In addition to being organized to extend the defenses, the forces must be equipped to the same end. Today the ability to destroy enemy aircraft far out depends on manned aircraft armed with suitable weapons.

One such weapon is the GENIE, an air-to-air atomic rocket on many of our interceptors standing alert today. Weapons like the GENIE carried by fast interceptors add tremendously to the flexibility and reach of our defensive strength.

In due course there will be a further problem of defense against ballistic missile attack for which appropriate protective means must still be built. These are being worked on by the Army and the Air Force.

Throughout this discussion I have referred to the need for quick reaction. Once more, this points to requirements for a tremendous communications capability, dispersal of aircraft, and the construction of alert facilities so that our aircraft can get off the ground quickly. Again, we have a system which must be trained to the finest possible point. This requires long hours of effort and hard practice; it requires bases at which facilities are available; bases which must be equipped and organized to support around-the-clock, 7-day-week operations. Behind those bases there must be a logistic system and a training system that will assure the effectiveness of our structure.

AREA AND TARGET DEFENSE

As the third requirement I listed area defense and finally the close-in point defense of the targets.

The overriding requirement for a far-out defense is readily apparent. First, the closer the enemy gets to his target the greater are his chances of reaching that target. We must expect Soviet development of air-to-surface missiles which can be launched miles from the intended target-comparable to those we are developing. We must try to prevent invading aircraft from getting close enough to launch any such device.

Secondly, keep in mind the destructive power of the weapon, including its fallout, with which an invading aircraft is almost sure to be armed. We must destroy as many of these weapons as possible far from population centers and friendly territories.

Finally, continuous coordinated attack on any enemy along his entire route gives greater assurance that the attacking aircraft will be destroyed.

These are the reasons that the Air Force and the Commander in Chief, NORAD, strongly support weapon systems like the BOMARC which are designed to protect large areas. Included also in this general framework with the BOMARC are our manned interceptors.

To bring all of these capabilities to bear in the destruction of enemy weapon carriers requires a complicated ground environment of radar stations, electronic computers and weapon-control devices. These must provide the capability for continuously following individual hostile weapon carriers with radar or other means, and for selecting and controlling hundreds of missiles and interceptor aircraft simultaneously. For these purposes, we supplement the vast radar network with a control system which is called SAGE, that is, the semiautomatic ground environment.

SEMIAUTOMATIC GROUND ENVIRONMENT

This system transmits, displays and interprets information of enemy raids, and translates the decisions of our air defense personnel into intercept instructions which guide missiles and interceptor aircraft to their targets. Further development of the SAGE system is supported by the budget you are considering.

The combination of SAGE, BOMARC missiles and interceptor aircraft using nuclear warheads, offers new promise of a major advance more toward effective active air defense.

However, the probability that some part of a massive bomber attack will still be able to penetrate to its targets makes it apparent that there is an additional requirement for short-range air defense missiles around a limited number of high-priority targets. Thus, the Air Force advocates an area defense by BOMARC and manned interceptors, augmented by close-in defense of certain critical targets by short-range missiles, such as the Army's NIKE.

Before looking at the Air Force portion of the air defense forces which this budget will support, I would like to illustrate how much there is to an air defense force which must be supported financially— beyond aircraft and missile units.

RADAR COVERAGE

This slide starts out by showing our national radar coverage. Here are the geographical areas within which sectors of the SAGE control system will be set up.

Now add the airborne early warning and picket ship extensions of our warning and control system.

Finally, the DEW line in the Far North and the Mid-Canada line. Each of these elements of our warning and control system is essential to the overall capabilities we have been discussing. Each element of the system requires a great deal of money, people, and effort.

This is an inevitable consequence of the complexity of modern weapons systems.

AIR DEFENSE FORCES AND PURPOSES

Here is our air defense force structure and equipping. This force as you can see is a composite of manned aircraft and missiles. It is designed to take advantage of the inherent strengths of aircraft and to incorporate the increasing capability of our missiles. I have included the Air National Guard interceptor units on this chart of the air defense forces because they are an important part of the overall air defense capability.

Here I would like to show you one of the new interceptors under development.

Here is the F-108 which will come into our forces in a few years. Teamed with these long-range interceptors will be the BOMARC area defense missile. With a range of over 400 miles, this missile will greatly augment our ability to meet attacking forces far out. Once again, we have a force which is feeling the impact of progress in military weapons. The Air Force contribution to air defense is becoming more of a missile force.

The combination of better radars, an improved control system, higher performance aircraft and more effective missiles adds up to a better air defense capability. But let it be clearly understoodit does not add up to a 100-percent effective air defense. And no matter what we do or what the Soviets do-neither side will ever be able to promise this 100-percent effectiveness, or for that matter, any figure close to it. Yet, we still need the best air defense we can

mount.

Why air defense? We need it for the very reasons we have stressed here warning, to complicate the attacker's problem and to reduce his effectiveness. Just as the Soviets know that in spite of their efforts to protect themselves, SAC will get through, so must we recognize that if they attack, some of their aircraft will get through. This question of the relative effectiveness of air defenses and penetration capabilities on both sides is, of course, a crucial one and one to which we give the most careful study. However, it is a very sensitive area and I should prefer to cover it at greater length, if appropriate, during the discussion period.

FORCES FOR LOCAL WARS OR OTHER TASKS IN GENERAL WARS

I have now discussed the first 2 of the 3 categories of essential forces defined by Mr. McElroy, as they apply to the Air Force.

Mr. McElroy in his third category talked about additional forces which might be used in local wars or in general war for tasks other than those already mentioned.

The first two categories cover essentially all of the combat forces of the Air Force but by no means all of its combat capabilities.

