informality of the authentication of a record cannot be made by a party who has antecedently offered that identical record in another proceeding. A state statute of limitations, providing that suits upon judgments rendered in other states, if not brought within two years shall be barred, is a bar to an action on such a judgment against one who only became a citizen of the state on the day on which suit was brought.2 Wherever a state court refuses in a cause to give due effect to a judgment rendered in a court of the United States, or in a court of another state, having by law jurisdiction of the subject-matter of litigation, and having acquired by due service of process, or otherwise, jurisdiction of the person of the party against whom judgment has been rendered, the action of the state court in so refusing is subject to review in the Supreme Court of the United States under the 25th Section of Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Act of 5 February, 1867. The record of a court of the United States is sufficiently proved when certified by the clerk of the court under its seal. And the judgments of the courts of the United States, when sued upon, or set up by way of defense in state courts, are, if rendered in a cause of which the court of the United States had jurisdiction both as to the subject-matter and the res or the person of the defendant, conclusive upon the parties and privies thereto, and enforcible in the state courts to the same extent as in courts of the United States.5 Judgments rendered in courts of the United States in causes, jurisdiction of which was obtained by reason of the citizenship of the parties, and in which the law of 1 Urtetiqui v. D'Arbel, 9 Pet. 692. 2 Bank of the State of Alabama v. Dalton, 9 How. 522. 3 14 Stat. 385. Rev. Stat. Sec. 709. Turnbull v. Payson, 95 U. S. 418. the state within which the court sat was administered, have only that validity and effect which is due to a judgment of a court of the state in such a cause,1 and, therefore, a court of a state which refuses to give a greater effect to such a judgment of a court of the United States cannot be said to decide against a title or right claimed under an authority exercised under the United States. 1 Dupasseur v. Rochercau, 21 Wall. 130. CHAPTER XI. RIGHTS OF PERSON AND OF PROPERTY. 111. Citizenship of the United States. 112. Citizenship of a state. 113. The right of suffrage. 114. The right of serving on juries. 115. Congressional regulation of the election of senators and representa tives. 116. Personal and property rights. 117. The rights within a state of citizens of other states. 118. Foreign corporations. 119. The XIII Amendment. 120. The XIV Amendment. 121. The police power. 111. As Miller, J., pointed out in the judgment in the Slaughter House Cases,1 the Constitution, as originally adopted, did not define citizenship of the United States, although it did, by Section 2 of Article IV, provide that "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states," and, by Section 2 of Article I, declare citizenship of the United States to be a necessary qualification for election as a representative in Congress. In view of that which the Constitution said, and of that which it left unsaid, upon this subject, it might well be concluded that citizenship of the United States was dependent upon and only incident to citizenship of a state, but the point was never judicially determined. The 1st Section of the XIV Amendment declares, that "all persons born or naturalized in the 116 Wall. 72. United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside." From and after the adoption of that amendment, therefore, the birth within the United States of a person subject to its jurisdiction, or the naturalization of an alien, makes the person so born, or naturalized, a citizen of the United States;1 and that right of citizenship is entitled to protection under such laws as Congress may enact in execution of the powers conferred by the XIV and XV Amendments. Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution authorizes Congress "to establish an uniform rule of naturalization." It is, therefore, beyond the power of any state to prescribe the conditions of naturalization, or to admit to citizenship any alien other than those whom the acts of Congress permit to be naturalized;2 nevertheless aliens may be naturalized by proceedings in courts of the states in conformity with the acts of Congress.3 112. In Dred Scott v. Sandford, the court determined that a free negro could not be a citizen of a state, but, in his dissenting judgment, Curtis, J., showed that it was an historical fact, that in five of the thirteen original states negroes were not only recognized as citizens, but also admitted to the exercise of the right of suffrage, and that many acts of Congress had, by necessary implication, recognized negroes as citizens; and the weight of authority supports the position, that each state may, so far as the Constitution of the United States does not restrain it, determine the status, and consequently the citizenship, of the persons 1 The Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 73; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 548. 2 Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 269; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 405. 3 Collet v. Collet, 2 Dall. 294. 419 How. 393. domiciled within its territory.1 By the terms of the XIV Amendment, "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside." Therefore birth, or naturalization, in the United States, followed by residence within the territory of any state, makes the person so born, or naturalized, and so residing, a citizen of that state. 113. All citizens are not necessarily entitled to the exercise of the right of suffrage, for the term "citizen," in the constitutional sense of the term, means one who owes the duty of allegiance and is entitled to the correlative right of protection, and it, therefore, includes persons, who, by reason of sex, or age, may not be qualified to vote: The right of suffrage is a subject of state regulation, and not a privilege, or immunity, of citizenship protected by the Constitution of the United States. A state may, therefore, without contravening any constitutional provision, deny the suffrage to women,2 but by force of the XV Amendment a state may not, in its limitations on the exercise of the right of suffrage, discriminate against citizens of the United States on account of their "race, colour, or previous condition of servitude." A state, therefore, cannot limit the right of suffrage to the white race. Nevertheless, the power of Congress to legislate for the protection of the rights conferred by that amendment being limited by the terms of the amendment, Congress cannot by statute provide for the punishment of state election officers for wrongfully refusing to receive the vote of a qualified voter at an election, when that refusal is not based upon 3 1 Strader v. Graham, 10 How. 93; Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540; Groves v. Slaughter, 15 id. 449; Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 id. 539. 2 Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162. 3 Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 665. |