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exercise of rights of fishing in its navigable waters;' that a state may so regulate the operation of draw-bridges over navigable waters, that the traffic on the water and the traffic on the land shall be so conducted as to interfere as little as possible with each other;’ that a state may grant, and control the exercise of, ferry licenses ;that a state may establish port regulations, prescribing where a vessel may lie in harbour, how long she may remain there, and what lights she must show at night ;* that a state may regulate the rates charged by a private warehouse for the storage of grain, notwithstanding the fact that grain be stored therein in course of interstate transportation;' that a state may regulate the rates of fares and freight charged by railways in interstate transportation ;o that a state may forbid, under a penalty, the driving of an engine on a railway within its limits, by one who has not been licensed by a state Board of Examiners, even though the engine-driver be engaged in moving passengers or freight between points within and points without the state;' that a state may require a railway to maintain fences and cattle guards, and, in default thereof, be liable for double damages ;8 that a state may authorize a municipality to forbid the use of steam-power by. railways within its municipal limits; ' that a state may


Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71; McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391. ? Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678. 8 Fanning v. Gregoire, 16 How. 524, 534; Conway v. Taylor, 1 Bl. 603. • The James Gray v. The John Frazer, 21 How. 184. 6 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113. Railway Co. v. Fuller, 17 Wall. 560; C., B. & Q. R. R. v. Iowa, 94 U. S.

Peik v. C. & N. W. Ry., ibid. 164; Sed cf. W. St. L. & P. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 id. 557, wherein Miller, J., said that in Munn v. Illinois, C., B. & Q. R. R. v. Iowa, and Peik v. C. & N. W. Ry., the question of the exclusive power of Congress to regulate interstate transportation charges, though presented, “received but little attention at the hands of the court."

7 Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465. 8 N. P. Ry. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512. 9 R. R. Co. v. Richmond, 96 U. S. 531.


forbid washing and ironing in public laundries within definite limits and between prescribed hours; that a state may regulate the organizing, drilling, and parading of military bodies, provided that such legislation does not interfere with the privileges granted by the militia laws of the United States;2 and that a state may grant a monopoly of the slaughtering of cattle. It has also been held, that a contract cannot be made by a charter, binding the state to exempt the corporate franchises and property from the operation of the police power of the state. It has also been held that a license granted on payment of a fee by the United States under the Internal Revenue Statutes to carry on the business of a wholesale liquor dealer in a state, does not authorize the licensee to carry on the business in violation of laws of the state prohibiting the traffic;' nor does it exempt the licensee from state taxation on the business so conducted;' and that letters patent granted for an invention do not confer upon the patentee the right of selling the patented article, within the territory of a state, in violation of a police regulation of the state.? On the other hand, reference may be made to the dictum of Marshall, C. J., in Brown v. Maryland,

Barbier v. Connelly, 113 U. S. 27; Soon Hing v. Crowley, ibid. 703. But a state may not, under pretence of regulating public laundries, vest in a municipality an authority arbitrarily and without the exercise of discretion, to grant or refuse permission to conduct a laundry: Yick Wo v. Hopkins; Wo Lee v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356. 2 Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252.

Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36; Butchers' Union v. C. C. Co , 111 U, S. 746. 4

C., B. & Q. R. R. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155 ; Ruggles v. Illinois, 108 id. 526; M. H. & N. R. R. v. Hamersly, 104 id. 1; S. V. Water Co. v. Schottler, 110 id. 347 ; Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 id. 25; Boyd v. Alabama 94 id. 645; Stone v. Mississippi, 100 id. 814; Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 id. 659; Butchers' Union v. Crescent City Co., 111 id. 746.

5 McGuire v. The Commonwealth, 3 Wall. 387.
6 Pervear v. The Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475.
? Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501.

