curity to our colonial possessions. It was to them we were indebted for the unparalleled exertions which we have been enabled to make in the course of this long and eventful contest; it was by them that we were enabled, in the wreck of Europe, not only to effect our own security, but to hold out to our allies the means of safety, if they had been but true to themselves. He might happen to be in alliance. our trade, to which we owed our present greatness and our naval superiority, did not exist he alluded to the great increase of our manufactures-to our great internal trade-to our commerce with Ireland, with the United states of America, with the East and the West Indies: it was these which formed the sinews of our strength, and compared with which the Levant trade was trifling. In another In thus considering the subject, it was point of view, he admitted that possessions necessary to look to the leading quarters in the Mediterranean were of importance of the world in which we were to seek for to enable us to co-operate with any conthis security. It was evident that our actinental power or powers, with whom we quisitions were all in the Mediterranean, in the East and in the West Indies. Those who thought that this country ought to retain all its acquisitions, would of course consider any cession made by us as incompatible either with our safety or with our honour. But those who did not go that length, would agree with him in thinking, that when we were to give back a part, and retain a part of our conquests, it was our duty to consider, which of them were the best calculated to promote the two great leading objects to which he had before alluded; and if it should appear, upon examining the pre-diterranean, to the attainment of the sent treaty of peace, that in two out of the three quarters which he had mentioned, viz. in the East and in the West Indies, we had retained such possessions, as were the best calculated to effect the security of our ancient possessions, we had, every circumstance considered, done as much as could be expected. Without undervaluing our conquests in the Mediterranean, and the gallant achievements by which they had been effected, especially the capture of Malta (and certainly no man was less inclined to undervalue them than he was), yet it must be admitted by every man acquainted with the real interests of this country, that compared with the East and West Indies, the Mediterranean is but a secondary consideration: indeed this was a proposition so obvious, that it was unnecessary for him to enter into any arguments upon the subject, Of the importance of the Levant trade, much had formerly been said: volumes had been written upon it, and even nations had gone to war to obtain it. The value of that trade, even in the periods, to which he had alluded, had been much exaggerated; but even supposing those statements to have been correct, they applied to times when the other great branches of means of giving additional security to our possessions in the East and West Indies. It was upon this principle that he heartily approved of the choice which ministers had made, in preferring our security in the West Indies to any acquisitions that we might have made in the Mediterranean; because he considered it as a rule of prudence, which ought never to be deviated from, not unnecessarily to mortify the feelings or pride of an enemy[Hear, hear! from the other side] Gentlemen, from their manner, seemed to think that he had not always adhered to that maxim: he would not interrupt his argument by entering into a personal defence of himself; but, whenever gentlemen were inclined to discuss that point, he was perfectly ready to meet them, giving them the full benefit of any expressions that he had ever used. Supposing the events of the war to be equally balanced, and in negotiating for one of two possessions, both of equal value, but that our possessing one of them would hurt the feelings or mortify the pride of the enemy more than the other, he should think that a justifiable reason for selecting the other; he did not say this from any affectation of sentiment, or peculiar tenderness towards the enemy, but because that could be adopted, than to make it independent both of England and France. an enemy would not give up such a possession without obtaining from us more than an equivalent. Upon this principle, he hoped the House would concur with him in thinking, that we ought not to insist upon retaining the island of Malta. If our object had been to retain any possession which had formerly belonged to the enemy, and which we had captured from them, with the view of adding to the security of our old dominions, then Malta did not come under the description, be cause it was not an ancient possession of the enemy, but had been acquired by him unjustly from a third power. It therefore appeared to him more consistent with wisdom and sound policy, rather to put Malta under the protection of a third power, capable of protecting it, than, by retaining it ourselves, to mortify the pride and attract the jealousy of the enemy. In turning his attention to the East Indies, he certainly saw cause for regret, because the opinion he had been taught to entertain of the value of the Cape of Good Hope was much lighter than that expressed by his noble friend. He knew there were great authorities against him; but, on the other hand, from what he had heard from marquis Cornwallis, and from a right hon. friend of his, who had long presided over the affairs of India (Mr. Dundas), he was induced to think the Cape of Good Hope a more important place than it had been represented on this occasion. But thinking thus highly as he did of the Cape, he considered it as far inferior indeed to Ceylon, which he looked upon to be, of all the places upon