ment had been allowed to go unpunished, it would have made way for universal anarchy. And a community of any kind without punishment for transgressors, is lacking in a most essential element of its peace and stability. II. But those whose moral character fits them to be the awarders of punishment are often the victims of it. The natural and right order of things in this respect is often exactly the reverse of what it ought to be, and just and noble men are treated as transgressors and suffer the punishment which ought to fall upon their persecutors. Might is very far from being right in this world, and even in this country Richard Baxter stood at the bar while Judge Jeffries sat upon the bench. The apostles of the Lord suffered scourging at the hands of the council at Jerusalem (Acts v. 40); Paul was condemned to death by Nero, and Incarnate Righteousness was crucified between two thieves at the instigation of some of the worst men that the world has ever seen. In all these cases, and in ten thousand others, the just were smitten, and as a rule they have suffered, not merely although they were righteous, but because they were so-it was their integrity that aroused the enmity of their persecutors-these moral “princes were "stricken for equity." " III. Such an abuse of power will in its turn be visited with punishment. Those who have thus unjustly condemned the righteous, have found in their own personal experience that "to punish the just is not good"-"not good" for their own peace of mind-not good for their future reputation-not good for the nation who instigated them or permitted them to do the deed. Haman found that it was not good for him to aim a blow at the upright Mordecai when he was himself hanged upon his own gallows; the Persian princes found it was not good to strike a prince for equity when they were themselves cast into the den of lions; Judge Jeffries found it out when he lay face to face with death in the Tower. And among all the nations whose history has confirmed the truth of the text, none stands out so prominently as that one whose king was the author of the proverb. The punishment of the just-the striking of moral princes for equity-was one of the most prominent of their national crimes, and He whose death at their hands filled up the measure of their iniquity, declared that it was the great cause of their national ruin. "Woe unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! because ye build the tombs of the prophets, and garnish the sepulchres of the righteous, and say if we had been in the days of our fathers we would not have been partakers with them in the blood of the prophets. Wherefore ye be witnesses unto yourselves that ye are the children of them that killed the prophets .. Wherefore, behold, I send unto you prophets, and wise men, and Scribes; and some of them ye shall kill and crucify; and some of them ye shall Scourge in your synagogues, and persecute them from city to city; that upon you may come all the righteous blood shed upon the earth, from the blood of righteous Abel unto the blood of Zacharias son of Barachias, whom ye slew between the temple and the altar" (Matt. xxiii. 29-35). The Jewish, nation has been for nearly nineteen centuries a witness that "to punish the just is not good, nor to strike princes for equity." OUTLINES AND SUGGESTIVE COMMENTS. Even deserved punishment to the righteous does not seem good when designed to chasten the willing with a view to holiness. Even." This seems to have been treated as a word de trop. King James' men make it also; as though Solomon grew tired of same ness, and broke the monotone by a new opening vocable. But with the. above rendering it takes its usual sense. Righteous." This word and "punishment" bear the weight of the word "even." Even the righteous, who ought to know better; and even punishment," which the righteous, at least, ought to be willing to bear.Miller. Often is the wise man's meaning much beyond his words. To punish the just not only is not good, but it is “the abomination (verse 15)-" an evident token of perdition" (Philip. i. 28). If rulers are "a terror to good works," they are ministers of God in authority, but ministers of Satan in administration. And how will such injustice" abide the day of His coming," when He shall "lay judgment to the line, and righteousness to the plummet!"