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faith was pledged to the observance of the peace; that it was an obligation binding upon the country to maintain it inviolable. After such a declaration, what objection could possibly be urged against the discussion of the terms of the treaty? What inconvenience could result from pointing out the injurious effects likely to proceed from them? Why was he not to be allowed to urge the House to fix a mark upon those impolitic and weak ministers who had negotiated such a treaty, and whose counsels had concluded it? It was not his wish to interrupt the treaty now that it was made; but only to lay before the House the dangerous tendency of its provisions, that future ministers might be warned against advising a measure so disadvantageous to the country. The object of what he should state to their lordships was prospective-it was to ascertain the situation in which the country stood now the peace was settled, and its terms agreed to-it was to point out the state of danger in which the country was involved by the treaty-not for the purpose of shunning the danger, but of exciting the country to adopt the real line of courage by preparing to meet it. Such was the view with which he had desired the attendance of their lordships this day. He should propose to them to lay before his majesty an address, expressive of their determination to preserve inviolate the treaty; but, having done so, to represent to his majesty the state of the country, and the means of avoiding the danger which threatened it. This was what he conceived it was the duty of their lordships as legislators to perform; and it should be his task to point out his reasons for doing so. For this purpose, it was necessary to advert to the arguments which had been advanced against the preliminary articles, and the events which had taken place since. He had already stated to the House his objections to the preliminary treaty: if the definitive treaty had been conformable to the preliminary articles, and the relative situation of France and Spain had not altered by intervening circumstances, however he might have been disposed to have protested against the definitive treaty, he should not have thought it necessary to have proposed to the House the adoption of any new measure; but he found that all the grounds of the pretensions on the part of France, as contained in the preliminary treaty, had not only been [VOL. XXXVI.]

confirmed by the definitive treaty, but exceeded. The terms of the latter were therefore infinitely more prejudicial than the former. He could not avoid calling the attention of the House to what had been the arguments used against the preliminary articles. It had been stated, that in all negotiations for peace there were two grounds or bases necessary to be adhered to: when after a long contest between two nations, the respective governments were considering how they might restore the blessings of peace and tranquillity, the basis on which the negotiation proceeded was, either the status ante bellum, the actual situation in which the parties stood before the war, or the situation in which they stood at the time of the negotiation, which was called the uti possidetis. Instead of the negotiators of the definitive treaty proceeding distinctly upon one of these grounds, they had applied both in the most prejudicial manner possible to this country. They had referred to the status ante bellum with regard to England, by giving up all she had taken during the war to France; and they had adopted the uti possidetis as to France, by leaving her in possession of all that she had acquired. It was obvious, that at the commencement of the negotiation each country was in possession of some advantage which operated to the disadvantage of the other. It was to our disadvantage that France possessed so much power on the continent; and it was to the disadvantage of France that we, by the superior skill and valour of our navy, were possessed of the colonies of France and Spain. The arrangement to have been desired was, that we should have diminished the power of France upon the continent, in proportion to our sacrifices with respect to the colonies that we had taken. If France could not have been persuaded to that, then it was our duty to have extended our mari. time power, for the purposes of compelling her. As far as appeared by the treaty, ministers had made no attempt whatever to reduce the power of France on the continent, but had, by concessions abroad, given her the means of weakening our colonial strength. This was not acting upon the principle adopted by lord Chatham at the peace of 1763. That enlightened statesman had always considered, that every preliminary treaty should be as definitive as possible. If the preliminary articles of 1763 were compared with the definitive, it would appear [2 Y]

which Portugal had been placed by the definitive treaty, the House had been merely told that it was a pity it should be so; and, with regard to the prince of Orange, their lordships were informed by one of the servants of the crown, that he looked at the articles concerning that prince with regret. The indemnity to the prince of Orange was left in such a situation by the treaty, that it depended entirely upon France whether he should