The Air Force capability to meet local war situations is contained within its general war forces. Certain jointly agreed plans for the handling of local situations anticipate limited SAC participation. Other plans are built around the contribution which must be made by our versatile tactical forces.

In our tactical forces overseas there is a deployed capability ready to take action when required to meet any range of hostile actions. This theater capability is exercised for this purpose. In addition, there is here in the United States the 19th Air Force, which has been organized and trained to operate anywhere in the world against a local aggression. This force can either move directly to the scene of action or replace theater forces which may already have gone to the scene of such action. The Air Force has prepared for local war situations. Specific plans exist and the appropriate strength is in being. The capabilities that we have within our general war forces are a primary capability to deter, contain, and terminate local aggression.

For local war situations, we have the demonstrated capability to apply with speed and precision whatever degree of force is appropriate. This spectrum of force extends from the mere presence of air units of known capability in or near a troubled area, through the high-explosive weapon, to the nuclear bomb. From this wide range of power, there can be selected the element of force our national interest calls for. Occasionally, there are suggestions of a lack of Air Force interest in the local war problem. I suggest that this is at least a misunderstanding. Obviously, it must be recognized that local wars have occurred with greater frequency than general wars; history proves that. This leads to two further considerations. First, the fact that

one circumstance is more likely than another does not necessarily mean that the more likely of the two is the one about which we must be most concerned. Mere frequency of occurrence is not the problem. We in the Air Force are primarily concerned with the greater problem; that is, general war. We know that this is the critical issue. We know too that within our capability to handle the greater problem we have the strength, suitably developed and organized, to dispose of lesser situations. Now the second consideration. Regardless of when or where a local war occurs, our primary concern results from fear that it may not remain local. Wars have a way of growing and spreading. History offers some interesting examples along these lines, too. We know that our country will do everything possible through diplomatic means to avoid becoming militarily involved in local situations. When a local situation has, however, become so serious that United States military power must be applied, then it is to our national interest and even to humanity's interest that those hostilities be terminated promptly and decisively. To this objective the Air Force can make a major contribution.

AIRLIFT FORCE

I have covered most of the essential considerations that constitute the basis for the Air Force program which the budget you are considering will support. One other such basis which warrants brief discussion here is our airlift force.

The Air Force must provide not only the airlift that is required to support Air Force activities, but also sufficient capability to satisfy jointly approved requirements of the other services. This adds up to an impressive need for military airlift. I talked earlier about certain operational requirements of our retaliatory forces. Clearly, these cannot be satisfied without airlift support as ready-to-go as the combat elements. I talked about the mobility of the tactical forces. This mobility cannot be realized without airlift support. I have just referred to the role of Air Forces in local war problems. These cannot be met without airlift support. The Air Force must be prepared to make certain airlift support available for Army forces in the field under emergency conditions, particularly in local war. Naval forces also require support under like circumstances. I do not propose to discuss the details of the organization and operation of MATS and other airlift forces, since this matter will be covered in more detail later. I simply wish to highlight the requirement for fast, immediately responsive airlift in very considerable quantity which must have a first function in general war of immediate support of the retaliatory effort if that effort is to succeed.

I would like now to show you the airlift forces which will be supported by the budget you are considering.

Airlift forces are usually divided into Strategic and Tactical; Strategic meaning long range, or intertheater; Tactical meaning short range intratheater, or airlift directly supporting forces in combat. Strategic airlift is that capability represented by the Air Force and Navy transport squadrons and heavy troop-carrier squadrons of the Military Air Transport Service. You will note that the program for MATS reflects the introduction of the Douglas C-133 turboprop cargo aircraft.

Tactical airlift is that airlift capability represented by the medium and assault troop-carrier wings. The program provides for a total of regular and 15 Reserve wings as of end of fiscal year 1958, decreasing from 24 to 22 wings by end of fiscal year 1959.

FUTURE TRENDS

My discussion here today would not be complete without some treatment of future trends. When we talk of the current budget and the forces that relate to it, we normally project forward only 2 years. This time period is too short to evaluate some of the research and development activities. At the same time it is desirable that you consider our present program with an appreciation of what is foreseen for the future.

First of all let me emphasize that the Air Force is continuously evolving and developing. It is not static. It is not immutable. The Air Force was born 50 years ago. It changed a great deal between the two world wars, and probably even more since the last one.

We in the Air Force know well the importance of receptivity to change. We are well aware of the need to venture, even to build out into the unknown. There are many examples of what receptivity to change has won for us. Our missile progress is one such example. And yet, it may be that this progress in missiles will ultimately realize its greatest value as a transition to the control of space.

The Air Force's problem has been historically one of getting a platform above the ground and moving it from one place to another until it reached a destination where it could accomplish a military job. Initially, the job of the platform was observation or reconnaissance. Later, offensive and defensive jobs were assigned to these platforms. When we talk about space we are talking about projecting further these same essential functions of reconnaissance, offense and defense.

In World War I, the platforms we could put in the air operated generally at altitudes of a few thousand feet. In World War II, we operated generally around 25,000 feet. Today we ordinarily operate closer to 50,000 feet. The platforms are moving higher. Just what natural limits there are is hard to say.

There has been, I believe, more progress in this area than is generally realized. The Air Force has been active in space research for many years. I would like now to show you some results of Air Force efforts in this area.

RESEARCH AIRCRAFT

The X-15, which has been under active development for approximately 2 years, is a pure research airplane. It can fly at speeds over 3,600 miles per hour at very high altitudes.

After reentering the atmosphere the X-15 will slow down to its best gliding speed and a normal landing will be made at a speed comparable to that of our present-day fighter aircraft.

This airplane, which is scheduled to fly in 1959, is another important step toward manned space flight.