-Bridges. The word prince signifies noble, and is differently understood. It may be applied to the nobility of station, or to that of mind. Some give preference to the latter; and by interpreting it of the noble-minded, and the "just" in the former clause, of the righteous or the people of God, make the two clauses thus to correspond, and to have much the same import. It seems, however, both more natural and more comprehensive to consider two ideas as expressed; the one relating to the duty of the ruler, and the other to that of the ruled. It is the incumbent duty of the ruler, on the one part, to administer justice with strict impartiality. It is the duty, on the other part, of subjects to countenance, encourage, and support the ruler in the equitable administration of his trust. To "strike" is evidently to be understood, not literally alone of actual striking, but of "smiting with the tongue" as well as with the fist or the rod, of all kinds of vituperation and abuse, and attempts to bring the throne into disrepute and odium, and unsettle its stability, by shaking the confidence and attachment of the community. There are many occasions in which a man may be tempted to this. He may, in particular cases, have his mind biassed by pride, by selfinterest, by partiality towards a friend, by political predilections; so that even when all has been done with impartial investigation, and the judgment pronounced according to the legitimate rules of evidence and demands of equity, there may be unfair, unreasonable and angry dissatisfaction; and the prince may be smitten for justice. Every man ought to be on his guard against this. against this. The higher the responsibility, the more burdensome and difficult the trust, and the more serious the results of bringing authorities and the laws into disesteem, and unsettling public confidence in them,ought to be the amount of our reluctant caution in pronouncing censure. Another remark may be ventured. One of the great difficulties with which governments of great nations have to contend, arises from the variety of crossing and contending interests with which they have to deal. How anxious soever they may honestly be, to allow no undue bias to draw them from the line of impartial justice, yet there is hardly a measure they can adopt that does not affect differently different classes of the community; so that, from their various predisposing circumstances, that shall appear to one class-to those in one particular department of trade or commerce-the very essence of injustice, which by another is lauded as a most unexceptionable exemplification of impartial equity. This ought surely to have the effect-I do not by any means say of forbidding the most vigilant observance and the freest and most searching scrutiny and discussion of every measure, and the exposure of its evil or questionable character and tendency-but assuredly of procuring some allowance for the difficulty of the task of pleasing all parties, and some moderation in the tone of censure even where to us the grounds for it are clear and palpable. No man who knows himself will affirm, in almost any case, that, placed, in other circumstances, he might not see with other eyes. I speak in general. There are cases in which the interests of a suffering country are, to a vast extent, involved, in which it becomes every man's paramount duty to speak out and to speak plainly, and to make the ears of the rulers to tingle with the outcry of humanity and justice. I would further apply the spirit of this verse to the case of arbitrators. We have ourselves, it may be, consented to submit a litigated point to arbitration. We do so with a full persuasion of our being in the right-of our claim being the just one. But the arbiters unite in giving it against us. It would be most unreasonable on our part to retain a grudge, especially at the one appointed by ourselves, on this account. Our reference implied confidence in his impartiality and honour, and implied a pledge of cheerful acquiescence. To grumble, to censure, and to withdraw our friendship, would be indeed to "strike him for equity." He would He would have proved himself unworthy of his trust, if his disposition to please and serve us had been too strong for principle, conscience, and oath. There is one government, in which "the just" are never "punished"-all whose laws and all whose sanctions are the per fection of equity. But alas! it is under that very government that the spirit expressed by the phrase "striking princes for equity" is most fearfully manifested. All the murmurings of sinners against either the law of God or its revealed and threatened penalty, are the very essence, in its deepest malignity, of this spirit.-Wardlaw. Righteous men are princes in all lands (Psa. xlv. 16); yea, they are kings in righteousness as Melchisedec. Indeed they are somewhat obscure kings as he was, but kings they appear to be, by comparing Matt. xiii. 17 with Luke x. 24; "many righteous," saith Matthew, "many kings," saith Luke. Now, to strike a king is high treason; and although princes have put up blows, as when one struck our Henry VI., he only said, "Forsooth, you do wrong yourself more than me, to strike the Lord's anointed."