though spirited, adventurers had hoped that they might in time establish a trade with the savages for furs. Were these objects to involve nations in wars? If there was a question of their doing so, it was because considerations of a far different kind were attached to them- considerations of national honour and dignity; between which and the objects themselves, there may often be no more proportion, than between the picture of a great master, and the canvas on which it is painted. lar occasions; nor do I know of any addition necessary to be made, except to observe, that in estimating the terms of peace in the manner here proposed, you are not merely to consider the physical force, or pecuniary value, of the objects concerned, but also the effect which peace made in such and such circumstances, is likely to have on the character and estimation of the country; a species of possession, which, though neither tangible nor visible, is as much a part of national strength, and has as real a value, as any thing that can be turned into pounds and shillings, that can be sold by the score or hundred, or weighed out in avoirdupois. Accordingly a statesman, acting for a great country, may very well be in the situation of saying,-I would make peace at this time, if nothing more were in question, than the value of the objects now offered me, compared with those which I may hope to obtain: but when I consider what the effect is, which peace, made in the present circumstances, will have upon the estimation of the country; what the weakness is which it will betray; what the suspicions it will excite; what the distrust and alienation it will produce, in the minds of all the surrounding nations; how it will lower us in their eyes; how it will teach them universally to fly from connexion with a country, which neither protects its friends, nor seems any longer capable of protecting itself, iu order to turn to those, who, while their vengeance is terrible, will not suffer a hair of the head to be touched, of any who will put themselves under their protection; -when I consider these consequences, not less real, or permanent, or extensive, than those which present themselves in the shape of territorial strength or commercial resources, I must reject these terms, which otherwise I should feel disposed to accept, and say, that, putting character into the scale, the inclination of the balance is decidedly the other way. Sir, there is in all this nothing new or refined, or more than will be admitted by every one in words; though there seems so little disposition to adhere to it in fact. -If we refer to the practice of only our own time, what was the case of the Falkland Islands and Nootka? Was it the value of these objects, that we were going to war for? The one was a barren rock, an object of competition for nothing but seals and sea-gulls; the other a point of land in a wilderness, where some obscure, If I wished for authorities upon such a subject, I need go no farther than to the hon. gentleman (Mr. Fox), who has recurred to a sentiment produced by him formerly with something of paradoxical exaggeration (though true in the main), namely that wars for points of honour are really the only rational and prudential wars in which a country can engage. Much of the same sort is the sentiment of another popular teacher, Junius, who, upon the subject of these very Falkland islands, says, in terms which it may be worth while to quote, not for the merit of the language, nor the authority of the writer,-though neither of them without their value,-but to show what were once the feelings of Englishmen, and what the topics chosen by a writer, whose object it was to recom mend himself to the people: "To depart in the minutest article, from the nicety and strictness of punctilio, is as dangerous to national honour, as it is to female virtue. The woman who admits of one familiarity, seldom knows where to stop, or what to refuse; and when the counsels of a great country give way in a single instance, when they are once inclined to submission, every step accelerates the rapidity of their descent!" We are not therefore, according to the present fashion, to fall to calculating, and to ask ourselves, what is the value at market of such and such an object, and how much it will cost us to obtain it. If these objects alone were at stake, I should admit the principle in its full force; and should be among the first to declare, that no object of mere pecuniary value could ever be worth obtaining at the price of a war; but when particular points of honour are at stake, as at Nootka or the Falkland islands (without inquiring, whether in those cases the point of honour was either well chosen, or rightly estimated); and still more, where general impression, where universal estimation, where the conception lity to its engagements, its steady adherence to its purposes through all fortunes are to be called in question; it must be a strong necessity indeed, stronger than any which I believe to exist in the present instance, that ought to induce it even to listen to counsel liable to be attended to be formed of the feelings, temper, power, policy, and views of a great nation are