the face of the globe, the one which The other possession which we had would add most to the security of our acquired, and upon the propriety of re- East-Indian possessions, and as placing taining which, much had been said, was our dominions in that quarter in a greater Minorca. With respect to this island, degree of safety than they had been in he perfectly concurred in the opinion of from the first hour that we set our foot on his noble friend (lord Hawkesbury), that the continent of India. An hon. friend it would always belong to the power who of his, had lamented that we had not stipossessed the greatest maritime strength; pulated for the retention of Cochin, and the experience of the four last wars proved stated, that in the former negotiations the justice of this observation; for Mi- lord Malmesbury had been instructed to norca had regularly shifted hands accord- insist upon its remaining in our possession. ing to the preponderance of maritime How far lord Malmesbury was instructed strength in the Mediterranean. In time to insist upon, or recede from, certain of peace, Minorca was a possession of no points contained in that projet, he did not great importance or utility; in time of feel himself now at liberty to state; but war, it could be of no use whatever, un- he believed no man would be inclined to less we possessed a maritime superiority; say, that it must of necessity be an ultiand if we did possess that superiority, ex- matum, because it was contained in a perience had shown that it would probably projet. Indeed one of the complaints fall into our hands. Upon these grounds, which we had against the French upon he, for one, would not have advised much that occasion was, that they wanted us, to be given in another quarter for the contrary to every diplomatic form, to purpose of enabling us to retain the give in our ultimatum first. He knew island of Minorca, doubting, as he did, that it was the opinion, at that time, of a whether in time of peace it was worth the noble marquis to whom he had before expense of a garrison. He thought, alluded, and who had rendered such therefore, that we were justified in look- essential services in India; but he was ing to the East and West Indies for the wrong in particularising India, for there possessions which it was our interest to was scarcely a quarter of the globe in retain; but he could not help expressing which this country had not derived imporhis regret, that circumstances were such tant advantages from the exalted talents as to prevent us from retaining a place so and virtues of that noble person, who important in many points of view, as the was now about to receive the last reward island of Malta; he lamented also, that of his services, in putting the finishing it was not possible for us to have made a hand to a treaty which would give peace to more definitive arrangement respecting its the world, after a war in which he had future fate; but unless we had been pre-had so large a share in averting from this pared to say that we would retain it our-country the dangers which threatened the selves, he did not know any better plan most vulnerable part of our possessions that the retaining of Cochin was necessary to the security of our Indian dominions. But the noble marquis, he was sure, did not now retain the same opinion, because its importance then depended upon its being a frontier post, to secure us from an enemy whom we had since completely destroyed. It would not surely be contended for a moment, that, when the power of Tippoo Sultaun was entire, and when there was a direct road from his dominions into our's, Cochin was not of infinitely more importance than it could be now when his dominions were in our possession. He did not wish to give a ludicrous illustration of this argument: but he was really so much astonished at what had been said upon this point, that he could not help stating a case which appeared to him directly in point with the present. If we were to look into the ancient periods of our history, when Scotland was a separate kingdom, hostile to us, and in strict alliance with France, the town of Berwick-upon-Tweed was a place of the greatest importance to us as a fortified frontier post; but surely it could not be said to be of equal importance now, when Scotland and England are united into one kingdom. This parallel did not appear to him to be exaggerated; and if Cochin was of no importance as a military post, he was inclined to think that its commercial value was not very great. As to the advantages that we must derive from the possession of Ceylon, it was unnecessary for him to enlarge upon them; they were too obvious not to be felt by every body. With regard to the Cape, he had before stated his opinion of its value; but if we could not retain it without continuing the war, he thought ministers had acted wisely in giving it up upon the terms they had, because, in point of value, it was inferior to Ceylon and Trinidad. He now came to the consideration of our situation in the West Indies; and he was decidedly of opinion, that, of all the islands which the fortune of war had put into our hands in that quarter, Trinidad was the most valuable; he should prefer it even to Martinico; undoubtedly as a protection to our Leeward Islands it was the better of the two, and, in point of intrinsic value, the more important. As to its value as a post from which we might direct our future operations against the possessions of Spain in South America, it must be felt by every one to be the best situated of any part in the West Indies. He had always been of opinion, that when it came to be a question merely of terms between England and France, we ought to retain the possession of one of the great naval stations in the West Indies, because our great want in