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doctrine by any fear of popish ascendancy. We have a duty to perform, for the doing of which we are responsible, but for the consequences of which, when done, we are not. We are not allowed to do evil that good may come; nor are we even to let our good be evil spoken of. Expediency is a poor guide. Caiaphas said, “It is expedient for us that one man die for the people, and that the whole nation perish not;' the expedient thing was done, one man did die, and in a few years all in that nation that did not ‘perish,' and were not taken captive, were disciples of that man as the Son of God! But because we plead for justice to Catholics as a right, we do not admit that it is inexpedient. Suppose everything the Protestant Associations demand were accomplished; suppose their pet project realized, the repeal of the Catholic Emancipation Act, would the Catholics be more likely to be converted, or less likely to become the Established Church? We think not. The measure might exasperate them into madness, or a more settled determination to regain all they have lost would probably take possession of their hearts. But such a measure cannot pass.
No one thinks of it except a few zealous and violent men who know nothing of the world, and who try everything by their hatred to popery, except the sayings and services of their own church. Believing, therefore, the political course pursued by the Protestant Associations to be neither just nor expedient, we cannot support them. We repeat it, we do not quarrel with them for being political, though we submit that, being so, their friends should not condemn others on that ground, but because the kind of political principles and proceedings which they adopt is altogether opposed to our most cherished convictions of what is right and wise.
There is one way in which the spread of popery may be divested of its terrors in a considerable degree. Popery, like every other system, can only persecute when it has the power. It is a harmless thing so long as it is weak. What is the probability of its becoming the established religion of this land, if an established religion
remain, we do not attempt to estimate, but one thing we know, that all the danger is not from without; but much from within ; that the process may be brought about by the conversion of Protestant churchmen, as well as by the intrusion of Catholics; that a church, as well as a city, may be taken through internal treachery as well as by external force. And what is the likelihood that popery, if established again, would persecute, and to what extent, we cannot pretend to state, but imagine that its inherent and essential tendency to oppression and cruelty would be somewhat affected and modified by the character of the times and the progress of the human and the national mind. But we do think, that the
spread of popery furnishes additional reason for strong and strenuous attempts to separate the church from the state. If Protestant Associations would direct their efforts towards this object, they would act, we humbly conceive, in greater accordance than at present, with the Word of God, their own object, and the exigencies of the times. We have no faith at all in any preference, by the Romish church, of the voluntary to the compulsory principle. We believe it will get and keep whatever it can. Let' Protestant ascendancy be put away that popish ascendancy may not be realized. Let the unscriptural union of the spiritual and the secular in the established church cease, and a present incentive to popish zeal, and a possible instrument of popish persecution, will cease with it.
Dissenters have a high duty to fulfil. Theirs is a solemn charge. They have had no
inction hi erto in the defence of the Protestant faith, and it is not likely to become
We know the supercilious smile with which the saying has been received, and will be received again; but we repeat it, that the time may come when despised dissenters shall have to keep' this faith.' Christianity has been nothing but dissent ere now, it may be nothing else again. Protestantism has been nothing but dissent ere now, it may be nothing else again. And should it be so, it will be kept well. • The foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness
of God is stronger than men.' Our polity may be derided and condemned by those who do not understand it, or submit to Christ, but we know it to be after the pattern given by our exalted Lord, and his truth is best preserved and spread by his own churches. They are the fittest exhibitions and most mighty engines of his faith. But let us not rely on forms ecclesiastical, however Christian. The times and prospect claim an earnest, humble, tender, manly piety. Our souls must fill and work our system. We must be men of faith, mighty in the scriptures, ready to every good word and work, with one wish and aim, that Christ may be magnified, whether by our life or death. We must unite courage with charity, purity with peace, the repose of faith with activity of zeal, profound devotion with a public spirit. We must speak the truth, but in love; must be
angry, being grieved for the hardness' of men's hearts; must contend earnestly, but only for the faith once delivered to the saints. Let us prepare for all things; let us vow to God; let us arise and anoint the shield! May God make us worthy, in work or woe, of our high vocation !
Art. II. The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, founded upon their
History. By the Rev. W. WHEWELL, B.D. 2 vols. 8vo. Parker : London ; Deighton: Cambridge.