in question, there to talk of calculating the loss or profit of possessions to which these considerations may be attached by their price at market, or the value of their fee-simple, is like the idea of Dr. Swift, when he is comparing the grants to the duke of Marl-with any of these consequences. It must borough, with the rewards of a Roman conqueror, and estimates the crown of laurel at two-pence. be a weighty danger, that in the scales of a great country, can be allowed to balance the loss of any part of its dignity. What The first question for a great country to then shall we say of a country, which, ask itself,-the first in point of order and abandoning from the outset every consithe first in consequence, is this: is the deration of this sort, will not wait till it part which I am about to act consonant to becomes insecure by ceasing to be that high estimation which I have hitherto respectable, but becomes unrespectable by maintained among the nations of the world? ceasing to be secure? Which drops at Will my reputation suffer ?*-whether once at the feet of its rival? Which that reputation relate to the supposed ex- begins by a complete surrender of its tent of its means, to the vigour and security; and suffers fame, character, digwisdom of its counsels, or to the upright-nity and every thing else to go along ness of its intentions. If, in any of these with it? ways, the country is to sustain a loss of character; if the effect of what is proposed be to render it less respected, less looked up to, less trusted, less feared; if its firmness in times of trial, its fide Whether such is the situation of this country, we shall judge better by taking a short view of the terms of the proposed peace. The description of these is simple and easy:-France gives nothing, and, excepting Trinidad, and Ceylon, England gives every thing. If it were of any con. *The answer to be given to this question, in the case of the present treaty, will be best ascertained perhaps by recurring to what hap-sequence to state what in diplomatic pened when the terms of the treaty were first language was the basis of this treaty, we declared. It was some time before any body must say, that it had no one basis; but could be found to believe them. The first re- that it was the status quo, on the part of porters, when they stated that every thing England, with the two exceptions in its was given up, except Ceylon and Trinidad; favour, of Ceylon and Trinidad; and the that Demerara, Cochin, the Cape, Malta, uti possidetis, with the addition of all the all were gone; were treated as persons who other English conquests, on the part of were joking, or who were themselves the France. But what may be the technical dupes of some idle joke put about by the op: description of the treaty, is, comparatively, position. Nobody could believe that the terms of the treaty were in reality such as of little importance. It is the result that that description represented them. On the is material, and the extent of power and continent, where the speculations are apt to territory, now, by whatever means, actube more refined; after some time given to ally remaining in the hands of France. disbelief, the difficulty was solved by the sup- The enumeration of this, liable indeed in position of secret articles. "Some great adpart to the disputed, but upon the whole vantages were to be secured to Great Britain sufficiently correct, may be made as of another kind:""Buonaparte was to abdicate:""Louis the 18th was to be restored:" &c. &c. It never entered the thought of any one, that the state of things was finally to prove, what it appeared in the first instance; and that from mere impatience of contest, from sheer impotence of mind, Great Britain had thus suddenly stopped in her career, dropped down as in a fit, and, abaudoning all her means of defence, was rolling herself in the dust at the feet of her adversary, regardless of what in future was to become of her, and looking to nothing but such temporary respite, as the satiate fury" of the foe, or some feeling still more degrading to her, might happen to yield. follows: In Europe.-France possesses the whole of the continent,* with the exception of *This position will not be thought to have become less commanding by the completion of an event, which, lost as this country is to all feeling of its situation, does seem to have produced some slight sensation, namely, the extinction of the Cisalpine Republic, and the reproduction of it under the new form and title of the Italian. Those who before doubted, to what degree Buonaparte was master of Europe, may find here wherewithal to settle their opinion. It is not the mere assumption * and invaluable port of Malta; so as to exclude us from a sea, which it had ever before been the anxious policy of Great Britain to keep in her hands,-and to render it now, truly and properly, what it was once idly called, the sea of France. In the West Indies,-St. Domingo,* Russia and Austria. If it be said, that parts of Germany, and the northern courts of Denmark and Sweden are not fairly described as being immediately under the control of France, we must balance this consideration by remarking, the