that there was scarcely any difference between them; while the direct contrary was the case with regard to the present treaty. By the incapacity of the negotiators, they had left themselves to treat with France during the pendency of a naval armistice. The question before that armistice was, whether this country would suffer the fleets of France, which were blockaded in the mouths of their harbours, to stir out. But what occurred immediately after the preliminary treaty? Inever be indemnified or not. As to the direct opposition to our entreaties and Cape of Good Hope, not a word had threats, France sent an armament to the been said, whether it would be advantageWest Indies, and imposed on this country ous to have it a free port or not. Why, the necessity of also sending to the West after having stipulated that Malta should Indies a naval force more than double any be independent, and that its independence that we had sent during the war. Thus should be guaranteed by one of the powers the first-fruits of the peace was the neces- of Europe competent to its protection, sity of keeping an armament of thirty-five was it placed under the guarantee of six sail of the line in the West Indies.-He powers, who never could be brought to would not enter into the pretence, on the agree upon the subject of it? How could part of France, for sending the expedition Malta retain its independence? How that she did send; nor would he discuss was it possible that the expense of the the question whether it would or would garrison, stores, and charges of maintainnot be better for this country if St. Do- ing that fortress, could be provided by a mingo was under the dominion of France. power to whom no revenues were left?" He should only observe, that, the more The expense of providing for Malta urgent and pressing were the wishes of amounted to 130,000l. annually, while its Buonaparté to send that armament, the revenues really applicable to that expendimore ought it to have been the policy of ture did not amount to more than 25,000l. the negotiators on the part of this country The inference he drew from his statement to have insisted, that the French fleet was, that the election of the Grand Master should not have sailed till the preliminary must depend upon France, and that, in all articles were converted into a definitive probability, the whole island would shortly treaty, and until he had afforded a con- fall under the power of France.-He next viction that he had no intention of ob- adverted to an advantage given to the taining such a cession as he had since ob- French with respect to the mutual cession tained in Italy.Something had been said of the colonies. It was stipulated, that of the time and temper in which the peace the French inhabitants of Ceylon and had been made on the part of France, Trinidad might retire from those islands, and that it afforded a proof that the per- while nothing of the kind was admitted son at the head of the French government into the treaty with regard to the colohad become a harmless, inoffensive neigh-nies that we ceded to France. His lordbour, and wished to show how much he had been misrepresented, when it had been insinuated that there were no bounds to his ambition. He would leave it to any man to say, whether, if peace depended upon the disposition of the republic, we should enjoy it, even for the length of time the present debate would occupy. It was evident the definitive treaty contained concessions infinitely more important than the preliminary articles; and it was no less true, that the conduct of the French government evinced a design to exclude the commerce of this country from the continent of Europe. With respect to the situation in

ship contended, that by the non-renewal of the treaty of Utrecht this country had renounced the stipulation, that France should not acquire in Spanish America any privileges with reference to commerce that were not granted to England. It was needless to urge how much more important such a stipulation would have been at the present moment than at the period of the treaty of Utrecht. By the treaty of 1783, we had ceded Goree and Senegal; but at the same time the cession was under a stipulation for the liberty of carrying on the gum trade; but now the cession had been confirmed without the renewal of the stipulation. That it

