III

THE INDIVIDUAL VERSUS THE GROUP

IN EDUCATION

Even a superficial study of modern educational theory reveals a marked contrariety of views concerning aims and values. Much of this discord is inevitable, in fact, beneficial. Someone has said that all science is a result of differences in opinions. Discussion and controversy doubtless lead to clearer definition of issues, sifting of essentials, critical evaluation of suggestions, and hence to a sounder theory and practise. When interpreted from a broader, more inclusive point of view the seemingly conflicting principles may be brought into unison and may appear complementary rather than contradictory. There are, however, some deep-lying oppositions which give rise to persistent problems in education. Some of the most common antinomies, as the cultural vs. the practical, interest vs. effort, the individual vs. society, still appear repeatedly in educational discussions and also furnish vexatious problems for practical teachers and administrators. In none of these mentioned are the opposing aspects irreconcilable. Breadth of view and a judicial attitude of mind not only point to lines of reconciliation, but often lead to a unification of the principles involved.

In the effort to set aside needless antagonisms, adjust conflicting claims and bring contending elements into the light of larger truth, no American educator has been more active or more helpful than Professor John Dewey. His treatment of the vexed problem of adjusting the claims of the individual and the institution, or the individual and the social whole, is always lucid and stimulating. It was, therefore, with much surprize that the writer read in a recent issue of the EDUCATIONAL REVIEW Doctor Finney's article intended as a 1 February, 1918.

criticism of the book, Democracy and education, and charging the author with "overemphasizing the value of the deliberative aspects of individual and social life and slurring over the value of habit and social compulsion."

Doctor Finney's article not only fails to take account of the many helpful suggestions in Dewey's book, but it adds difficulty to the whole problem of social education; it illustrates how the introduction of sociological, metaphysical, and biological concepts into educational theory may result in vagueness and confusion. The educational philosophy of the article is strikingly parallel to that of Plato's Republic. It starts with the same misconceptions, falls into the same errors, and breaks down at similar points.

Plato was obsest with the idea that true reality is unchangeable, and that change or alteration is nothing but lawless violation of the deepest principles of the universe. He carried this idea over into social relations and tried to devise a political state in which change would have no place. His solution is a scheme for the distribution and limitation of human activity. He would divide all men into three classes, law-givers or legislators, soldiers, and tradesmen, assigning each individual to the class for which he is best fitted by nature. The smallest class, statesmen, philosophers, lovers of wisdom, those with trained minds capable of grasping the universal and unchanging, can recognize the fundamental principles of existence, and devise institutions, laws, and regulations, and thus furnish a basis for a stabilized society. Gradual improvements of society thru education has no part in Plato's plan. That would accustom men to the idea of change, distract their minds and lead to a factional society. In his ideal state the function of education is to conserve. Altho Plato taught that in this state each individual should be doing that for which he is best fitted by nature and that it is the business of the state to discover and train these aptitudes, he limited his social arrangement to the sorting of men into a small number of classes. He had no conception of what modern science has disclosed concerning the infinite diversity of individual capacities or the indefinite number of

activities which may characterize various social groups. Any unity or fixity secured by Plato's plan would be only apparent, for it would be secured by force, suppression, and distortion.

Education should be directed toward social purposes and ideals, but the social organization which does not provide for the interaction of the many forms of associated life will inevitably result in social stratification. There will be separation into privileged and subject classes and the former will resort to rigid institutionalism in order to preserve group interests. Society is static in the degree in which it is stratified. Doctor Finney says that "the whole history of mankind is a struggle between individualism and institutionalism, first one in excess and then the other." He quotes Hayes to the effect that as in physics a static situation may become dynamic by weakening the support, so a dynamic era may be introduced into society by weakening and undermining settled beliefs, the breakdown of established customs, and the wavering of public sentiments. How shall we explain this alternation of so-called static institutionalism and dynamic individualism? The explanation is to be found in the tendencies of stratified society. The privileged class inevitably becomes indifferent to the needs and experiences of other classes and hence narrow and over-specialized. This class either over-reaches itself and becomes so tyrannical that revolt and revolutionary excesses result, or it degenerates and becomes artificial, sterile, and inefficient, thus inviting change, corruption, and disorder. The present tragedy of Russia is the outcome of centuries of autocratic repression and bureaucratic control; the excesses of the French Revolution were a reaction against the brutality and stupidity of the ancien régime. The drawing of rigid class lines produces a tension which is "powder" for social revolution. The "hazards and risks inherent in an age of change," which Doctor Finney says are overlooked, are no more real or numerous than those inherent in the so-called static periods.