scientific knowledge and varied accomplishments to put forth two thick octavos, which shall not have a great deal of valuable and instructive matter in them. We think there are few works, however, to which the old maxim of the Roman critic more strongly applies than to the present,
Si quid tamen olim
prematur in annum Membranis intus positis ;' or which would have been more susceptible of improvement from deliberate and repeated revision. Not that we wish that the learned author had literally acted upon the above maxim, or kept his manuscript in his 'scrinium' for quite so long a period as nine years; a third part of that time might have been sufficient, and less than that we do not believe would have been much more than sufficient, to enable him to do full justice to himself and his vast and important theme. Instead of this, scarcely are the sheets of his extensive History of the Induc*tive Sciences' dry, when he comes forth with two bulky volumes, containing more than twelve hundred pages between them, on the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences '—a subject which, if it involve less research and learning than the other, is at least as difficult, and perhaps demands more time for satisfactorily treating it. Many of the principles which come under discussion are of the most subtle and abstract nature, must be revolved again and again by the mind (whatever its native perspicacity and acuteness) before they assume the requisite degree of clearness, and demand the utmost address and diligence to give them perspicuous expression. It is the want in some degree of these qualities that we cannot but think the chief defect of the work,-a defect which could scarcely fail to have yielded to greater deliberation and delay. Our author does not, as all the world knows, want knowledge ; his reading and research have been unusually extensive, if not too excursive, and in the mathematical sciences, whether pure or applied, he justly holds the highest place; but it is easy to see that on the purely metaphysical parts of his subject he has read more than he has thought, has accumulated more than he has digested. We do not think him at all wanting in those qualities
of mind which would naturally fit him for the successful investigation of metaphysical truth; but we do doubt whether
many of the subjects of which he here treats have been turned over with the requisite degree of frequency and deliberation ; with the same degree of frequency and deliberation, for example, which he well knows he has found necessary in his favorite and more familiar departments of speculation. Yet metaphysical subjects, if we would attain perfect clearness of thought, and even an approximation to perfect perspicuity of expression, require as much time, and as earnest and prolonged abstraction of intellect, as the mathematics-perhaps it might be said, much more. It is often alleged, indeed, that a great mathematician is by that very circumstance unfitted to be a successful or profound reasoner out of his own domain. This we apprehend is not the effect of mathematical studies in themselves considered, but results from the fact that if prosecuted to a very great extent they necessarily absorb the student's time and attention, and leave no leisure to familiarize the mind in an equal degree with the modes of thought, arguments, and terms employed in other departments of science. But if (to whatever extent they have been cultivated) they have still left the proper leisure for all this, we are far from thinking (if we except some few remarkably constructed minds which seem never to have been designed to deal with anything except magnitude and number) that they will at all stand in the way of a successful prosecution of other sciences. If they have been so exclusively pursued as not to leave the requisite leisure for the formation of other habits and the acquisition of other knowledge than they themselves involve, they will of course have this effect, but just upon the same principle as in Sir Thomas More's humorous poem,* the serjeant that would play the
Wyse men alwaye
Wening to rise
I wish to speed him well;
A marchant eke
That will go seeke,
By all the means he may,
To fall in sute
Till he dispute
His money cleane away,
Pleting the lawe
For every strawe
Shall prove a thrifty man,
With bate and strife
But, by my life,
I cannot tell you whan.'
friar took but little by the exchange. Professor De Morgan has somewhat humorously expressed the same thought in his Algebra; * That those who are only mathematicians frequently reason ill on other subjects . .:. is an important truth, though not
either a great or recent discovery-having been, in point of ' fact, ascertained immediately after the fall by our common ' ancestor, who having till then been nothing but a gardener, must have found himself but an indifferent tailor.'
But to return from this short digression, though not irrelevant, to Professor Whewell. Not only do we think that longer delay—a more deliberate revision-must have greatly added to the clearness of many of the metaphysical views he has propounded, but would have immeasurably improved the general execution of the work. It would, we doubt not, have been more condensed; and would have contained really more matter within straiter limits. We have heard of a man who apologized for the length of a letter by the curious plea that he had no time to make it shorter. Professor Whewell's work stands in need of some such apology, without the possibility, we fear, of his being honestly able to offer it.-In the first place, we cannot help thinking that the scientific illustrations would have been far fewer, but singly expanded to a much greater length, and expressed in language less scientific. At present, they are often so brief, and expressed with such unsparing profusion of scientific technicalities, that none but those versed, and well versed too, in each science, can expect fully to understand them. The work requires a mastery of almost all the inductive sciences before we can fully appreciate the principles which determine the philosophy’ of any one of them. Yet surely a work on the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences means, if it mean anything, a work on the principles which equally lie at the basis of all, and should be at least intelligible to him who combines with a sound knowledge of any one of them, such a knowledge of the leading facts and terms connected with the rest as will enable him to understand copious and familiar explanations of any particular points which shall be selected for illustration. A work on the principles of language generally, ought not surely to suppose that the reader, in order to understand it, must be a Grimm or an Adelung; nor a work on the principles of music, that the reader must be practically skilled in playing on all sorts of instruments. We repeat, therefore, that the illustrations should have been fewer and more copiously explained, in order to enable the reader clearly to see in what way ciples laid down in the work applied to them, and how they exemplified the ‘Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences.' In the next place, many pages of the illustrations might, in our opinion, have been spared altogether, as pertaining rather