8. SALE-VENDOR, WHETHER ACTS AS AGENT OF THE VENDEE IN MAKING A RESALE.-Though it has sometimes been said that a vendor, in making a resale of the property when the vendee does not take and pay for it, acts as agent for the latter, this does not accurately describe their relations. The vendor is really acting for himself in disposing of the property for the purpose of ascertaining the actual damages he may sustain. He owes to the vendee, in making this sale, duties which, in some respect, resemble those of an agent in so far as he is required to exercise the same good faith which would be required of him as agent, in obtaining the best price, and in following any proper instructions which the vendee may give as to the time and manner in which the sale shall be made. (Moore v. Potter, 692.)

See Receivers, 5, 18.

SCHOLARSHIP.

See Execution, 6.

SHERIFFS.

See Attachment, 2, 4; Execution; Mortgage, 13.

SHORTHAND NOTES.
See Appeal, 6, 7.

SLANDER.

1. SLANDER-WORDS ACTIONABLE PER SE.-To say of the plaintiff that he swore to a lie before the aldermen is actionable per se. (McGaw v. Hamilton, 786.)

2. SLANDER BY REMARKS BEFORE A LEGISLATIVE BODY.-A member of a legislative body who, upon a judgment in favor of the plaintiff being referred to, without any motion being made respecting it, says the plaintiff swore to a lie in the course of the trial which resulted in the judgment, is liable for slander. The remark, under the circumstances, is not privileged, or at all events, it should be left to the jury to determine whether the utterance was malicious, wanton, and designed to injure plaintiff under the color of a privileged communication. (McGaw v. Hamilton, 786.)

SLANDER-PRIVILEGED

COMMUNICATIONS

3. OR REMARKS IN THE LEGISLATIVE BODY, WHAT ARE.-A member of a legislative body cannot take advantage of his official position to give expression to private slanders against others and then claim that his words were privileged. (McGaw v. Hamilton, 786.) 4. SLANDER-PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION, WHAT IS NOT.-A communication to be privileged must be made upon a proper occasion from a proper motive, and must be based upon a reasonable and proper cause. (McGaw v. Hamilton, 786.)

5. SLANDER-WORDS NOT ACTIONABLE PER SE-COLLOQUIUM-INNUENDO.-The words "I know Sheets took wheat that did not belong to him" are not actionable per se, but are sufficient where there is a colloquium and innuendo averring that appellee was guilty of larceny, and that parties so understood appellant to mean. (Hinesley v. Sheets, 356.)

SPIRITUALISM.

See Wills, 8, 9.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

See Limitations of Actions.

STATUTES.

1. STATUTES ADOPTED FROM ANOTHER STATE-CONSTRUCTION.-If a statute of one state is adopted by another, the construction put upon the statute in the former will be adopted in the latter. (Cowhick v. Shingle, 17.)

2.

STATUTES-CONSTRUCTION OF, WHEN TAKEN FROM ANOTHER STATE.-Although the construction put upon statutes by the courts of the state from which they are borrowed is entitled to respectful consideration, yet such construction is not permitted to prevail when not in harmony with the spirit and policy of the legislation and decisions of the borrowing state. (Oleson v. Wilson, 639.)

3. STATUTES - REPEAL-NO SAVING CLAUSE EFFECT OF.-It is a general rule that, after a statute is repealed, without a saving clause, the former repealed statute, in regard to its operative effect, is considered as if it had never existed, except as to matters and transactions past and closed. (Mahoney v. State, 64.) 4. STATUTES - REPEAL-NO SAVING CLAUSE-EFFECT OF, AS TO PENDING PROSECUTION.-If a statute repealing a former act does not contain a substantial re-enactment of the provisions of the old act, so that a suit or prosecution brought under the old statute may be finished under the new act, and such repeal takes place before the final action of the appellate court, pending proceedings in error therein from a judgment of conviction, the prosecution must be dismissed, or the judgment reversed. (Mahoney v. State, 64.)

5.

STATUTES-REPEAL-NO

SAVING CLAUSE-EFFECT

OF, AS TO PENDING PROSECUTION.-If a statute permitting seabby sheep to be removed from point to point, with the permission of the sheep inspector, or without it, to a dipping corral, with the written consent of all sheep owners along the route, is repealed, without any re-enactment of the provisions of the old statute, and without any clause saving prosecutions under the former act, by a statute which permits no removal of diseased sheep at all, except upon the permission of the sheep inspector, and then only for the purpose of treatment for the disease, a new and distinct offense is created, the old statute is no longer in force, and, if such repeal takes place while a proceeding in error to reverse a judgment of conviction under the former act is pending before the appellate court, the judgment will, on motion, be set aside, and the defendant dicharged. (Mahoney v. State, 64.)

