the anti-slavery advocates propose for these awful evils, is the declaring the slave trade piracy by the laws of all civilized nations. It is evident now that this would only still further aggravate the existing evils; and that nothing but it is wanting to put the last hand to the cup of African bitterness. The whole navies of the world could not stop the smuggling of slaves between Africa and the American shores; the search for slave vessels, with the penalty of death hanging over the crew if taken, would only aggravate the sufferings of the captives by rendering desperate the cruelty of the captors. If the trade were stopped from the African shores, it would speedily begin from the southern provinces of America, who would breed slaves to fill up the gap produced by British madness in the West Indies. One way, and one only, of stopping the infernal traffic exists; and that is, enabling the British planter, with stationary slaves, gradually improving in industry, to undersell the foreign slave-holder in the supply of the world with sugar. That methodthe simple, just, progressive method of nature was in satisfactory progress; and the slave trade must have declined, and perhaps in the course of ages expired, from the effect of the competition of the British stationary serf with the foreign imported slave, when the whole progress was stopped by the Emancipation Act; our own islands reduced to ruin; our own slaves restored to savage life; and a new impulse, to which philanthropy can assign no limits, communicated to the execrable traffic in human flesh! Such even, when under humane guidance, and when actuated by a benevolent spirit, is the legislation of the masses. What must it be, if stimulated by cupidity and directed by ambition? After the dreadful and irremediable evils inflicted on our own subjects our own negroes-and the African race in general, by the well-meant but ill-judged and most disastrous legislation of late years, the recent disputes between the mother country and the Jamaica House of Assembly siuk into insignificance, and cease to be the object of serious attention, except as indicating the indisposition of the party, unhappily still possessing the majority in the British legislature, either to stop in the career of injus tice, or make any amends for the errors of past times. It is evident, however, that, having plunged so deeply into former errors, it was incumbent on the British parliament to have had more than usual toleration for exasperated feeling and wounded interests to have recollected that men, seeing their properties and the substance of their families wasting away, under the effect of former British legislation—could not be expected to have their feelings peculiarly cool, or their tempers signally under control, in political contests with the dominant power, from whom they had suffered so much: and that now, when experience is on all sides so clearly demonstrating how well grounded their complaints really are, was the time, by a respectful attention to their suggestions and uniform deference to their wishes, to have demonstrated the disposition of the parent state, to remedy, so far as yet in their power, the existing evils. Instead of this, what have the Liberal Ministry done? Why, they brought in a bill suspending the constitution of Jamaica, on the first angry controversy with the British Parliament; and on its being stopped by the firmness and zeal of the Conservative opposition, they have brought in another, substantially the same, and vesting absolute legislative power in the governor and council, if certain acts of Assembly were thrown out by the veto of the sovereign authority! We first tax the West India planter one hundred per cent on his agricultural produce; next let loose the live stock on his estate for less then half their value, and in so doing, render his fields totally unproductive; and, when he remonstrates on a subordinate point of management, deprive him of all his liberties and reduce him to despotic authority! If these are the blessings which democratic institutions secure to their colonial dependencies, what evils has despotism in store for its subjects? and if such is the system of government of a widely-extended colonial dominion, how long is it likely to withstand the shock of fortune con. sequent on the almost total paralysis of the central executive power? ON HUME'S ARGUMENT AGAINST MIRACLES. HUME's argument against miracles is simply this:-Every possible event, however various in its degree of credibility, must, of necessity, be more credible when it rests upon a sufficient cause lying within the field of what is called nature, than when it does not more credible when it obeys some mechanical cause, than when it transcends such a cause and is miracu lous. Therefore, assume the resistance to credibility, in any preternatural occurrence, as equal to x, and the very ideal or possible value of human testimony as no more than x, in that case, under the most favourable circumstances conceivable, the argument for and against a miracle will be equal: or, expressing the human testimony by , affected with the affirmative sign [+]; and expressing the resistance to credibility on the other side of the equation, by z, affected with the negative sign [x], the two values will, in algebraical language, destroy each other, and the result will be =0. But, inasmuch as this expresses the value of human testimony in its highest or ideal form, a form which is never realized in experience, the true result will be different,—there will always be a negative result =-y; much or little according to the circumstances, but always enough to turn the balance against believing a miracle. "Or in other words," said Hume, popularising his argument, "it will always be more credible that the reporter of a miracle should tell a falsehood, or should himself have been the dupe of appearances, than that a miracle should have actually occurred— that is, an infraction of those natural laws (any or all) which compose what we call experience. For, assume the utmost disinterestedness, veracity, and sound judgment in the witness, with the utmost advantage in the circumstances for giving full play to those qualities; even in such a case the value of affirmative testimony could, at the very utmost, be equal to the negative value on the other side the equation: and the result would be, to keep my faith suspended in equilibrio. But