8 12 Wheat. 447.


where he said, with regard to the right of the states to control the sale of imported goods, “sale is the object of importation, and is an essential ingredient of that intercourse of which importation constitutes a part. It is as essential an ingredient, as indispensable to the existence of the entire thing, then, as importation itself. It must be considered as a component part of the power to regulate commerce. Congress has a right, not only to authorize importation, but to authorize the importer to sell.” There are later cases, which seem to fall within the line of that dictum. In Sinnot v. Davenport1 and in Foster v. Davenport, it was held that a state cannot require the owners of vessels licensed as coasters by the United States to file with the authorities of a state port a statement in writing of the name of the vessel, the names of its owners, their places of residence, and the amount of their respective interests in the vessel, as conditions prerequisite to the navigation of the waters of the state by such vessels. In Hall v. De Cuir 3 it was held that a state cannot by statute require "those engaged in the transportation of passengers among the states to give to all persons traveling, within that state, upon vessels employed in such business, equal rights and privileges in all parts of the vessel, without distinction of race and colour,” nor subject “to an action for damages the owner of such a vessel, who excludes coloured passengers, on account of their colour, from the cabin set apart for the use of whites during the passage.”

In R. R. v. Husen, it was held, that a state cannot prohibit the driving of certain species of cattle into the state during a specified portion of the year, nor permit the transportation of such cattle through the state at any other time of year

1 22 How. 227. 2 22 How. 244.

8 95 U. S. 485. 4 95 U. S. 165.


upon condition that the transporting agent “ shall be responsible for all damages which may result from the disease called the Spanish or Texan fever, should the same occur along the line of transportation.” In W. St. L. & P. Ry. v. Illinois, it was held that a state cannot regulate the charges by railroad companies within its limits for a transportation which constitutes a part of commerce among the states." In Bowman v. C. & N. W. Ry., it was held, that a state cannot forbid a common carrier to bring into the state from another state intoxicating liquors, when the laws of the state forbid the sale of such liquors by unlicensed persons, nor does such state legislation relieve a common carrier from liability in darnages to an unlicensed consignee, who has been injured by the refusal to transport such liquors. It is not easy to reconcile the cases. If the question were to be considered upon principle, and apart from authority, it might be said upon the one side, that the autonomy of the states is nothing more than a name if they are not to be permitted to exercise for the protection of the lives, health, and comfort of their citizens the ordinary police powers of government; and that the constitutional grant to the government of the United States of any power which in its exercise may affect the internal concerns of a state must be understood to have been granted on the implied condition that its exercise is to be subject to the police power of the state. In reply to this it might be said, upon the other side, that, as the power of police involves a power not only to control, but also to

i 118 U. S. 557. The facts in this case are stated in full, supra, pp. 128

et seq.

2 This case was decided before the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act.

3 To be reported in 125 U. S., and in which cause judgment was entered on 19 March, 1888.

and property

forbid, the constitutional powers granted to the

ment of the United States would be nugatory if the
government of the state might veto, under the pretense
of regulating. Perhaps the rule deducible from the
cases is, that, while each state did not, by the adoption
of the Constitution, surrender its ordinary local powers
of self-government operative upon all persons and
property which exist, or may come, within its territory,
and which merge in the mass of persons
ubject to its jurisdiction, yet, nevertheless, the terri-
torial limits of each state's jurisdiction, the grant to the
government of the United States of powers conflicting
with state sovereignty, and a due regard to the rights
of citizens of other states, must be held to limit the
exercise by each state of its otherwise illimitable
powers of police, by the restriction that those powers
are not to be so exercised as to interfere with the full
execution of the powers granted to the United States.
If this be the rule, persons or property brought within
the territory of a state by the exercise of any federal
power, must be exempted from obstructive state control
until the federal power has ceased to operate, and the
persons, or property, on which it acted, have merged in
the mass of persons, or property, within the territory of
the state. On the same principle, federal agencies are
exempted from any such state regulation, as hinders the
agent in the full performance of his, or its, duty to the
government of the United States. Of course, Congress
may so legislate with regard to any subject-matter of
federal regulation, as it has heretofore legislated with
regard to Quarantine and Pilotage,' that the states may
be enabled to rightfully regulate that which would
otherwise be exempt from their control.

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