influence which France possesses in these governments, and the commanding position which she occupies with respect to Austria, by the possession of Switzerland and Mantua, and those countries which have been considered always, and twice in the course of the present war, have proved to be the direct inlet into the heart of her dominions. In Asia,-Pondichery, Mahé, Cochin, Negapatam, the Spice Islands. In Africa, the Cape of Good Hope, Goree, Senegal. In the sea that is enclosed by these three continents, which connects them all, and furnishes to us in many respects our best and surest communication with them, -the Mediterranean,-every port and post except Gibraltar, from one end of it to the other, including the impregnable of so much new territory, or of so much new dominion at least, over a territory already dependent; nor the new danger arising from thence to Austria (either of them circumstances, that in former times, would have set the continent in a flame), but what the state must be of the powers of Europe, whoever they are, when they can sit quiet spectators of this proceeding, without daring to stir a step to prevent it. The assumption of this territory, though it be only a change in the form of the dominion exercised over it, must by no means be considered as of little importance. As has been well observed (vide Cobbett's Register, vol. 1, page 114), the use to be made of a country, in any state of independence, however nominal, is by no means the same, as when that country is placed at once in the hands of the governing power. France is mistress, it is true, of Spain and Prussia, and of Holland, Switzerland, Genoa, Tuscany, and all the south of Italy; but not to the same degree of the two former countries, as she is of the others; nor of the others, in the same manner as she is of the new Italian Republic. There may be a difference of several weeks. Among the posts and ports included in this description, we must not omit to particuJarize the island of Elba, with its port, Porto Ferrajo. This little island, small in extent, but not small in consequence, and rendered nobly conspicuous at the close of the day, by the last parting rays of British glory, which fell upon it, was supposed by the provisions of the treaty of Luneville to have been left indirectly only in the power of France; The inasmuch as it was expressly stipulated, that it was to form part of the territories of the new king of Etruria,-a king made by France; in the wantonness of her malice, and as a mockery of the ancient sovereigns of Europe. The possession of the island, however, in this way was not thought sufficient; and therefore, that nothing might be wanting to mark that perfect contempt of good faith which has never failed to be manifested by the republic in all her transactions with other countries, Elba was to be obtained by a secret treaty with the king of Spain, the chief of the house of which the king of Etruria was a member. the treaty of Luneville, and England in the consequence was, that when Austria in late preliminary treaty, thought that they had left this island, such as it had always been before, part and parcel of the duchy of Tuscany, they found it, to their great surprise, rising up against them, as a separate posses sion in the hands of France, ready to be employed for the more easy subjugation of Naples, and for whatever other purposes France might have to prosecute in that quarter of the world.-It is not easy to conceive an instance of more contemptuous imposition on one side, nor of more forlorn and pitiable acquiescence on the other. * Great doubt seems to be entertained at this moment, whether France will or will not finally obtain possession of St. Domingo; and great exultation to be felt in consequence by those, who, a few months ago, upon the ground that the conquest of St. Domingo, by France, was necessary for the security of our own islands, had consented to so extraordinary a measure as the sending out an immense armament, from the enemy's ports, in the interval between the preliminary and the definitive treaties. The probability is, that France will succeed, so far at least as to keep possession of part of the island; but should she not, then all the terrors affected to be felt at the establishment of a black empire, will return with ten-fold force; for the blacks will remain masters, -and masters after having tried their powers in a regular contest with European troops,-not to mention the hostility which they may well be suspected to conceive against us, who after various treaties and negotiations, the nature of which may require hereafter a little examination, finally lent our assistance to the sending out a force, intended for the purpose of bringing them back to slavery. Should the other event happen, and France obtain possession of St. Domingo, it may then well be a question, both the French and Spanish parts, Martinico, St. Lucie, Guadaloupe, Tobago, Curaco. In North America,-St. Pierre and Miquelon, with a right to the fisheries in the fullest extent to which they were ever claimed; Louisiana (so it is supposed),* how long we shall remain in possession of Jamaica. So little can ordinary men enter into that