Altho the scheme of Plato's Republic was too utopian and impossible to be adopted by any state, his thought had a

subtle influence in fostering the ideals of social uniformity and institutional control in the middle ages. The Renaissance and the Reformation, tho effecting no thoro or profound changes, gradually led many men away from these ideals, until in the eighteenth century, there appeared a theory of society and education which is the antithesis of the Platonic doctrine. In the writings of Rousseau we find an impassioned pleading for the free development of individuality. At times Rousseau's statements reflect an extreme individualism and only inadequately represent the significance of the new movement to which he sought to give expression. His seemingly anti-social philosophy is the expression of an impulse toward a society in which man's capacities would not be cramped and hampered by tradition or distorted by restriction in favor of selfish rulers and classes. The ideal of the movement was not the elimination of the state or of social institutions, but a more progressive, comprehensive, and humanitarian society. Education according to nature was thought to be the first step in insuring a stable social order. Tho inspired by a noble ideal the movement was weak on its constructive side. The nature pedagogy needed a social counterpart. Organization necessary to realize its ideal was not forthcoming. Individual philanthropists and educators labored to demonstrate its effectiveness, but even the most enthusiastic saw the necessity of enlisting the interest of existing states. This new educational ideal began to gain favor among statesmen at a period when the nationalistic movement was gaining ground in the political life of Europe, particularly in Germany. In the depression following the Napoleonic conquest German patriots and statesmen recognized in the work of Pestalozzi a means of recovering their political integrity. Education became a means of realizing national greatness and power. The state became not only the means but the end of education. The ideal in Germany became the citizen useful to the state, and this led to a stratification of society with the militaristic party in complete control. For three generations every educational force in Germany has been mobilized to foster

the ideal that individual culture is identical with the political subordination which the militaristic system involves. The stratified social and educational systems in modern Germany are in a very true sense a realization of the Platonic scheme and reveal its inherent weaknesses.

The purpose of the foregoing sketch is to make clear the problem of social education in a democracy. If we are to make education an agency for promoting human welfare and progress we must avoid the errors of some of the continental states-errors to which the theory of the article mentioned would lead if carried to a logical conclusion. It is evident that a democratic society can never reconcile individual development with a social stability secured thru any external control, nor can it be satisfied with any compromise between the two; they must be organically related. For a society which will insure both individual realization and social control we must seek a new principle.

In social philosophy such terms as society, social mind, social habit, are used in a normative rather than a descriptive sense. When these terms are applied without definition to education they are vague and ambiguous. The weakness of Doctor Finney's treatment lies largely in his failure to define and evaluate the various aspects and forms of social life. The fallacy resulting from such a failure is very clearly stated by Dewey in the following extract:2 "Society is one word but many things. Men associate together in all kinds of things and for many purposes. One man is concerned in a multitude of diverse groups in which his associations may be quite different. It often seems as if they had nothing in common except that they are modes of associated life. There are political parties with different aims, social sets, cliques, gangs, corporations, partnerships, groups bound closely together by ties of blood, and so on in endless variety."

Doctor Finney expresses admiration for the technique which society has developed for securing conformity of the individual, lauds the "steam-roller," and becomes enthusiastic over the efficacy of "the cat-calls of the street, the 2 Democracy and education, p. 94.