that quarter was a naval port. The four great naval stations were Guadaloupe, Martinico, St. Lucia, and Trinidad; and those of Trinidad and Martinico were the best, and the former the better of the two. He would now trouble the House shortly upon the subject of our allies. With respect to the Porte we had done every thing that we were bound to do: nay more-we had compelled the French to the evacuation of Egypt, and had stipulated for the integrity of her dominions. There was another object which we had obtained, and to which he did not think so much importance had been given as it deserved; he meant the establishment of an infant power, viz. the republic of the Seven Islands, which would perhaps have otherwise fallen under the dominion of France: this certainly was an acquisition of great importance for this country, not inferior, perhaps, to the possession of Malta itself. The only answer he had heard upon the subject was, that there had been a treaty concluded between France and the Porte, by which the evacuation of Egypt was stipulated for; but it could not be for a moment doubted that it was to the exertions of this country, and to the brilliant achievements of our army and navy, that the evacuation of Egypt must be attributed; and if France had, by a diplomatic trick, taken the advantage of this in two treaties, that could not derogate from the merit of this country. With regard to Naples, we were not bound to do any thing for her. She had even desired to be released from her engagements to us; but she was compelled to this by an over-ruling necessity; and the government of this country, in its conduct towards Naples, had only acted in conformity to its own interests, and that upon large and liberal grounds, in endeavouring to repair the fortunes of an ally who had given way only to force. The hon. gentleman had argued, that we ought to have guaranteed to Naples her dominions, because, from the contiguity of the Cisalpine republic to Naples, the French might, in pursuance of the treaty, evacuate their territories one day, and re-enter them the next; but if, from the situation of Europe, the present stipulation could not effect the security of Naples, it must be obvious that any guarantee would be equally unavailing. With regard to Sardinia, the same observations were applicable; for we were not bound to interfere for her, unless it was to be maintained that we were to take upon ourselves the task of settling the affairs of the continent. But if we were unable to settle the affairs of that part of the continent which was in our own neighbourhood, with what effect of propriety could we attempt it in Italy? He was ready to grant that we ought to have claimed Piedmont for its sovereign, but could we have obtained it? Could we have procured its restoration, unless we could have disposed of the king of Etruria, unless we could have gained the Cisalpine and Ligurian republics, and driven the French from the mountains of Switzerland? Unless we could have done all this, it would have been in vain to restore the king of Sardinia to his capital, surrounded as he would have been by the French, and by their dependent and affiliated republics. As to Portugal, eyery body must lament her misfortunes. But if it was right in her to ask to be released from her engagements to us, and if it was right in us to consent to it, then clearly we were absolved from any obligation to her, because an obligation which is put an end to on the one side, can, upon no fair reasoning, be said to continue on the other. As to the cession of Olivenza, it certainly was not of any great importance; but much had been said about the territory which France had obtained from Portugal in South America, and a considerable degree of geographical knowledge had been displayed in tracing the course of rivers; but gentlemen should recollect, that a South-American and a European river were materially different; for when you were talking of the banks of a river in South America, it was in fact very often little less than the coasts of an ocean. It had been said, "you affect to guarantee the integrity of Portugal, but it is only after France and Spain have taken every thing they wished for." But this again was not correct. The treaty of Badajos certainly did not give to France all she desired, because France, by a subsequent treaty, extorts another cession of still greater importance to her. [VOL. XXXVI.] What happens then? Portugal has given up this second portion of her territory by force, when you interfere and cancel the second treaty, and bring them back to the stipulations in the first. To you, then, Portugal owes this difference in the limits of her South-American empire, and to her you have acted not only with good faith, but with dignified liberality The only remaining ally was the prince of Orange. From our ancient connexions, from our gratitude for the services of the house of Orange at the period of the Revolution, from his connexion with our sovereign, we could not but take a lively interest in his fate, and we had shown it by our conduct. He was not to be told of the guarantee of the constitution of Holland, without recalling to the recol lection of the House the efforts we had made to defend, the unparalleled exertions we had used to restore him to his dominions. Even on the present occasion his interests had not been neglected. We did interfere for him; and we were told, that his interests were at that time the subject of negotiation, and that he would receive an indemnity. Even if we were to take that upon ourselves, it ought not to stand in the way of a great national arrangement. Thus stood the case with regard to our acquisitions and to our allies. But it had been said, that we ought to have obtained more; that we ought to have obtained something