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ings. For else these carriers might have an opportunity of Chap. IX. undoing all persons that had any dealings with them, by combining with thieves, &c.; and yet doing it in such a clandestine manner as would not be possible to be discovered. And this is the reason the law is founded upon that point" (r).

In the absence of any special contract, a railway company is Loss of goods. responsible for the loss of goods entrusted to their care; they insure against and bear the risks of all casualties of the transit except such as result from vis major, i.e., acts of nature (otherwise termed acts of God) and the Queen's enemies (s). Unless there is an express contract, the obligation of the railway company as a carrier of goods, is to carry them according to the usual route as professed by the company to the public, and to deliver them within a reasonable time (t).

The company is only bound to carry in a reasonable time under ordinary circumstances, and is not bound to use extraordinary efforts or incur extra expense in order to surmount obstructions caused by a vis major, such as a fall of snow (u).

A railway company which holds itself out as a carrier of goods between two places, even though one of them is beyond the confines of England, is still subject to the common law liability of a carrier for hire, and is bound to receive all goods which are reasonably tendered to the company for conveyance between these limits (x), and if a loss of the goods occurs during the transit, though not on their own line, the receiving company is responsible (y).

Liability beyond limits of

line.

The liability of a railway company as common carriers of Animals. animals, is, in the absence of any negligence, subject not only to the exemption of the Act of God and the Queen's enemies, but to the further exemption of any act wholly attributable to the inherent vice of the animal (2). Thus, a bullock, one of a

(r) Coggs v. Bernard, Raym. 909; 1 Sm. L. C. See Wyld v. Pickford, 8 M. & W. 443.

(s) Kendall v. L. & S. W. Rail. Co., L. R. 7 Ex. 373. For examples of actions against railway companies for loss of goods, see Harrison v. Brighton Rail. Co., 29 L. J. Q. B. 209; Metcalfe v. Brighton Rail. Co., 27 L. J. C. P. 205; Coombs v. Bristol & Exeter Rail. Co., 27 L. J. Ex. 269; 3 H. & N. 1.

(t) Hales v. L. & N. W. Rail. Co., 4 B. & S. 66; 32 L. J. Q. B. 292.

(u) Briddon v. G. N. Rail. Co., 28 L.

J. Ex. 51.

(x) Crouch v. L. & N. W. Rail. Co., 14 C. B. 255; 23 L. J. C. P. 73.

(y) Webber v. G. W. Rail. Co., 34 L. J. Ex. 170; 4 H. & C. 582 (Ex. Ch.); Wilby v. West Cornwall Rail. Co., 27 L. J. Ex. 181; 2 H. & N. 703; Scotthorn v. S. Stafford. Rail. Co., 8 Ex. 341; 22 L. J. Ex. 121; Coxon v. G. W. Rail. Co., 29 L. J. Ex. 165. See Bristol & Exeter Rail. Co. v. Collins, 7 H. L. Cas. 194; 29 L. J. Ex. 41.

(z) G. W. Rail. Co. v. Blower, L. R. 7 C. P. 655; 41 L. J. C. P. 268; Kendall

Chap. IX. number of cattle delivered to a railway company, was properly loaded into a proper truck by the company. The truck was properly fastened and secured, but in the course of its journey the bullock escaped from the truck, and was found lying dead on the railway. There was no negligence on the part of the company, and the fact was that the escape of the bullock was wholly attributable to the efforts and exertions of the animal itself. It was held that the company was not liable for the loss of the animal (a).

Carriage of coals.

Dangerous

goods, 29 & 30 Vict. c. 69.

Contributory negligence.

There is no obligation on railway companies, whether at common law or under the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 31, to carry goods otherwise than according to their profession. Thus it is competent to a railway company to restrict its coal traffic to the carriage of coals for colliery owners, from the pit's mouth to stations where such colliery owners have depots appropriated to them for the reception and sale of their coals, and to decline to carry coals from station to station, or for coal merchants, such arrangement being essential to the regulation of the large traffic in that article, and the company not being common carriers of coal (b).