-Trapp. I. Reticence of speech. This subject has been dwelt on before. See on chap. x. 19-21. The verses before us suggest further that a man who is sparing of words is not necessarily a man of abundant wisdom, for even a fool may hold his peace sometimes. Solomon elsewhere tells us that "a fool uttereth all his mind" (Prov. xxix. 11); but the fool of this text is not so foolish as to do that. It has been remarked that "by silence a fool abates something of his senselessness, and since he gets the opportunity to collect himself and to reflect, a beginning of wisdom is developed in him" (Von Gerlach). It argues some amount of wisdom in a man if he is silent when he has nothing to say which is worth the saying. But the false conclusion must not be drawn, that every man who is not given to much speech is a man of great understanding and of vast mental resources. It is much better that the stone should remain upon the mouth of a well of impure water, but it must not be taken for granted, because the well is kept closed, that there is a supply of life-giving water within. II. Calmness of temper. It is a mark of wisdom to strive after a "cool" (excellent) "spirit." 1. It makes life more pleasant. A man who allows him self to be vexed and irritated by all the anuoyances of every-day life has no enjoyment of his existence. A fretful and hasty temper makes every bitter draught more bitter, and takes the sweetness out of the cup that would otherwise be a pleasant one. 2. It makes a man more respected and more useful. A man who cannot curb his temper is a despicable object, and will certainly be despised. A passionate man may be pitied and excused, but he cannot be respected. Hence he cannot have much influence for good upon others. This subject also has been treated before. See Homiletics on chap. xiv. 17 and 29, pages 363 and 386. OUTLINES AND SUGGESTIVE COMMENTS. "He that restrains his words knows knowledge." The words are precise. It is the fact that he "knows knowledge" that impels a man to restrain his words. If he did not “know knowledge," if he had not light, and did not know it when he saw it; if he did not see light in God, and know it when he has seen it, and really see enough of it to convince him that "God is light," he could not stand the darkness. The unfortunates in hell have no light to enable them to endure the dark. the saint, knowing knowledge, and seeing that it exists in God, is balanced enough against the mysteries to enable him to restrain his words. ... The wise man asserts that this silence is a chief mark of piety. . . If a man do shut his lips he is wise. fool is a wise man when he is silent, and when, in meek submission, he bows to what he cannot understand.—Miller. But The He cannot be known for a fool who says nothing. He is a fool, not who hath unwise thoughts, but who utters them. Even concealed folly is wisdom. -Bp. Hall, He that hath knowledge hath not many words: the fulness of the one causeth in him a scarcity of the other. And there is nothing that he spendeth idly more unwillingly than his words. But yet, having knowledge, he knoweth both when to spare and when to spend. The original words here are knowing knowledge, for many know much, but it is not knowledge that they know. Some labour hard and waste their time to know needless vanities, which, being better unknown, have not true knowledge in them. . . . Right knowledge is the knowledge of the Lord, and he that knoweth this spareth his words to spend them to God's glory. And as it is in many the penury of their knowledge that causeth the superfluity of their words, so chiefly it is the lack of this knowledge. For by this knowledge we learn that an account must be given for every idle word. . . . . Silence being so rare a virtue, where wisdom doth command it, it is accounted a virtue where folly doth impose it. He that fails of this first help, and is so far gone in folly as that his tongue outgoes his understanding, yet hath a second help, and that is to stop, and shut his lips before they go too far, which, though not the first, yet is a second praise; and he hath the repute of some understanding who either seeth, or is thought to see, his want of understanding.-Jermin. It has been safely enough alleged that of two men equally successful in the business of life, the man who is silent will be generally deemed to have more in him than the man who talks: the latter "shows his hand;" everybody can tell the exact length of his tether; he has trotted himself out so often that all his points and paces are a matter of notoriety. But of the taciturn man, little or nothing is known. "The shallow murmur but the deep are dumb." Friends and acquaintances shake their heads knowingly, and exclaim with an air of authority, that "So and so" has a great deal more in him than people imagine. They are as often wrong as right, but what need that signify to the silent man? . . To follow out one of the Caxtonian essayist's illustrations,-When we see a dumb strong-box, with its lid braced down by iron clasps and secured by a jealous padlock, involuntarily we suppose that its contents must be infinitely more precious than the gauds and nicknacks which are unguardedly scattered about a lady's drawing-room. Who could believe that & box 80 rigidly locked had nothing in it but odds and ends, which would be just as safe in a bandbox?"