We really can see no more absurdity in a ship-building patent than in a patent for Bible printing. The principle is one. Let those who deny the allegation demonstrate the difference.

Let us look at the principle in its legitimate extension. If the royal prerogative be extended to anything in religion, among Dissenters, it must be extended to everything. Why does not his majesty claim to print liturgies for such of the Dissenters as use them? Why, indeed, not compel their use by all? Why does he not dictate to them special prayers on special occasions? But we trifle! Who does not perceive that since the Dissenters' emancipation act, the entire body of Nonconformists have a full, good, indefeasible right to print the Scriptures for themselves? But who does not perceive that, if they are bound to buy the Bibles produced at the royal press, at the pleasure-price of the patentees, they are still forced to submit to the authority of the civil power in the most important of all religious concerns? Who does not see that the principle which sustains such a right goes much further than the right which it sustains? If his majesty may say who shall print, may he not also say whether any one shall print?

The rights of Dissenters are altogether incomplete, unless they enjoy the full liberty of printing the Scriptures for themselves. Even granting, what we do not allow, that the Bible patent is valid, in so far as the Church is concerned, still the recent change in the condition of Dissenters has placed the whole question of the Bible monopoly in an entirely new position. When that monopoly was established there was no such body in the realm, and hence the patent looked only at the Church. Now, however, that this immense class of subjects has arisen in the land, they are without the ecclesiastical pale; and the right of Bible printing is and has been, ever since the passing of the law which brought emancipation, the Nonconformists' birthright. The Bible is the common property of all Christians, and since religious uniformity is no longer contemplated by the law of England, no right of prerogative can now be argued from an alleged necessity to prevent heresies in doctrine. Whatever color or pretext there might have been for the king's interference when religious uniformity was enforced by law, there can assuredly be none now; and it is in his character as supreme head of the Established Church alone, that his right can by any possibility exist.

But we have not yet done with the law, the confusions and contradictions of which are among the chief grounds of our hope. Where reason and justice supply no immutable principle, it is no marvel if lawyers of the first ability differ in opinion; and hence the denial of Lord Mansfield, that the king had any prerogative right to the translation of the Bible. This

great lawyer put it entirely on the ground of property, which leads us to the second foundation assigned by Blackstone for the royal copyright.* Lord Mansfield pours contempt on the royal prerogative, and places the king on the same ground with any author or proprietor. The Hebrew Bible, Greek Testament, and Septuagint,' says his lordship, 'do not belong to 'the king; but the translation he bought.' Mr. Justice Willes takes a similar view. I cannot distinguish,' says he, 'between 'the king and an author. I disclaim any idea that the king 'has the least control over the press but what arises from his property in his copy.' in his copy. By these distinguished men the doctrine of prerogative is at once discarded. This is a grand approach to reason and intelligibility; it also narrows, by more than a half, the ground of contest. The principle here laid down is one of the greatest possible importance. It is the only distinct and tangible view that has ever been set forth on the subject of prerogative, which it explains by annihilation! It strips the subject of all disguise, and renders it a matter to which the principles of commerce and of general justice may be fully and readily applied. Keeping this principle steadily in view, then, we shall have little difficulty in demolishing the whole fabric of the Bible monopoly. Here we have its advocates in the toils, and, if they can, let them escape! The royal right arises from the single fact that the king was at the expense of the translation; prerogative there is none. Even the supreme headship of the Church seems, at least for the moment, to be given up or forgotten. Very well: was this expense a private disbursement of the king? If so, the Bible must have been his private property; it would not have belonged to the crown, but to the person, and, instead of descending to his successor, it must have devolved to his heirs. Again, allowing that there did exist a right of property in the copy, at common law, and that the king, not being named in the statute of Anne, was not affected by it; still it remains to be shown that the king acquired the copyright by purchase, as distinguished from a license, for reward, to publish the result of the labor of others. But again, if, as the fact was, the expense was paid out of the public purse, was not the purchase for a public benefit? Had the crown, then, a right, in law or justice, to convert Bible printing into a monopoly which must of necessity be prejudicial to that benefit. Take it either way, and then show us how it can be made to sustain the Bible patent. Tell us how, even upon the absurd hypothesis of a perpetual common law copyright, the crown could, under the circumstances, acquire an

Millar v. Taylor, Burrows, p. 2404, 2405.

exclusive right over the translation of the Scriptures! Is King James intended as the first who acquired the right? Let us, then, examine his majesty's instructions to the translators, and their address to the readers, and we shall find that they freely used all the existing translations. To this, in fact, they were enjoined in the king's fourteenth rule, which runs thus: These 'translations to be used when they agree better with the text than the Bishops' Bible, viz., Tindal's, Coverdale's, Mathewe's, 'Whitchurch's, Geneva.' The translators confess, too, that they acted up to their instructions, and made the fullest use of the labors of their predecessors. These considerations suffice to destroy at once and for ever all claim to property in the translation. The claim of property, indeed, as distinguished from prerogative, was never dreamed of so long as the licensing acts existed.

The right appears, according to Blackstone, to be a sort of prerogative property; but Lord Chief Justice De Grey, in the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, speaking of the argument of the Solicitor-General York, in the case of Baskett v. University of Cambridge,* says, that property founded on prerogative, however allowable for counsel to put, was 'not admissible by, nor 'intelligible to, a judge;' and Lord Camden, in the same case, speaking of the arguments in favor of prerogative copies, says, 1st. It is put on the topic of prerogative, then of ownership.'