6.

STATUTES-CONSTRUCTION-INVALID

PROVISIONS.

To arrive at the correct interpretation of an act claimed to be unConstitutional, the invalid portions of the act may be considered in construing its other provisions which are confessedly good. (Swift v. Calnan, 443.)

See Attachment, 1; Contracts, 1; Equity, 2; Insurance, 1; Judgment, 4; Mechanic's Lien, 1; Officers, 8; Party-walls; Railroad Companies, 1.

STOCKHOLDERS.

See Banks and Banking, 26, 27; Husband and Wife, 8.

SUNDAY.

See Judgment, 2.

SUPERSTITIOUS USES.

See Charities, 3.

SURETYSHIP.

1. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-ABSENCE OF SIGNATURE BY PRINCIPAL.-The mere fact that the surety alone signed a note does not release him. (Fassnacht v. Emsing Gagen Co., 322.) 2. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-CONCEALMENT OF FACTS BY PAYEE-FRAUD.-If the surety signed as security, not knowing the exact amount, but supposing it was for the purchase price of certain goods, and the payee knew this to be the belief of the surety, but also knew that the amount included a pre-existing debt, his failure to inform the surety was in law a fraud that would release the surety from the entire contract. (Fassnacht v. Emsing Gagen Co., 322.)

SURETY - INSTRUCTION

3. PRINCIPAL AND AS TO FACTS.-It is error for the court to instruct the jury that the note in case "is a perfect note on its face, that it is a strong inference that the party signing the same did so as principal, and not otherwise." (Fassnacht v. Emsing Gagen Co., 322.)

2.

See Officers, 16-20.

SURVIVORSHIP.

See Executors and Administrators, 4.

TAXES.

ASSESSMENT-ILLEGAL

1. TAXATION-ASSESSMENT, WHO MAY MAKE.-It is essential to the validity of a tax that the assessment be made by the officer authorized by law to make it. He must be either an officer de jure or de facto. (City of Tampa v. Kaunitz, 202.) ACT-FRAUD-GOOD An illegal act done with a fraudulent purpose avoids an assessment. An illegal act committed in good faith will not avoid an assessment. A legal assessinent with an improper motive is not an assessment unlawfully made. (City of Tampa v. Kaunitz, 202.)

FAITH.

3. TAXES-SPECIAL ASSESSMENT AND ORDINARY TAXDISTINCTION.-A special assessment for a local and permanent improvement, such as the construction of a large ditch for drainage purposes, though levied through the exercise of the taxing power, is not regarded as an annual or ordinary tax, but as an equivalent for benefits in the increased value of the property. (Huston v. Tribbetts, 275.)

4. TAX TITLE, WHO MAY NOT ACQUIRE AND ASSERT.— Where land is devised to A for life with remainder to B for life, and after B's death, the property to go to his heirs, and B accepts the devise, he cannot, by purchasing the property at a tax sale during the life of A, acquire any title which he can assert for the purpose of cutting off the interest of his heirs as remaindermen. It would be otherwise if he never accepted the devise. (Defreese v. Lake, 584.) See Estates, 3-5; Interstate Commerce, 1; Mortgage, 18; Municipal

Corporations, 10.

TAX SALE.
See Devise, 6.

TAX TITLE.

See Taxes, 4.

TELEPHONE MESSAGE.

See Evidence, 4.

TRIAL.

1. JURY TRIAL.-A COURT IS NOT BOUND TO SUBMIT TO
THE JURY MATTERS which, if established, would constitute no
legal defense to a recovery, or as to which there was no evidence.
(German Sav. Bank v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 399.)

2. JURY TRIAL.-A COURT MAY PROPERLY REFUSE TO
SUBMIT to a jury interrogatories which, however answered, could
not have controlled or changed the verdict, or have resulted in a
finding necessarily determinative of the cause. (German Sav. Bank
v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 399.)

3. JURY TRIAL-COERCING A VERDICT.-Though, after the
jurors have been out some twenty-two hours, the judge tells them
that the cause was submitted to them for decision and not for
disagreement, and that he will give them a further trial, he can-
not be regarded as having coerced a verdict. (German Sav. Bank
v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 399.)

4.

TRIAL, CHANGE OF PLACE OF BECAUSE OF LOCAL
PREJUDICE.-Under the statutes of Iowa, a change of the place
of trial because of local prejudice must be applied for before any
continuance has been granted for any cause, unless the applicant
was ignorant of such local prejudice at the time of the prior grant.
ing of the continuances. (German Sav. Bank v. Citizens' Nat. Bank,
399.)