-Jacom. CHAPTER XVIII. CRITICAL NOTES.-1. Through desire, etc. The readings and expositions of this verse are many. Zockler translates, "He that separateth himself seeketh his own p'easure, against all counsel doth he rush on," and the renderings of Stuart, Miller, and Delitzsch are substantially the same, except that Delitzsch translates the latter clause-"against all that is beneficial he shows his teeth." Other readings are "A self-concerted fool seeks to gratify his fancy and intermingleth himself with all things" (Schultens); "He who has separated himself agitates questions as his desire prompts, and breaks his teeth on every hard point" (Schulz); "He seeks occasion, who desires to separate himself from his friends" (Hodgson). Others read as in the authorised version. (See Comments). 3. Ignominy, rather, "shameful deeds." 4. The last clause of this verse may be divided into two smaller ones and placed in apposition, thus: "a bubbling brook," -a fountain of wisdom. Fausset remarks that the Hebrew word used for man is ish, a good man, not adam, the general term for man. 6. Calleth for. Stuart understands this in the sense of "to deserve." 8. Wounds. The word so translated occurs only here and in chap. xxvi. 22, and will bear very different renderings. Some translate it words of sport (Stuart and Zockler); others, with Delitzsch, dainty morsels; others, "whispers, soft breezes." 9. Waster, or destroyer. 1a. Safe, or, lifted high. 14. Infirmity, i.e., sickness, disease of body. As in similar verses, Miller translates a wounded spirit:" a spirit of upbraiding. Here again, as in verse 4, the Hebrew word ish is used for man. man's gifts. "Hebrew, adam, the gift of a man, however humble and low" (Fausset). 19, "Is harder to be won;" these words are not in the original, but have been inserted to supply the sense. Some translators read “a brother offended resisteth more than a strong city.' Miller reads, "When a brother is revolted away, it is from a city of strength." 20. Satisfied "If this word is taken in a good sense the fruit must be good; but it may be ironical, meaning false or malignant words will find ample retribution. Perhaps the next verse helps us to determine the meaning" (Stuart). 21. They that love it, i.e., "make it a special object of gratification" (Stuart). 24. The first clause of this verse should be "A man of many friends will prove himself base, or is so to his own destruction," i.e., he who professes to regard everybody as his friend will, in so doing, involve himself in trouble. 66 16. A MAIN HOMILETICS OF VERSE 1 and 2. Reference to the Critical Notes and to the Comments will show the widely different translations and expositions given to the first verse. We follow the authorised version. SOLITUDE. I. Solitude is indispensable to the attainment of wisdom. If a tree is to become well-proportioned-if it is to spread out its branches on every side so that its girth is to be proportioned to its height, it must have space-a degree of separation is indispensable to its perfect development. It must be free to stretch out its roots and shoots on every side, and to appropriate to itself those elements in the earth and in the atmosphere which will make it strong and vigorous. So if a man is to be a wise man, if his mental and spiritual capabilities are to be developed as his Creator intended they should be, he must at times separate himself-a certain amount of solitude is indispensable. If he would grow wise in the mysteries of the natural world he must oftentimes shut himself away from the haunts of men, and ponder the manifold phenomena which creation presents to him, and endeavour to unravel her secrets. If he desires to become wise by acquaintance with the thoughts and deeds of the great and mighty men of past ages he must withdraw himself at certain seasons from the society of his fellow-men, and give himself up to study and reflection. And if he desire to acquire what, after all, can alone make him a truly wise man-an acquaintance with himself and with God-he must have seasons of separation in which to listen to the voice of his own heart and to the voice of His maker. A man, when he is alone, is more likely to see things as they really are; he is less under the influence of the seen and temporal than when he is in the market, or on the crowded highway, and consequently things unseen and eternal have a more powerful influence over him at such a season. No man |