By the Carriage and Deposit of Dangerous Goods Act, 1866, 29 & 30 Vict. c. 69, s. 3, it is enacted that no person shall deliver any goods which are specially dangerous (c), to a railway company to be carried unless the true name and description of such goods are distinctly marked outside the package or case, under a penalty not exceeding £500, or a certain term of imprisonment. By s. 6 the railway company is not bound to receive or carry any such dangerous goods.

Where the consignor of the goods delivered to be carried has acted in such a manner as to conduce to their loss or damage, as for instance, where goods are imperfectly packed (d), he cannot

v. L. & S. W. Rail. Co., L. R. 7 Ex. 373;
41 L. J. Ex. 184. See Nugent v. Smith,
1 C. P. D. 423; 45 L. J. C. P. 697
(C. A.).

(a) G. W. Rail. Co. v. Blower, supra.
It has been held by many eminent judges
that the common law liability of carriers
as insurers does not apply to animals:
see per Pollock, C.B., and Martin, B.,
in Pardington v. S. Wales Rail. Co., 26
L. J. Ex. at p. 108; per Erle, J., in
McManus v. Lanc. & York. Rail. Co., 28

L. J. Ex. at p. 358; per Ld. Wensleydale (then Parke, B.), in Carr v. Lane. & York. Rail. Co., 21 L. J. Ex. at p. 262. See the American case of Clark v. Rochester Rail. Co., 4 Kern. 570.

(b) Oxlade v. N. E. Rail. Co., 15 C. B. N. S. 680.

(c) Nitro-glycerine or glonoine oil (s. 1), see Farrant v. Barnes, 11 C. B. N. S. 553; 31 L. J. C. P. 139.

(d) Per Ld. Ellenborough, Stuart v. Crawley, 2 Stark, 323.

recover compensation in an action against the railway company (e).

Chap. IX.

The Carriers'

& 1' Wm. 4, Act, 11 Geo. 4

By the statute 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Wm. 4, c. 68, commonly called the Carriers' Act, reciting that by reason of the frequent practice of bankers and others of sending by the public mails, stage- c. 68. coaches, and public conveyances by land for hire, parcels and packages containing money, bills, notes, jewellery and other articles of great value in small compass, much valuable property is rendered liable to depredation, and the responsibility of common carriers for hire is greatly increased; and that through the frequent omission by persons sending such parcels to notify the value and nature of the contents thereof, so as to enable such common carriers, by due diligence, to protect themselves against losses arising from their legal responsibility, and the difficulty of fixing parties with knowledge of notices published by such common carriers, with the intent to limit such responsibility, they have become exposed to great and unavoidable risks, and have thereby sustained heavy losses; it is enacted, that no common carrier by land for hire shall be liable for the loss of, or injury to, any gold or silver coin, or any gold or silver in a manufactured state, or any precious stones, jewellery, watches, clocks, or timepieces, trinkets, bills, orders, notes, or securities for payment of money, stamps, maps, writings, title deeds, paintings, engravings, pictures, gold or silver plate or plated articles, glass, china, silks in a manufactured or unmanufactured state, and whether wrought up or not wrought up with other materials, furs or lace, contained in any parcel or package which shall have been delivered either to be carried, for hire, or to accompany the person of any passenger in any public conveyance when the value of such articles or property contained in such parcel or package shall exceed the sum of ten pounds, unless at the time of the delivery thereof at the office, warehouse, or receiving house of such common carrier, or to his bookkeeper, coachman, or other servant, for the purpose of being carried or of accompanying the person of any passenger, the value and nature of such articles or property shall have been declared by the person sending or delivering the same; and the increased charge thereinafter mentioned or an engagement to pay the same, accepted by the person receiving such parcel or package.

(e) See Richardson v. N. E. Rail. Co., L. R. 7 C. P. 75; Glover v. L. & S. W.

Rail. Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. 29; Butterworth
v. Brownlow, 34 L. J. C. P. 266.

216

Chap. IX.

