assets of the bank. Coupons of state bonds, though negotiable and receivable for taxes due to the state, are not bills of credit, for they are not intended to circulate as money.2

1 Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257; Darrington v. The Bank of Alabama, 13 How. 12.

CHAPTER VIII.

STATE COMPACTS.

86. What compacts are permitted, and what are forbidden.

86. Section 10 of article I of the Constitution declares, that "no state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation. No state shall, without the consent of Congress, . . . . enter into any agreement or compact with another state." This constitutional prohibition forbids compacts between a state and foreign nations, and also compacts between states of the United States, to which the assent of Congress has not been given. It is, therefore, decisive against the validity of the confederation entered into by the insurgent states in 1861. It also forbids a governor of a state to enter into an agreement with a foreign government for the extradition of a prisoner. But states may, with the consent of Congress, enter into agreements touching conflicting boundaries, and, in such cases, the consent of Congress does not necessarily have to be given by congressional legislation expressly assenting to each of the stipulations of the agreement between the states, but that consent may be inferred from the legislation of Congress touching the subject-matter of the agreement.1

3

1 Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176; Sprott v. U. S., 20 Wall. 459; Ford v. Surget, 97 U. S. 594; U. S v. Keehler, 9 Wall. 83.

2 Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540.

3 Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 724; Missouri v. Iowa, 7 How. 660; Florida v. Georgia, 17 id. 478; Alabama v. Georgia, 23 id. 505; Virginia v. West Virginia, 11 Wall. 39; Poole v. Fleeger, 11 Pet. 185.

4 Virginia v. West Virginia, 11 Wall. 39.

CHAPTER IX.

FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE.

87. The constitutional provision.

88. The concurrent jurisdiction of the federal and state courts.

87. Section 2 of article IV of the Constitution declares, that" a person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime." The words "treason, felony, or other crime," as Taney, C. J., said in Kentucky v. Dennison,1 "in their plain and obvious import, as well as in their legal and technical sense, embrace every act forbidden and made punishable by a law of the state. The word 'crime' of itself includes every offense, from the highest to the lowest in the grade of offenses, and includes what are called 'misdemeanors,' as well as treason and felony." This constitutional provision imposes on the executive of the state in which the fugitive has taken refuge the duty of surrendering the fugitive upon demand made by the executive of the state from which the fugitive has fled, and upon proof made that he has been legally charged with crime, and this duty has been recognized by the act of Congress of 12 February, 1793, but if the governor of the state to which the

fugitive has fled refuses to deliver him up to justice, "there is no power delegated to the general government, either through the judicial department or any other department, to use any coercive means to compel him." The Supreme Court of the United States, therefore, will not issue a mandamus to compel the performance by a governor of a state of his constitutional duty of surrendering to another state a fugitive from the justice of that state.2

88. An alleged fugitive from justice may petition. a court of the United States for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the legality of his detention, but as the responsibility of determining whether or not the alleged fugitive from justice be in fact a fugitive from justice, rests upon the executive of the state to which the fugitive has fled, a court of the United States will not discharge the fugitive upon the hearing of the writ of habeas corpus, because, in its judgment the proof that the prisoner is a fugitive from justice is, though satisfactory to the executive, not as complete as might have been required. The alleged fugitive may also apply, by petition for a writ of habeas corpus, to a court of the state within which he is detained in custody for the purpose of being delivered to the justice of another state, for the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States over such petitions for writs of habeas corpus is not exclusive of the jurisdiction of the courts of the states in such cases, and the agent of the state demanding the surrender of the alleged fugitive is in no sense an officer of the United States, nor otherwise exempt from the process of the courts of the states."

1 per Taney, C. J., in Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 109.

2 Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66.

3 Ex parte Reggel 114 U. S. 642.

* Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624.

L

CHAPTER X.

THE JUDICIAL POWER.

89. The necessity for the existence of a judicial department of the United

States.

90. The constitutional provisions.

91. The terms of the grant of federal jurisdiction.

92. The exclusive jurisdiction.

93. The original jurisdiction.

94. Removal of causes from state courts to the courts of the United States.

95. The appellate and supervisory jurisdiction.

96. The requisites of a judicial case.

97. Courts martial.

98. Impeachment.

99. The judicial construction of the Constitution.

100. The XI Amendment.

101. Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution, and the IV Amendment.

102. The V Amendment.

103. The VI Amendment.

104. The VII Amendment.

105. The exemption of federal process from state control.

106. Limitation of federal process by the reserved rights of the states. 107. The limitations of state jurisdiction and process by the federal

supremacy.

108. The rule as to conflict of jurisdiction.

109. The XIV Amendment as affecting state jurisdiction.

110. The effect of Section 1 of Article IV of the Constitution.

89. It is, under any form of government, essential to the enforcement of the laws with a due regard to the maintenance of the liberties of the citizens, that a judicial department, independent by reason of the security of the tenure of office and adequacy of compensation of the judges, should be charged with the duty, and entrusted with the power, of construing the laws, and of finally determining issues of fact and of law in prosecutions for crime and in litigations as to