profound scheme of policy, which would give to your enemy at a peace, or even before peace was concluded, what you had yourself been artempting to acquire during the war, at the expense of more than ten thousand men, and probably of twice as many millions of money. What is here supposed is now found to be the fact. By a secret treaty settled with Spain, on the 21st March, 1801, but not to be declared till after peace with England, or till ministers should be found, who, previously to peace, would suffer France to do what she pleased, Spain cedes to France the possession of Louisiana, aud with it, as is supposed, that of the two Floridas. It is impossible to pretend that this event was one which could not have been foreseen. It was foreseen by the treaty of Utrecht; it was foreseen by the fears o every reflecting American; it was pointed out to the people of America, nearly six years ago, not only as an event likely to happen, but as likely to happen in the very mode which we have now scen (vide Cobbett's Register, page 199.) Putting foresight out of the question, the fact must have been known, had the ministers here either dared to question France, or instead of allowing France to negotiate for her allies, insisted on treating directly with those powers themselves. Dreadful is their responsibility, by whom these precautions have been neglected, and by whom these things have finally been suffered to happen. But the crime or madness of those who have caused these evils, is less to us than the evils themselves. France has hitherto reckoned her progress by states and kingdoms: she may now count by continents: she has established herself in the new world. By the possession of these countries, placed as they are, and combined with those which before belonged to her, she will hold, as by a sort of middle handle, the two great divisions of this quarter of the globe, and will brandish these continents like the blades of that tremendous instrument, which did such signal service in the patriot hands of lord Edward Fitzgerald. The consequences of this acquisition in one of the two hemispheres (North America) are well detailed, in different parts of the work above referred to [See p. 44, 199, 253, and 265]. France, planted now in the same continent with the United States, cutting them off from some of their richest districts, extending her settlements behind them, gra a word dreadful to be pronounced, to all who consider the consequences with which that cession is pregnant, whether as it acts northward, by its effects upon the United States, or southward, as opening a direct passage into the Spanish settlements in America. dually but not slowly, till the mouths of the Mississippi shall be united with the sources of the St. Lawrence, will soon make them feel the want of that security which they have hitherto derived from an intervening ocean: and against a new and unconsolidated mass of states, will finally effect that, which it required only ten years to accomplish against the old and well-compacted governments of Europe. In the mean-while we may employ ourselves in considering, what is likely to be her control over the conduct of America as respecting this country; what the danger to Canada, and to that portion of our trade, which is carried on with those countries; what the effect of a French establishment in Louisiana and the Floridas, joined to what France will have in St. Domingo, Martinique, and Guadaloupe, upon the whole of our WestIndian interests and possessions. But it is on the other side, and towards the South, that the scene is most awful; where we behold the whole wealth of the new world lying exposed in goodly prospect, and France, with no other point to settle than the moment when it may suit her convenience to take possession of it. Buonaparté, established in Louisiana, has as ready an access to the treasures of the Spanish mines, as any banker has to his strong box. Thanks to those who have given him the key of them. The wealth of Shain will from henceforward, directly and immediately, and with no necessity for any intermediate process, be the wealth of France: and let no man flatter himself with the hope, that it will become in her hands, what it was in those of its former possessors, the means of enfeebling strength, and relaxing industry and exertion. In succeeding to the riches of Spain, there is no ground to hope, that France will succeed to her weakness or folly. She will better profit by the example of her predecessors, and will keep her wealth in a due and perfect subordination to the higher and dearer interests of her ambition. Her mines will be only the store-house of her power. She will see, in these dark repositories, nothing but a magazine of future wars; which, like winds from the cave of Eolus, will rush forth to sweep the earth, and level whatever may yet be found to oppose the final accomplishment of her wishes. Unà Eurusque Notusque ruunt, creberque procellis Africus, et vastos volvunt ad litora fluctus. An open boat in the Bay of Biscay, with all the storms of heaven raging for its de South America she chooses to occupy; and as far as relates to the Spanish part, without even the necessity, a