And (s. 2) that when any parcel or package containing any of the specified articles shall be delivered and its value and contents declared, and such value shall exceed ten pounds, it shall be lawful for such common carriers to demand and receive an increased rate of charge to be notified by some notice affixed in legible characters in some public and conspicuous part of the office, warehouse, or receiving house, where such parcels are received by them for the purpose of conveyance, stating the increased rates of charge required to be paid over and above the ordinary rate of carriage, as a compensation for the greater risk and care to be taken for the safe conveyance of such valuable articles, and all persons sending or delivering parcels containing such valuable articles at such office shall be bound by such notice, without further proof of the same having come to their knowledge. And (s. 3) that when the value shall have been so declared, and the increased rate of carriage paid, or an engagement to pay the same shall have been accepted, the person receiving such increased rate of charge, or accepting such engagement, shall, if required, sign a receipt for the parcel, acknowledging the same to have been insured, which receipt shall not be liable to any stamp duty; and if such receipt shall not be given when required, or such notice shall not have been affixed, the common carrier shall not be entitled to any benefit or advantage under the Act, but shall be responsible as at common law, and be liable to refund the increased rate of charge. No public notice or declaration (s. 4) to limit, or in anywise affect the liability at common law of any such common carriers.

Every office, warehouse, or receiving-house which shall be used or appointed by any common carrier, for the receiving of parcels, to be conveyed, is (s. 5) to be deemed and taken to be the receiving house, warehouse, or office of such common carrier. And where any parcel shall have been delivered at any such office, and the value and contents declared, and the increased rate of charge paid, and such parcel shall have been lost or damaged, the party entitled to recover damages, in respect of such loss or damage shall also be entitled (s. 7) to recover back such increased charges, in addition to the value of such parcel.

Nothing in the Act is (s. 6) to annul or affect any special contract between such common carriers and any other parties for the conveyance of goods and merchandise, nor (s. 8) to protect any common carrier for hire from liability to answer for loss or

injury to any goods or articles arising from the felonious acts of Chap. IX. any coachman, guard, book-keeper, porter, or other servant in his employ, nor to protect any such coachman, &c. from liability for any loss or injury occasioned by his personal neglect or misconduct.

This Act applies to railway companies as common carriers, and is frequently pleaded in defence to an action for the loss of goods. Although the Carriers' Act applies only to goods carried by land, yet where a railway company made one contract for the carriage partly by land and partly by water, it was held that the contract was divisible so as to bring that part which applied to carriage by land within the protection of the statute (ƒ).

the Carriers'

Act.

A railway company is not deprived of the protection afforded "Loss" within by the Carriers' Act (s. 1), merely by the fact that the loss of the goods is temporary and not permanent, nor can the owner of the goods which ought to have been, but were not, declared pursuant to the statute, recover damages for the consequences of the loss of them, as distinguished from the loss itself (g). The fact that the loss or injury to the goods happens after they have been negligently taken by the company beyond their point of destination does not disentitle the company to the protection of the Act. Thus the plaintiff took a ticket from York to Darlington. Before starting on the journey he handed two water-colour drawings (which were tied together face to face, so that it could be seen that they were pictures of some kind) to the guard, asked him to take care of them, and saw them labelled for Darlington. The pictures were above the value of ten pounds; but the plaintiff had made no declaration of the value. When the train arrived at Darlington he got out, took a fresh ticket for Barnard Castle, and told the porter to see that the drawings were taken out and put into the train by which he was starting. The drawings however were not taken out, but were carried on to Durham, and when they were recovered by the plaintiff, had sustained considerable injury. It was held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover for the damage to the drawings, on the ground that the company was protected by the Carriers' Act, which applied to the case of goods negligently carried beyond the point of destina

(f) Le Conteur v. L. & S. W. Rail. Co., L. R. 1 Q. B. 54; 35 L. J. Q. B. 40; Baxendale v. G. E. Rail. Co., L. R. 4 Q. B. 224; 38 L. J. Q. B. 137 (Ex. Ch.).

(g) Wallace v. Dublin & Belfast Rail. Co., 8 Ir. R. C. L. 341; Miller v. Brasch, 10 Q. B. D. 142; 52 L. J. Q. B. 127 (C. A.).

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