was the intention of France to make war | country should have retained the soveagainst our commerce, was evident from reignty of the Cape. In order to be able the circumstance of a decree having been to bring home our commercial fleets from issued by the government, forbidding the India, or to send out troops, it would be right of trading on the coast of that part always necessary to send a convoy, and of Africa. He should be glad if the sug- then we should be insecure. In time of gestions he had stated could be repelled. war, how was a single regiment to be If their lordships could be satisfied that sent? It was true, that troops might be the definitive treaty would not prejudice sent directly from Great Britain to India, the rights of this country, then, if he without touching at the Brazils or the could not approve of it, he should be Cape; but in such case they would not be ready to admit, that, the preliminary arti- fit for service for many months after they cles having been approved by parliament, had landed. But the advantages we posit was bound to sanction the definitive sessed in the sovereignty of the Cape was treaty. It had been acknowledged that this-When the war broke out in the the possession of Italy by France would Mysore with Tippoo Sultan, we sent a justify a recurrence to a state of war- corvette to the Cape, whence a force of this was not his own argument, but the fresh troops were dispatched fit for immeadmission of the secretary of state. He diate service, landed, marched up the now entreated the attention of the House country, and were present at the siege of to the situation in which the country stood Seringapatam. It was not, he believed, at the time of the commencement of the too much to say, that, by ceding the Cape negotiation. It was in a state of war, to Holland, we had, in point of fact, but under circumstances calculated as ceded it to the power of France. In the much as possible to alleviate its inconve- West Indies we had restored to France niences, We had acquired the possession Martinique and Tobago, and had facili of colonies to an immense extent, which tated the means of recovering St. Dominwere valuable, not only from their military go. She was besides in possession of situation, but from their affording the Louisiana, and the fruitful country of means of carrying on the war itself, The Florida; for it was a circumstance too produce of the West Indies had been plain to admit of a doubt, that Spain 2,000,000l. annually, from which a very never could keep Florida while France considerable revenue had arisen. This had possession of Louisiana. In addition resource was lost. We had by our naval to these advantages she had the means power obtained such a preference, that of entering Mexico at any time.-Such the fleets of France could not stir; now was the comparative situation of France. they had been suffered to proceed to the and England in the East and West InWest Indies; and we were compelled to dies and America. How did we stand send an expensive armament to watch with respect to the Mediterranean, the them. We were also in possession of re- next seat of our naval interest? sources sufficient to have enabled us to naval superiority in the Mediterranean have carried on the war till we had ob- was most important; but his majesty's tained just, adequate, and reasonable con- ministers had placed the country in such ditions of peace. Had we availed our- a situation, that he defied any one to tell selves of them? No; we had left to him how a single ship could be sent to the France the whole preponderating power Mediterranean. By this policy they had of the continent, and had confirmed her dispossessed the country of Majorca, Miin the possession of Italy. We had also norca, and even the Island of Elba, which added to France possessions of consider- could only be useful to France for the able importance in India, but had omitted purpose of excluding us from Leghorn. to stipulate that they should not be forti- We were thus destitute of the means of fied. We had given up to Holland the maintaining any fleet in the Mediterranean. town and port of Cochin; a situation His majesty's ministers had put it out of which the French would avail themselves the power of the king of Sardinia to open of for the purpose of intrigue-one in his ports to an English fleet. It was owwhich we should have most to apprehending to the assistance afforded by the king from the attempts of France, and be least able to counteract them. His lordship maintained, that it was necessary, for the safety of our Indian possessions, that this

Our

of Naples and Sicily, that lord Nelson had been able to refit that fleet which had effected the overthrow of the French armament at Aboukir, and disappointed the

gigantic ambition of France. What was the return the English government had made to him for his assistance? It had procured a stipulation, that France should evacuate his dominions, but had not provided that she should not return whenever she thought proper. The inevitable consequence of such policy would be, that France would obtain the possession of Naples, and in the end we should find ourselves excluded by France from the whole commerce of the Levant. Every object of importance obtained by the valour of our navy had been surrendered by the counsels of those ministers who had made them pass into the hands of France. -Now to address their lordships on the subject of the defence made to these various charges-the defence rested on the ground of an imperious necessity for peace. In this defence, the noble lord who had advanced it was at least consistent, because he had uniformly maintained, that the country was not in a condition to strain every resource to carry on the war; but his majesty's ministers denied the existence of any such necessity. If it was true, that the country was under circumstances of imperious necessity, it was not astonishing that the definitive treaty should have been agreed to; but what security had we that France would suffer us to recover from that state of necessity to which she had reduced us? Such a plea on our part would only furnish a pretence for going on from sacrifice to sacrifice, from loss to disgrace, till at last we had nothing to contend for. It was to prevent this that he had brought forward the present motion, from which he was persuaded every advantage would be derived. It would have the effect of declaring to the public and to the enemy, that the country was not reduced to the necessity of making a disgraceful peace. In fact, such an argument as that founded upon necessity could not be raised by any country that was not prepared to receive the yoke of a conqueror. The question was, whether the advantages of the peace were greater than the disadvantages of the war? If it was expedient to have made this peace, it must have been so from the consideration that some advantage was obtained by it. The advantages might possibly be said to have proceeded from the extension of our commerce; or from enabling the country to adopt a system of economy; or from our having obtained some security for the continu