'First. Henry VI. brought over the printers and their presses; ergo, says counsel, he has an absolute right to the whole art, ' and all that it can produce.

6

2nd. Printing belongs to nobody; and what belongs to nobody is of course the king's.

3rd. The king pays his judges; ergo, he purchases that right 'for a valuable consideration.

4th. He paid for the translations of the Bible; therefore, forsooth, he bought a right to sell Bibles. Away with such 'trifling!'

This admirable sense found a ready response across the Irish Channel in the judicial bosom of Lord Chancellor Clare, in the case of Grierson v. Jackson. In giving judgment his lordship said, 'I can conceive that the king, as head of the Church, may say, that there shall be but one man who shall print 'Bibles and Books of Common Prayer, for the use of churches ' and other particular purposes; but I cannot conceive that the king has any prerogative to grant a monopoly as to Bibles for 'the instruction of mankind in revealed religion. If he had, it 'would be in the power of the patentee to put what price he

* 1 Bl. Rep. p. 106.

Ridgway's Rep. p. 304.

pleased upon the book, and thus prevent the instruction of mankind in revealed religion.'

Our readers have now before them the sum of the law upon the subject of the Bible monopoly; and, we think, men of understanding will be able to form their own opinion of its moral, if not also of its legal, merits. They must clearly see that the abolition of the Test and Corporation Acts has exerted an extraordinary influence upon this patent; and that a right to produce, or in any way to procure, the books employed in their public and social worship, is among the unquestionable privileges of English Nonconformists. So unjust, so unreasonable have the patentees for many years felt their privileges to be, that they have shrunk from the ungracious task of prosecution. They have winked at the infraction of their patent in all possible ways, even previous to the abolition of the Test Acts, when they might still have retired into the citadel of patents, precedents, and prerogatives, and have fulminated upon the unhappy men who had stepped within the enchanted circle. It was not thus fifty years ago. Patentees were then heroic men. Towards the close of the last century, so celebrated for pensions, jobbing, the contraction of debt, the plunder of the public, and the slaughter of men, public fasts were much in vogue. The periodicals of the day record the following fact relative to one of these occasions.

'CASE IN CHANCERY FOR THREE PENCE!!!

Eyre and Strahan, King's Printers, v. Ogilvy and Speare.

May 3, 1794.

A few days previous to the last general fast, the defendants, through ignorance of the law, sold one copy of the Form of Prayer,' appointed to be used upon that occasion, not printed by authority of the king's patent.

The plaintiffs, without giving the smallest intimation to desist, filed this bill to compel the defendants to account to them for the profit arising from the said sale. Upon being served with the subpœna, the defendants applied to have proceedings staid; which the plaintiffs, after considerable hesitation, agreed to, on condition of defendants paying costs, and making affidavit to the sale. This important cause was this day finished, when the plaintiffs received THREE PENCE !!! the profit arising from the sale; and when the attorney, Edward S. Foss, of Gough Square, did not blush to receive £13 6s. 9d. for costs incurred.'

Well and truly might Burke exclaim, were he now alive, the age of chivalry is gone, and the glory of Europe is departed for ever! Just conceive of Mr. Spottiswoode now commencing an action against some Bibliopole of the Row, for selling one

copy of a form of prayer not printed by him! The thing is impossible. The days of prosecution, the glory' of the patentees, are passed away, no more, we trust, to return. No patentee, in his senses, will, we believe, henceforth venture to appear in an English court to prosecute for the printing of the Scriptures. Were we ourselves printers, we should not hesitate, in the face of the whole world, to employ our types and presses in diffusing the Scriptures of truth. As Nonconformists, in particular, we boldly claim it as a part of our religious rights to prepare or procure our Bibles, as well as our other books of devotion, in whatever manner we please. That right we should exercise to the uttermost. We would, therefore, present no petitions on the subject. This we should deem worse than folly; it were to concede a point the reverse of the great principle which we assume, which we claim, and for which we are ready to contend to the last extremity! All such petitioning we consider to be in the highest degree both preposterous and injurious. In printing for ourselves we contend that we do no wrong. If the patentees think differently, and hold that they are thereby aggrieved, let them seek their remedy, and we will abide by the consequences! If they do not move, our object is gained; if they do, the question will then be tried; and if, in the eye of the bench, we have not in law what we know we have in justice, we will find means to redress the mighty grievance, and to conquer this glorious privilege, which, of right inalienable, belongs to the Dissenters of England! On many accounts this is the best method of proceeding. By petitioning we should only add strength to the cause of monopoly. Considering the state of parties in the House of Commons, and especially in the Lords, and above all the jealous and bitter feeling of the Established Church which would impel them to move heaven and earth to oppose the abolition, we deem all attempts in the way of petition little better than effort thrown away. We can, to be sure, conceive of an organization and a movement which would force the abolition, or compel the grant of a concurrent patent to the Dissenters; but this would take considerable time, and be a matter of some labor and expense. To all that might be necessary for the object, however, we would cheerfully submit were it necessary. But we are, after much deliberation, conscientiously opposed to all attempts at abolition by petitioning, on the ground of moral principle. It assumes as true what we maintain to be false, viz., 1st, the validity of the Bible patent; and, 2nd, its application, supposing its validity, to the Bibles used by Protestant Dissenters. We hold that the patent is not worth a straw; and we further hold that, whatever be its character, in relation to the Established Church, it cannot upon any principle of law, of justice, or of common sense, apply to us.