in any real case, ever likely to come before us, the result will be worse; for the affirmative testimony will be sure to fall in many ways below its ideal maximum; leaving, therefore, for the final result a considerable excess to the negative side of the equation. SECTION II. Of the Argument as affected by the Covert Limitations under which it is presented. Such is the Argument: and, as the first step towards investigating its sanity and its degree-its kind of force, and its quantity of force, we must direct our attention to the following fact, viz., that amongst three separate conditions under which a miracle (or any event whatever) might become known to us, Hume's argument is applied only to one. Assuming a miracle to happen (for the possibility of a miracle is of course left open throughout the discussion, since any argument against that would at once foreclose every question about its communicability), then it might happen under three several sets of circumstances, in relation to our consciousness. 1st, It might happen in the presence of a single witnessthat witness not being ourselves. This case let us call Alpha. 2dly, It might happen in the presence of many witnesses,-witnesses to a vast amount, but still (as before) ourselves not being amongst that multitude. This caso let us call Beta. And 3dly, It might happen in our own presence, and fall within the direct light of our own consciousness. This case let us call Gamma. Now these distinctions are important to the whole extent of the question. For the 2d case, which is the actual case of many miracles recorded in the New Testament, at once cuts away a large body of sources in which either error or deceit could lurk. Hume's argument supposes the reporter of the miracle to be a dupe, or the maker of dupes-himself deluded, or wishing to delude others. But, in the case of the thousands fed from a few loaves and small fishes, the chances of error, wilful or not wilful, are diminished in proportion to the number of observers; and Hume's inference as to the declension of the affirmative x, in relation to the negative, no longer applies, or, if at all, with vastly diminished force. With respect to the 3d case, it cuts away the whole argument at once in its very radix. For Hume's argument applies to the communication of a miracle, and therefore to a case of testimony. But, wherever the miracle falls within direct personal cognizance, there it follows that no question can arise about the value of human testimony. The affirmative x, expressing the value of testimony, disappears altogether; and that side of the equation is possessed by a new quantity (viz., ourselves our own consciousness) not at all concerned in Hume's argument. Hence it results, that of three possible conditions under which a miracle may be supposed to offer itself to our knowledge, two are excluded from the view of Hume's argument. not. SECTION III. Whether the second of these conditions is not expressly noticed by Hume. It may seem so. But in fact it is And (what is more to the purpose) we are not at liberty to consider it any accident that it is not. Hume had his reasons. Let us take all in proper order: 1st, that it seems so; 2dly, that in fact it is not so; and 3dly, that this is no accident, but in tentional. 1st, Hume seems to contemplate such a case, the case of a miracle witnessed and attested by a multitude of persons, in the following imaginary miracle which he proposes as a basis for reasoning. Queen Elizabeth, as every body will remember who has happened to read Lord Monmouth's Memoirs, died on the night between the last day of 1602 and the first day of 1603 this could not be forgotten by the reader, because, in fact, Lord M., who was one of Her Majesty's nearest relatives (being a younger son of her first cousin Lord Hunsdon,) ob. tained his title and subsequent preferment as a reward for the furious ride he performed to Edinburgh (at that time at least 440 miles distant from London), without taking off his boots, in order to lay the earliest tidings of the great event at the feet of her successor. In reality, never did any death cause so much posting day and night over the high roads of Europe. And the same causes which made it so interesting has caused it to be the best dated event in modern history; that one which could least be shaken by any discordant evidence yet discoverable. Now, says Hume, imagine the case, that, in spite of all this chronological precision-this precision, and this notoriety of precision-her Majesty's court physicians should have chosen to propagate a story of her resurrection. Imagine that these learned gentlemen should have issued a bulletin, declaring that Queen Elizabeth had been met in Greenwich park, or at Nonsuch, on May-day of 1603, or in Westminster, two years after, by the Lord Chamberlain when detecting Guy Faux-let them even swear it before twenty justices of the peace; I for one, says Hume,`ain free to confess that I would not believe them. No: nor, to say the truth, would we; nor would we advise our readers to believe them. He 2dly, Here, therefore, it would seem as if Hume were boldly pressing his principles to the very uttermost. that is, were challenging a miracle as untenable, though attested by a multitude. But, in fact, he is not. only seems to do so; for, if no number of witnesses could avail anything in proof of a miracle, why does he timidly confine himself to the hypothesis of the queen's physicians only coming forward? Why not call in the whole Privy Council?-or the Lord Mayor and Common Council of London-the Sheriffs of Middlesexand the Twelve Judges? As to the court physicians, though three or four nominally, virtually they are but one "In proportion to the number of observers."- Perhaps, however, on the part of Hume some critical apologist will say" Doubtless he was aware of that; but still the reporters of the miracle were few. No matter how many were present, the witnesses for us are but the Evangelists.' Yes, certainly, the Evangelists; and, let us add, all those contemporaries to whom the Evangelists silently appealed. These make up the "multitude" contemplated in the second case. man. They have a common interest, and in two separate ways they are liable to a suspicion of collusion: first, because the same motives which act upon one, probably act upon the rest. In this respect, they are under a common influence; secondly, because, if not the motives, at any rate the physicians themselves, act upon each other. In this respect, they are under a reciprocal influence. They are to be reasoned about as one individual. 