to balance the great increase of power which France had obtained; that we have given France the means of increasing her maritime strength, and, in short, that " we have signed the death-warrant of the country." Now, in the first place, if we had retained all our conquests, it would not have made any difference to us in point of security. He did not mean to say, he would not have retained them all if he could; but they were no more important than as they would give us a little more or a little less of colonial power, and only tended to promote our security by increasing our finance. But would the acquisition of all these islands have enabled us to counterbalance the power which France had acquired on the continent? They would only give us a little more wealth; but a little more wealth would be badly purchased by a little more war: he should think so, even if we could be sure that one year's more war would give it to us; particularly when it was recollected, how [F] many years we had now been engaged in this contest. In speaking, however, about our resources, he would take upon himself to state (and he hoped the House would give him credit for some knowledge upon the subject), that if any case of necessity should arise, or if our honour should require another contest, we were far, very far indeed, from the end of our pecuniary resourses, which, he was happy to say, were greater than the enemy, or even the people of this country themselves, had an idea of. For the purpose of defence, or for the security of our honour, we had still resources in abundance; but they ought to be kept for those purposes, and not lavished away in continuing a contest, with the certainty of enormous expense. We might sit down in a worse relative situation than we were in at present, our object not obtained, our security not effected. As to the general point, we could not now think of balancing the powers on the continent. It was undoubtedly right, that if the French had conquered much, we ought also to endeavour to retain much; but in treating with France, we were not to consider what France had got from other countries, but what was the relative situation between us and France. Gentlemen had talked of the uti possidetis; but France had not insisted upon the principle in her treaties with the powers on the continent; she had not retained the possession of all she had conquered, and consequently we could not be justified in insisting upou that principle. He admitted, that if a country had increased in power and territory faster than its natural rival (for, without speaking hastily, he must consider France in that character), that might justify the engaging in a confederacy to bring him back to his ancient strength; but if he had been able to dissolve that confederacy, that would perhaps be the worst reason in the world why, when we came to make peace with him, we were to expect the more favourable terms. It would be but bad reasoning, if one power were to say to another, "You are much too powerful for us, we have not the means of reducing that power by force, and therefore you must cede to us a portion of your territories, in order to make us equal in point of strength." Gentlemen might undoubtedly wish this; but that which regulated wishes, would not regulate actions. Many things might be prayed for, that were hardly to be expected in reality. But he did not see that we were giving to the enemy all this colonial wealth and maritime power which had been represented; what we gave back was not only smaller than what we retained, but much of it was in a ruined state. He was therefore inclined to think, that, for many years at least, we should have the colonial trade, and that too increasing in extent and value. That we should not have been justified in asking for more, he did not mean to assert; but that we should have got more, or that we ought to have continued the war to increase our possessions, was a proposition to which he could not give his assent. Allusions had been made to former opinions and language; upon this subject he should only say, that, peace having been restored between England and France, forbearance of language and terms of respect were proper; but it would be affectation and hypocrisy in him to say, that he had changed, or could change, his opinion of the character of the person presiding in France, until he saw a train of conduct which would justify that change. He would not now occupy the attention of the House by entering into a discussion of the origin of the war; the unjust aggression which was made upon us was established by recent evidence; but it was unnecessary to enter into it now, because, upon that subjebt, the opinion of the House and of the country was fixed. The great object of the war, on our part, was defence for ourselves and for the rest of the world, in a war waged against most of the nations in Europe, but against us with particular malignity. Security was our great object; there were different means of accomplishing it, with better or worse prospects of success; and, according to the different variations of policy occasioned by a change of circumstances, we still pursued our great object, security. In order to obtain it, we certainly did look for the subversion of that government, which was founded upon revolutionary principles. We never, at any one period, said, that, as a sine quâ non, we insisted upon the restoration of the old government of France; we only said, there was no government with which we could treat. This was our language up to 1796; but in no one instance did we ever insist upon restoring the monarchy; though, said Mr. Pitt, I do not hesitate to acknowledge, that it would have been more consistent with the wishes of ministers, and with the interest and security of this country. I |