the purpose of working them; though Sir W. Grant has intimated (t) that this position is liable to considerable doubt.

Upon a sale of copyhold lands, (u) the vendor insisted upon surrendering by attorney, and not otherwise, and the purchaser having entered into proofs that the custom required a surrender in person, the Master of the Rolls directed an issue as to the custom. On appeal it was insisted for the defendant, the vendor, that the issue was improper; but Lord Hardwicke saw no ground to vary the decree; for it was the case of a purchaser of an estate, whom no court of justice would compel to accept of such a title upon any doubtful evidence. It was not a question what kind of title a man might have in his family but what kind of title a purchaser was compelled to take. Upon that question, whether a good title could be made, the Court had directed an issue, that if this might be a good title to the plaintiff by letter of attorney, he might accept of it: but his Lordship said that he would not compel a man to accept of a title under a letter of attorney.

And in a case (x) where the title depended on the construction of a very doubtful devise, Lord Thurlow refused to compel a specific perform

(t) 16 Ves. 393.

(u) Mitchel v. Neal, 2 Ves. 679. (1755.)

(x) Heath v. Heath, 1 Bro. C. C. 147. (1782.)

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ance; and said that for a court of equity to compel a party to take an estate which it cannot warrant to him, would be an extraordinary proceeding.

So where objections were taken to the title (y) (in favour of which the Master had reported) founded on considerable doubts as to the validity of certain leases, the subject of the contract, granted under the powers of an act of parliament; the Court thought the leases bad so far as they depended on their conformity to the terms of the power; and though the Court inclined to be of opinion, that the leases were confirmed by the operation of a recovery, yet another question. arose, whether the continuance of the leases after a recovery suffered, did not depend more on the statute, 21 Hen. 8. c. 15., than the recovery itself. Eyre, Lord Commissioner, observed, that in the particular case of a bill for the specific performance of a contract for the purchase of an estate, where there are considerable difficulties on the face of the title, and there are no means of clearing them, and no jurisdiction to bind the question, he thought that was not the case for decreeing a specific performance.

} Again, where the judges of the Court of King's

Bench, upon a case directed for their opinion, had

(y) Cooper v. Denne, 4 Bro. C. C. 80. 1 Ves, jun. 565. S. C. (1792.):

certified that the vendor had the absolute interest at law, in the lease in question, the Lord Chan cellor remarked, (2) that the particular expression of the certificate was intended as a caution to him, and suggested a trust behind for parties not before the Court; that when he sent it to law, he thought it a very doubtful question, and that he could not force a purchaser to take a title upon which he entertained great doubt. An act of par-s liament was afterwards obtained for perfecting the title.

Some leasehold houses having been taken under a sequestration, (a) which issued for want of an an swer to a bill against a surviving executor and devisee in trust, the plaintiffs prayed that the sequestrators might be ordered to sell the houses: but the Lord Chancellor said, he could not well compel the sequestrators to sell, without at the same time warranting the title. The sequestration did not transfer the term to the sequestrators; it was only a process to compel an appearance: he could not compel a man to take a title which he was to support by a bill for an injunction.

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But in the next case which occurred, (b) where the title was to be taken under a confused and obscure will, upon which an eminent conveyancer was stated to have said, that it was unsafe for a pur

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(2) Sheffield v. Lord Mulgrave, 2 Ves. J. 526. (1795.) a (a) Shaw v. Wright, 3 Ves. J. 22. (1795.)

(b) Warneford v. Thompson, 3 Ves. 573. (1797.)

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chaser to rest, and against which title the Master had reported, a specific performance was decreed, the Master of the Rolls being clearly of opinion that the will conferred an authority to sell alt

One of several trustees for sale (c) not having executed the deed of trust, nor intermeddled in the trusts, and being unwilling to act, conveyed and released all his estate and interest to his co-trustee, and afterwards refused to join in the receipt for the purchase money. Lord Loughborough thought it had been so managed as to amount to an acceptance of the trust; (d) and that though the hazard probably was not great, he did not know how to make the purchaser incur it.

Lord Eldon refused (e) to compel a purchaser to take a title depending upon the presumption of a grant of a portion of tithes from a lay impropriator; the Court of Exchequer having held that there

(c) Crewe v. Dicken, 4 Ves. 97. (1798.)

(d) The trustee should have disclaimed. The old doctrine seems to have required the disclaimer of an estate of freehold to be in a court of record, Butler and Baker's case, 3 Co. 25. But it was lately decided, that a disclaimer by a devisee by deed was effectual, Townson v. Tickell, 3 Barn. and Ald. 31. Holroyd, J. seemed to think that even a deed was superfluous. was Crewe v. Dicken, was not cited. See also Nicloson v. Wordsworth, 2 Swanst. R. 365. It may be useful to state, that previously to Townson v. Tickell, deeds of this nature had been I executed under sanctions which placed their efficacy beyond doubt. wede (1)

(e) Rose v. Calland, 5 Ves. 186. (1800) 6254

could be no presumption upon length of time, even, against a lay impropriator, though his, Lordship was of a different opinion; but he would not decree the purchaser to enter into a lawsuit, and try his Lordship's opinion at his (the purchaser's) expense.

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Exceptions were taken (ƒ) to the Master's report in favour of the title, involving many doubtful tions upon the point, whether the limitations in a will, after the estate for life of the plaintiff, the vendor, were contingent remainders, or executory devises; the plaintiff contending that they were, contingent remainders; and resting his title upon the destruction of those estates, there being no estate in trustees to support them. The Lord Chancellor said, that if the purchaser were willing to have the opinion of a court of law, he would very willingly send it to law: but he did not know how to compel a purchaser to take a title he must go to. law for immediately. Adding, that he did not much like a tenant for life destroying contingent remainders, taking, advantage of the want of trustees in the will, and then coming to the court to give a sanction to that title; and asked if any case had.. occurred in which the court had ever established such a title, and forced a purchaser to take it. His Lordship afterwards observed, that it had been intended to bring a bill into parliament to prevent the necessity of trustees to preserve contingent,

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