with the wig and gown of office he has no longer any political opinions, and must

1 In the British Parliamentary session of 1885, out of 202 public bills brought in, 144 passed the House of Commons, and several of these were rejected by the House of Lords. Of these 144 public bills 116 had originated in the House of Commons, 28 in the House of Lords, 54 were Government bills, 62 "provisional order" bills, only 28 bills of private members. Of the 279 private bills 203 passed. The number of public bills introduced is increasing in England, though not so rapidly as in America, but the number of private members' bills that are passed does not increase, recent changes in parliamentary procedure having reduced their chances.

administer exactly the same treatment to his political friends and to those who have been hitherto his opponents, to the oldest or most powerful minister and to the youngest or least popular member. His duties are limited to the enforcement of the rules and generally to the maintenance of order and decorum in debate, including the selection, when several members rise at the same moment, of the one who is to carry on the discussion. These are duties of great importance, and his position one of great dignity, but neither the duties nor the position imply political power. It makes little difference to any English party

in Parliament whether the occupant of the chair has come from their own or from the hostile ranks. The Speaker can lower or raise the tone and efficiency of the House as a whole by the way he presides over it: but a custom as strong as law forbids him to render help to his own side even by private advice. Whatever information as to parliamentary law he may feel free to give must be equally at the disposal of every member.

In America the Speaker has immense political power, and is permitted, nay expected, to use it in the interests of his party. In calling upon members to speak he prefers those of his own side. He decides in their favour such points of order as are not distinctly covered by the rules. His authority over the arrangement of business is so large that he can frequently advance or postpone particular bills or motions in a way which determines their fate. Although he does not figure in party debates in the House, he may and does advise the other leaders of his party privately; and when they "go into caucus" (i.e. hold a party meeting to determine their action on some pending question) he is present and gives counsel. He is usually the most eminent member of the party who has a seat in the House, and is really, so far as the confidential direction of its policy goes, almost its leader. His most important privilege is, however, the nomination of the numerous standing committees already referred to. In the first Congress (April 1789) the House tried the plan of appointing its committees by ballot; but this worked so ill that in January 1790 the following rule was passed :—“All committees shall be appointed by the Speaker unless otherwise specially directed by the House." This rule has been re-adopted by each successive Congress since then. Not only does he, at

1 In England select committees on public matters are appointed by the House. i.e. practically by the "whips" of the several parties, though sometimes a dis

the beginning of each Congress, select all the members of each of these committees, he even chooses the chairman of each, and thereby vests the direction of its business in hands approved by himself. The chairman is of course always selected from the party which commands the House, and the committee is so composed as to give that party a majority. Since legislation, and so much of the control of current administration as the House has been able to bring within its grasp, belong to these committees, their composition practically determines the action of the House on all questions of moment, and as the chairmanships of the more important committees are the posts of most influence, the disposal of them is a tremendous piece of patronage by which a Speaker can attract support to himself and his own section of the party, reward his friends, give politicians the opportunity of rising to distinction or practically extinguish their congressional career. The Speaker is, of course, far from free in disposing of these places. He has been obliged to secure his own election to the chair by promises to leading members and their friends; and while redeeming such promises, he must also regard the wishes of important groups of men or types of opinion, must compliment particular States by giving a place on good committees to their prominent representatives, must avoid nominations which could alarm particular interests. These conditions surround the exercise of his power with trouble and anxiety. Yet after all it is power, power which in the hands of a capable and ambitious man becomes so far-reaching that it is no exaggeration to call him the second, if not the first political figure in the United States, with an influence upon the fortunes of men and the course of domestic events superior, in ordinary times, to the President's, although shorter in its duration and less patent to the world.1

cussion in the House leads to the addition of other members. Hybrid committees are appointed partly by the House and partly by the committee of Selection. Private bill committees are appointed by the committee of Selection. This committee is a small body of the older and more experienced members, intended to represent fairly all parties and sections of opinion.

"The appointment of the committees implies the distribution of work to every member. It means the determination of the cast business shall take. It decides for or against all large matters of policy, or may so decide; for while Speakers will differ from each other greatly in force of character and in the wish to give positive direction to affairs, the weakest man cannot escape from the necessity of arranging the appointments with a view to the probable character of measures which will be agitated. This, however, is far from the measure of the Speaker's power. All rules are more or less flexible. The current of precedents