3dly, As Hume could not possibly fail to see all this, we may be sure that his choice of witnesses was not accidental. In fact, his apparent carelessness is very discreet management. His object was, under the fiction of an independent multitude, to smuggle in a virtual unity; for his court physicians are no plural body in effect and virtue, but a mere pleonasm and a tautology. And in good earnest, Hume had reason enough for his caution. How much or how little testimony would avail to establish a resurrection in any neutral case few people would be willing to pronounce off-hand, and, Pruabove all, on a fictitious case. dent men, in such circumstances, would act as the judges in our English courts, who are always displeased if it is attempted to elicit their opinions upon a point of law by a proposed fiction. And very reasonably; for in these fictitious cases all the little circumstances of reality are wanting, and the oblique relations to such circumstances, out of which it is that any sound opinion can be formed. We all know very well what Mr Hume is after in this problem of a resurrection. And his case of Queen Elizabeth's resurrection being a perfectly fictitious case, we are at liberty to do any one of three different things:-either simply to refuse an answer; or, 2dly, to give such an answer as he looks for, viz., to agree with him in his disbelief under the supposed contingency, with out therefore offering the slightest prejudice to any scriptural case of resurrection: i.e. we might go along with him in his premises, and yet balk him of his purpose; or, 3dly, we might But the useful result from all this By a neutral case is meant, 1st, one in which there is no previous reason from a great doctrine requiring such an event for its support, to expect a resurrection; 2dly, a case belonging to a period of time in which it is fully believed that miraculous agency bas ceased. SECTION IV. Of the Argument as affected by a Clas sification of Miracles. Let us now inquire whether Hume's argument would be affected by the differences in miracles upon the most general distribution of their kinds. Miracles may be classed generally as inner or outer. I. The inner, or those which may be called miracles for the individual, are such as go on, or may go on, with in the separate personal consciousness of each separate man. And it shows how forgetful people are of the very doctrines which they themselves profess as Christians, when we consider, on the one hand, that miracles in this sense are essential to Christianity, and yet, on the other hand, consider how often it is said that the age of miracles is past. Doubtless, in the sense of external miracles, all such agencies are past. But in the other sense, there are distinct classes of the supernatural agency, which we are now consider ing; and these three are held by many Christians; two by most Christians; and the third by all. They are a.-Special Providences: which class it is that many philosophic Christians doubt or deny. B.-Grace: both predisposing [by old theologians called prevenient] and effectual. y.—Prayer considered as efficacious. Of these three we repeat, that the two last are held by most Christians: and yet it is evident that both presume a supernatural agency. But this agency exists only where it is sought. And even where it does exist, from its very nature (as an interior experience for each separate consciousness) it is incommunicable. But that does not defeat its purpose. It is of its essence to be incommunicable. And, therefore, with lation to Hume's great argument, which was designed to point out a vast hiatus or inconsistency in the divine economy" Here is a miraculous agency, perhaps, but it is incommunicable: it may exist, but it cannot manifest itself; which defect neutralizes it, and defeats the very purpose of its existence"--the answer is, that as respects these interior miracles, there is no such inconsistency. They are meant for the private forum of each man's consciousness: nor would it have met any human necessity to re have made them communicable. The language of Scripture is, that he who wishes experimentally to know the changes that may be accomplished by prayer, must pray. In that way only, and not by communication of knowledge from another, could he under stand it as a practical effect. And to understand it not practically, but only in a speculative way, could not meet any religious wish, but merely an ir religious curiosity. As respects one great division of miraculous agency, it is clear, therefore, that Hume's argument does not apply. The arrow glances past: not so much missing its aim as taking a false one. The hiatus which it sup poses, the insulation and incommunicability which it charges upon the miraculous as a capital oversight, was part of the design: such mysterious agencies were meant to be incommu nicable, and for the same reason which shuts up each man's consciousness into a silent world of its own-separate and inaccessible to all other consciousnesses. If a communication is thrown open by such agencies between the separate spirit of each man and the supreme Spirit of the universe, then the end is accomplished: and it is part of that end to close this communication against all other cognizance. So far Hume is baffled. The supernatural agency is incommunica ble: it ought to be so. That is its perfection. II. But now, as respects the other [ great order of miracles—viz. the ex- L ternal, first of all, we may remark a very important subdivision: miracles, in this sense, subdivide into two most different orders-1st, Evidential miracles, which simply prove Christianity. 2nd, Constituent miracles, which, in a partial sense, are Chris tianity. And, perhaps, it may turn out that Hume's objection, if appli cable at all, is here applicable in a separate way and with a varying force. The 1st class, the evidential miracles, are all those which were performed merely as evidences (whether simply as indications, or as absolute demonstrations) of the divine power which upheld Christianity. The 2d class, the constituent miracles, are those which constitute a part of Christianity. Two of these are absolutely indispensable to Christianity, and cannot be separated from it even in thought, viz, |