ance of peace. He should consider these points separately. With respect to our commerce, the peace must evidently have operated to the diminution of it. In support of this proposition, he referred to many observations respecting the acquisition of commercial power by France under the definitive treaty. Upon the question of economy, he contended, that in order to be able to husband our revenue, it was necessary that we should be able to protect it. With this view, he recommended government to keep a large naval and military establishment in a constant state of discipline. With regard to any naval establishment in the Mediterranean, ministers by their conduct had rendered it impossible to send a fleet there. It was with peculiar satisfaction he understood it was the intention of government to adopt the necessary measures of having a large channel fleet ready for actual service at forty-eight hours notice. With respect to security having been obtained for not going to war again, he could assure the House that no man wished more than himself that such might be the case. If it was not so, this country would have to commence a new war under every cir cumstance of disadvantage. If at the end of three campaigns we recovered what we had given up by the treaty, he should think we had made a most glorious war. Such was the situation in which the country stood; and he flattered himself that the House would concur with him in the propriety of considering how we might best resist the danger that threatened us. He feared the spirit of the country would be broken, unless its councils were directed by abler men. He had deemed it necessary to desire the House to carry a declaration to the foot of the throne, containing a resolution, that the House was ready to attend to every practicable economy calculated to enable this country to resist every future attempt on the part of the enemy; but that, in order to do so, it would be necessary to have a scale of defence sufficient to meet the danger.-The noble lord next adverted to the question of the right of the British flag in the navigation of the Eastern seas, and the claims of France and Holland to carry on a free and independent trade. He observed, that although this country might be disposed to treat such claims as ridiculous, Holland and France might not do so. If it should be necessary to maintain a war in India for the sovereignty of the

territory, he should consider such war as Just and necessary; but the question was, whether France and Holland would entertain the same opinion? Perhaps the very ship that carried out the orders to give up the factories to the French, might bring back an account of actual hostilities. He deprecated the consequences of a war in India, particularly at a time when the East India directors had stated that the company was too poor to instruct their own servants in the rudiments of their business. The noble lord again adverted to the impolicy of suffering the treaties to expire, recapitulated his arguments, and expressed his intention of introducing into the Address a hope that no time might be lost in settling, by amicable adjustment, those points which had not been arranged by the definitive treaty. He concluded by moving,

"That an humble Address be presented to his majesty, to assure his majesty, that we have taken into our most serious consideration the treaty of peace, which his majesty has been graciously pleased to communicate to this House:

"That we acknowledge, with all humility and submission, his majesty's undoubted prerogative of peace and war; and that we shall consider it to be our first duty, as far as may depend on us, to maintain inviolate the public faith, as it is pledged by this treaty, and to assist his majesty in performing, with uprightness and punctuality, those engagements into which his majesty has been advised to

enter.

"But that we cannot conceal the painful apprehensions with which we consider the result of those engagements, nor can we forbear to offer to his majesty our humble and dutiful advice for the adoption of such measures as can alone, in our opinion, under the blessing of Providence, avert from us the dangers with which we are now surrounded:

and unavoidable dispute which it has left entirely unadjusted;-and, above all, those continued and systematic projects of aggrandizement, of which, in the very moment of peace, we have seen, unhappily, such undeniable and convincing evidence:

"That, by relinquishing so many sources of prosperity in peace, and so many bulwarks of defence in war, and, by renouncing, at the same time, the advantage and security always hitherto derived from the accustomed renewal of former treaties, the British government has imposed on itself a greater necessity than has ever before existed for measures of increased precaution, and for determinations of unshaken constancy:

"That we therefore rely on his majesty's paternal wisdom, for a watchful and unremitted attention to the situa tion and future conduct of the power with whom we have negociated; and we think it necessary more especially to assure his majesty, of our ready and firm support in that determination, which, we trust, his majesty will henceforward pursue, of resisting every fresh encroach. ment, of whatever nature, which shall be attempted in the maritime, commercial, or colonial rights and interests of the British empire:

"This our solemn declaration must, as we believe, materially conduce to prevent the necessity which it is calculated to meet: and we trust that his majesty will also approve of our desire to support it by a scale of naval and military defence, adequate to the extent of our danger, and to the importance of the interests which

we have to maintain :

"The anxiety which we feel in this respect, is the necessary consequence of our sincere wish for the permanence of the public tranquillity, which his majesty has now re-established: And it is for the same important purpose, "That it is impossible for us to have that we also most earnestly recommend seen, without the utmost anxiety and to his majesty's wisdom the pressing nealarm, all the unexampled circumstances cessity of arranging, by immediate and which have attended the final conclusion amicable discussion, those points of essenof the present peace :-The extensive and tial interest which had been adjusted by important sacrifices, which, without any former treaties, but for which no provi. corresponding concession, this treaty has sion has been made in this negotiation: added to those already made on our part "These counsels we submit to his maby the preliminary articles :-the un-jesty with confidence, in the present awful looked-for and immense accessions of crisis of public affairs, prepared to meet territory, influence, and power, which it with firmness all the difficulties and danhas tacitly confirmed to France:-the gers of our present situation, but desirous, numerous subjects of clashing interest, above all things, to promote the stability

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