necessity that probably would not cost her much, of infringing any part of the present treaty. Such is the grand and comprehensive circle to which the new Roman empire may be soon expected to spread, now that peace has removed all obstacles, and In South America, Surinam, Demerara, Berbice, Essequibo, taken by us and now ceded; Guiana, and by the effect of the treaty, fraudulently signed by France with Portugal. just before the signature of these preliminaries, a tract of country extending to the river Amazon, and giving to France the command of the entrance into that river. Whether, by any secret article, the evils of this cession will prove to have been done away, time will dis-opened to her a safe and easy passage cover. In fact, (be that as it may), France may be said to possess the whole of the Spanish and Portuguese settlements upon that continent. For who shall say, that she has not the command of those settlements, when she has the command of the countries to which they belong;cum custodit ipsos custodes? She has, in truth, whatever part of the continent of struction, does not present an image of more unequal contest, than Great Britain struggling with a power, which combines against her the old world and the new; which to the force of nearly the whole continent of Europe, to something in Asia, to much in Africa, and more in the West-Indies, adds the naval resources of the continent of North America, and the wealth of the Spanish mines. All these latter dangers, be it remembered, are created solely and exclusively by the peace. While war continued, these resources could never have gone to the enemy; they might, at any moment when necessity had been pressing, or hope in Europe had become extinct, have been secured to ourselves. The fear of this was probably the cause which preserved so long to Spain and Portugal the nominal independence which they have enjoyed. But these advantages (we shall be told) could only be obtained by war; and war is ruin.Not exactly indeed to every country; because to France it has proved the means of empire and greatness; and even in Great Britain, up to the period of the ninth year of war, the progress of ruin did not seem to be very alarming. We shall know, before long, what the efficacy is of that provision, which grave and sober men have made for the happiness and safety of their country, in peace. * There is no chance that the evils of the peace in this respect will be done away, whatever may become of the particular cession here alluded to. Between the boundary settled by the treaty of Madrid and the boundary now conteded for, in whatever treaty this latter is to be found, the difference is so small as hardly to be worth disputing. Either will give to France the command of the river Amazon. In this view the French may possibly concede the point: unless indeed the assurances given by our ministers, that they meant to do so, may be a reason with them for maintaining it. [VOL. XXXVI.] into the three remaining quarters of the globe. Such is the power, which we are required to contemplate without dismay! under the shade of whose greatness we are invited to lie down with perfect tranquillity and composure! I should be glad to know, what our ancestors would have thought and felt in this situation? what those weak and deluded men, so inferior to the politicians of the present day,* Somers, the king Willlams, all those who the Marlboroughs, the Godolphins, the Somers, the king Willlams, all those who viewed with such apprehension the power of Louis 14th; what they would say to a peace, which not only confirms to France the possession of nearly the whole of Europe, but extends her empire over every other part of the globe. Is there a *There have always been, in the House of Commons, some half-dozen or dozen sensible men, who having found out, that Great Britain was an island, have been of opinion that all continental connexions are injurious, and calculated only to fill the pockets of those, who, in return for English guineas, had nothing to give but the valour and military talents of their subjects. As the progress of reason is slow, this party had remained for a century or more in a very obscure minority, opposed by all who for their wisdom or talents, or supposed knowledge of public affairs, had figured at any time in the history of the country. But oppressed as the party had long been, they have lived to see the day, when their opinions are at length triumphant; and when the ministers of the country, with the full approbation of parliament and of the nation, are settling a treaty of peace upon a formal recognition of their principle, and declare in substance, that Great Britain has no longer any concern or interest in the affairs and situation of the continent. It is only unfortunate, that time has not yet been given to evince the truth of this principle by experience. When it shall be seen that the renunciation of foreign connexions, and retreat into our insular resources, shall have produced no harm, but that, on the contrary, the power and prosperity of Great Britain shall have risen higher than before, then will this doctrine have received its full and final confirmation. [H] |