3 erty from the operation of the police power of the state. A state, therefore, may limit by subsequent legislation the rates of fare and freight charged by its railways.1 A state may, in the case of a railway whose charter authorizes it from time to time to fix, regulate, and receive tolls and charges vest in a commission by a subsequent statute the power of fixing those rates. Nor can a state surrender by implication, the right to regulate by subsequent legislation the location of railway stations and the stoppage of trains at such stations. A state may by statute regulate the rates of a water corporation whose charter vested the power of fixing the rates in a board of commissioners, some of whom were appointed by the company. A state may forbid the continued prosecution of their respective trades by corporations organized for the purpose of manufacturing and selling liquors, or selling lottery tickets and drawing lotteries," or rendering dead animals and offal into fertilizers." So also a state may, in derogation of previous grants of exclusive privileges for the conduct of a business, which is necessarily subject to police regulation, such as that of slaughtering cattle, authorize others to conduct the same business. 75. In Dartmouth College v. Woodward,' Marshall, C. J., conceded that "the framers of the Constitution did not intend to restrain a state from the regulation of 1 C., B & Q. R. R. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155; Peik v. C. & N. W. Ry., ibid. 164; M. & St. P. R R. v. Atlee, ibid. 179; W. & St. P. R. R. v. Blake, ibid. 180; Stone v. Wisconsin, ibid. 181; Ruggles v. Illinois, 108 U. S. 526. 2 Stone v. F. L. & T. Co., 116 U. S. 307; Same v. I. C. R. R., ibid. 347. 3 M. H. & N. R. R. v. Hamersly, 104 U. S. 1. S. V. Water Works v. Schottler, 110 U. S. 347. 5 Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25. 6 Phalen v. Virginia, 8 How. 163; Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U. S. 645; Stone v. Mississippi, 100 id. 814. Fertilizing Co v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659. 8 Butchers' Union v. Crescent City, 111 U. S. 746. 9 4 Wheat. 629. its civil institutions adopted for internal government." On this principle, there can be no implied contract on the part of a state that it will not amend its Constitution, in so far as that Constitution deals with the administration of the public concerns of the state.1 Nor can a state legislature bind subsequent legislatures as to the exercise of the powers of sovereignty over the political subdivisions of the state, and over its municipal corporations with regard to subject-matters of public and not of private interest, as, for instance, the location of a county seat,2 or the boundaries of its municipalities, or the sale of property held by a municipality for public purposes, such as water works, or the appropriation under state authority of municipal obligations by their holders as a set-off against municipal claims against those holders; 5 nor does the appointment by the state of a public officer for a fixed term for a stipulated compensation constitute a contract between the state and the appointee whose obligation is impaired by either the reduction of his compensation or his removal from office, but after the duties have been performed by the appointee of a municipal corporation. during the term of his office there is a contract whose obligation is impaired by a subsequent statute abolishing the power of taxation for the payment of his compensation. Of course, in the case of an officer appointed under a statute which in terms defines the tenure of the office to be according to law, a subsequent statute removing him is not an impairment of the contract. 1 Church v. Kelsey, 121 U. S. 282. 2 Newton v. Commissioners, 100 U. S. 548. 3 U. S. v. Memphis, 97 U. S. 284. New Orleans v. Morris, 105 U. S. 600. 8 76. The state's consent to be sued being voluntary and of grace, that consent does not constitute a contract whose obligation can be impaired by a subsequent repeal of the statute permitting such suit,' especially where the statute authorizing the suit has provided no means for the enforcement of any judgment that may be rendered against the state. Under such circumstances the state may, by subsequent legislation, withdraw its consent to be sued.2 In this connection, that which was forcibly said by Mathews, J., in the judgment of the court in the case of In re Ayres,3 may well be borne in mind. The learned judge said: "it cannot be doubted that the XI Amendment to the Constitution operates to create an important distinction between contracts of a state with individuals and contracts between individual parties. In the case of contracts between individuals, the remedies for their enforcement or breach, in existence at the time they were entered into, are a part of the agreement itself, and constitute a substantial part of its obligation.* That obligation cannot be impaired by any subsequent legislation. Thus, not only the covenants and conditions of the contract are preserved, but also the substance of the original remedies for its enforcement. It is different with contracts between individuals and a state. In respect to these, by virtue of the XI Amendment to the Constitution, there being no remedy by a suit against the state, the contract is substantially without sanction, except that which arises out of the honour and good faith of the state itself, and these are not subject to coercion. Although the state may, at the inception of the contract, have consented as one of its conditions to 1 Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527; Bank of Washington v. Same, ibid. 530. 2 M. & C. R. R. v. Tennessee, 101 U. S. 337: S. & N. A. R. R. v. Alabama, ibid. 51. 3 123 U. S. 504. 4 Louisiana v. New Orleans. 102 U. S. 203. subject itself to suit, it may subsequently withdraw that consent and resume its original immunity, without any violation of the obligation of its contract in the constitutional sense." 1 77. The force and effect of the prohibition, as construed by the court, is, that a state may not, by any law or by any act to which the state, by its enforcement thereof, gives the force of a law, deprive a party of the legal right of enforcing, or obtaining compensation for the breach of, an express contract, executed or executory, between individuals, or between a state and individuals, but a state may regulate or limit the remedies of the contracting parties, provided that it leaves in force a substantial part of the legal remedies which subsisted at the time of the making of the contract. 1 Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527; Railroad Company v. Tennessee, 101 U.S. 337. CHAPTER VI. EX POST FACTO LAWS AND BILLS OF ATTAINDER. 78. The constitutional provisions. 79. The distinction between retrospective and ex post facto laws. 80. Ex post facto laws defined. 81. Illustrations of ex post facto laws. 82. Illustrations of laws which are not ex post facto. 83. Bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties. 78. Section 10 of article I of the Constitution declares that "no state shall pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law." Section 9 of article I of the Constitution, restricting the powers of Congress, declares that "no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed." 79. Ex post facto laws relate to criminal, and not to civil, procedure. They are necessarily retrospective, but all retrospective laws are not ex post facto.2 State laws which operate retrospectively, or which divest antecedently vested rights of property, are not prohibited by the Constitution of the United States, if they are not ex post facto laws, and if they do not impair the obligation of contracts. A state legislature, unless restrained by the Constitution of the state, may, therefore, enact statutes setting aside a decree of a court of probate, refusing to 1 Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88, 110; Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 456. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386. 3 Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cr. 138; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 266; Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 380; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88, 110; Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 456; B. & S. R. R. v. Nesbit, 10 How. 395; Livingstone v. Moore, 7 Pet. 469. |