5. TRIAL CRIMINAL CASES CONTINUANCE TO PRO-
CURE WITNESS-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-It is error to refuse
to grant a proper application for a continuance of a criminal case
to procure the presence of a material witness for the accused, un-
der a constitutional guaranty to persons prosecuted for crime, of
the right to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in their behalf. (State v. Williams, 869.)

6. APPELLATE PRACTICE-CRIMINAL TRIALS.-The fail-
ure of an appellant in a criminal case, who is in jail, to file his
brief within the required time may be excused, and is not ground
to dismiss his appeal, when his counsel has removed from the state
and he files his brief as soon as he learns that it has not been
filed. (State v. Williams, 869.)

7. TRIAL-CRIMINAL CASES-COMPELLING WITNESS TO
APPEAR IN MANACLES.-It is error to require a witness for a
person accused of crime to appear in court in manacles during the
trial, although such witness, charged with the crime jointly with
the accused. has been convicted upon a separate trial. (State v.
Williams. 869.)

8. TRIAL-CRIMINAL CASES-RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO AP-
PEAR WITHOUT MANACLES.-Unless some impelling necessity
-demands the restraint of a person accused of crime to secure the
safety of others and his own custody, the act of compelling him to
appear in manacles during his trial is not only a violation of the
common law, but also a violation of a constitutional guaranty that
"the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person."
(State v. Williams, 869.)

9. TRIAL-OBJECTION TO INCOMPETENT WITNESS.-If a
witness is made, by statute, incompetent to testify at all, objection
must be made when he is sworn. (Winters v. Winters, 428.)

10. JURY TRIAL-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.-The jury
are the sole judges of the sufficiency of the testimony and the
veracity of the witnesses, and unless there is evidence that the jury

was improperly influenced, the court will not reverse the decision
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. (Doyle v. State, 159.)
11. TRIAL-DEPOSITION.-AN OBJECTION TO THE COM-
PETENCY OF EVIDENCE, taken on the hearing of a deposition,
may be made for the first time at the trial. (Winters v. Winters,
428.)

12.

TRIAL-DEPOSITION-OBJECTION TO COMPETENCY
OF EVIDENCE-PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.-Under a
statute providing that no exceptions to depositions other than for
incompetency or irrelevancy can be regarded unless made by mo-
tion before the case is reached for trial, an exception to the deposi-
tion of a physician, on the ground that it reveals confidential com-
munications, may be made for the first time at the trial, because
the objection goes to the competency of the evidence, and not to
the witness. (Winters v. Winters, 428.)

13. PRACTICE.-AFTER FINDINGS HAVE BEEN FILED
and a judgment entered thereon, there is but one method by which
the findings can be changed or modified, except, perhaps, in respect
to a mere clerical error, and that is the mode pointed out by stat-
ute by the granting of a new trial. Until the findings are thus
set aside, they must stand in their integrity as originally made.
(Hawxhurst v. Rathgeb, 142.)

TRUSTS.

1. A TRUST TO MANAGE PROPERTY and to pay over and
deliver it to beneficiaries at a time specified implies that the trus-
tees are to retain it in their control without authority to sell or
otherwise dispose of it, and that it is to be delivered to the bene-
ficiaries, so far as consistent with the nature of the property, in the
same condition in which it was received by the trustees. If, how-
ever, the property consists of bonds and mortgages, payment
thereof may be made to the trustees, who may reinvest the proceeds
in other securities. (Goad v. Montgomery, 145.)

LIABILITY

2. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-TRUSTEE'S
AS INDORSER.-If a negotiable instrument is issued to A. B.,
trustee, and he subsequently indorses it, he is personally liable
upon his indorsement. (Bank v. Looney, 830.)

3. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.-THE FACT THAT THE
WORD "TRUSTEE" is on the face of securities, cannot put the
purchaser to any inquiry beyond ascertaining whether the trustee
has power to sell or otherwise dispose of them. (Bank v. Looney,
830.)

4. A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT made in favor of A. B.,
trustee, is none the less negotiable, and a purchaser thereof from
the trustee is not charged with, nor subject to, equities existing in
favor of the makers when the trustee, in disposing of the note, did
not act in contravention of his trust. (Bank v. Looney, 830.)

5. TRUSTEES, POWER OF TO DISPOSE OF PROPERTY.-
In the absence of any authority given expressly or by implication
in an instrument creating a trust, property which has passed into
the hands of the trustees to be held by them for a limited time
must be kept by them and delivered in kind to the beneficiaries at
the termination of the trust. (Goad v. Montgomery, 145.)

6. TRUSTS-REMEDY WHERE TRUST FUNDS ARE IN-
TERMINGLED, OR DISSIPATED.-If trust moneys are mingled
with those of the trustee, the trust may be impressed upon such
fund or property with which it is mingled, but if it appears that
the trust moneys are dissipated or lost, there is no fund to im-