recovery may be had, although death was produced by a ruptured blood
vessel about the heart, caused either by fright or resulting from extra-
ordinary mental or physical exertion put forth by the deceased to save
himself from injury when in imminent peril brought about by accident.
ld.

14. ID. - Where policy declares that insurance "does not extend to any
bodily injury of which there shall be no external and visible sign upon the
body of the insured," and also that it shall not cover "any death caused "
in certain ways named, the former clause is only applicable to injuries
not resulting in death. Id.

JUDGMENTS.

1. A VOID JUDGMENT CANNOT BE REGARDED AS HAVING ANY LEGAL EXIST.

ENCE in any court, for any purpose. White v. Foote L. Co., 650.

2. JUDGMENT RENDERED IN ACTION AGAINST PARTY THEN DEAD, FACT OF
DEATH BEING UNKNOWN to the court or the other parties, is not void,
but is irregular and voidable, and may be set aside upon a proper appli-
cation, by motion, in the action, made within a reasonable time. The
application may be made by any person having right under or derived
from the deceased party, after the action began. Knott v. Taylor, 547.
8. ORDINARILY, ONLY PARTY AGAINST WHOM IRREGULAR JUDGMENT IS REN-
DERED can complain of it; and if he does not, the presumption is that
he is satisfied with it. It is otherwise, however, where he was dead
when the judgment was rendered. Id.

4. JUDGMENT CANNOT BE ATTACKED COLLATERALLY, or by an independent
action, for mere irregularity. The remedy is by motion in the action in
which the irregularity complained of appears. Id.

B. JUDGMENTS, VACATION OF. -POWER CONFERRED UPON JUDGE BY STATUTE
(N. C. Code, sec. 274) to vacate and set aside a judgment and relieve a
party therefrom, when taken against him through his mistake, inadvert-
ence, surprise, or excusable neglect, does not extend to a judgment
which necessarily follows the verdict. In the latter case, relief is obtain-
able on motion for a new trial made at the term when the judgment was
rendered; but it is discretionary with the judge even then to allow or
refuse the relief, and his action in refusing it, except for a supposed
want of power, is not reviewable on appeal. Clemmons v. Field, 529.
6. COURT CANNOT AT A SUBSEQUENT TERM AMEND, MODIFY, OR SET ASIDE
A REGULAR JUDGMENT, except upon an application to rehear, or be
cause of accident, mistake, or inadvertence of the court, surprise, or
excusable neglect, as provided by statute. Cook v. Moore, 587.

7. ENTRY WILL BE STRUCK FROM THE RECORDS, AND ERROR CORRECTED,
where by inadvertence an order of affirmance is entered instead of an
order of reversal. Id.

8. INJUNCTION IS NOT PROPER REMEDY OF PARTY TO JUDGMENT AGAINST the
enforcement thereof, but the redress is by a direct interposition in the
cause, recalling or modifying the process, and meanwhile issuing a super-
sedeas to the officer in possession of it. Coward v. Chastain, 533.

9. JUDGMENTS, RESTRAINING ENFORCEMENT OF. - COURT SITTING AS COURT
OF EQUITY HAS NO POWER to interfere with the records of the common
pleas, and strike therefrom a judgment entered by that court; but if a
proper case is presented, it may enjoin the plaintiff from proceeding to
enforce the judgment. Giver's Appeal, 795.

10. BILL IN EQUITY WILL LIE TO RESTRAIN ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT E-
TERED upon a bond given in settlement of the criminal charge of forgery,
if the defendant has had no day in court, and has not been guilty of
laches in setting up the defense when he had an opportunity to do so.
But where the complainant, pending an appeal from a decree erroneously
dismissing such bill, obtains a rule to show cause, and an order opening
the judgment, and admitting him to a defense, and these latter proceed.
ings appear of record, the dismissal of the bill will be affirmed. Id.
11. QUESTION OF JURISDICTION MUST BE TRIED by the whole record in Mis-
souri, and when it appears therefrom that the court had no jurisdiction
over the person or subject-matter, the judgment is void, and will be so
treated in a collateral proceeding. Adams v. Cowles, 74.

-

12. NOTICE BY PUBLICATION. JUDGMENT RECITAL as to the terms of an order
of publication on non-resident defendants, if contradicted by the order
itself, must yield, and the order must control. Id.

13. WHERE JUDGMENT OF COURT of General JURISDICTION RECITES due
service of notice on non-resident defendants, and there is nothing in the
order of publication or the record which specifically contradicts such
recital, it will be presumed, upon collateral attack, that the court has
acted correctly and with due authority, and its judgment will be as
valid as though every fact necessary to jurisdiction affirmatively ap-
peared; and if the statute required an affidavit of non-residence to be
filed prior to the order of publication, it will be presumed, in the absence
of proof to the contrary, that such affidavit was filed. Id.
14. RECITAL IN RECORD BY COURT THAT DEFENDANTS IN PROCEEDING
NAMED HAD BEEN SERVED WITH PROCESS is evidence that they had been
so served, and that the court had jurisdiction of their persons. Such
record cannot be attacked collaterally for irregularity or for fraud. If
assailed for irregularity, a motion in the proceeding would be the proper
remedy; if for fraud, and the proceeding be ended, the remedy is by an
independent action. Brickhouse v. Sutton, 497.

-

15. VOID JUDGMENT. IT IS ONLY WHEN COURT OF GENERAL JURISDICTION
undertakes to grant a judgment in an action or proceeding where it has
not jurisdiction of the parties or the subject-matter of the action, and
this appears from the record, by its terms or necessary implication, or
by the absence of something essential, that the judgment will be abso-
lutely void, and may, therefore, be disregarded and treated as a nullity
everywhere. In such case, the action of the court would be coram non
judice. Id.

16. COURT CAN PROTECT DEFENDANT LIABLE TO TWO ACTIONS- one by his
grantee for a breach of the covenant of seisin, and another by an as-
signee of his grantee upon that of warranty — by attaching conditions to
the judgment, or by staying execution. Tillotson v. Prichard, 95.
17. RECORDED JUDGMENT CONCERNING LAND IS NOTICE to subsequent pur-
chasers, in the absence of fraud and misrepresentation; and equity will
not relieve against negligence in failing to examine the record, by inter
fering with the legal rights of others who are without fault. Bunn v.
Lindsay, 48.

18. EVIDENCE IS COMPETENT TO SHOW THAT DEBT REPRESENTED BY PLAIN-
TIFF'S JUDGMENT WAS PRIOR IN POINT OF TIME to an unrecorded con-
veyance of the legal title as collateral security, held by the terre-tenant,
against whom it is sought to revive the judgment in a proceeding by
scire facias. Kinports v. Boynton, 706.

19. DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT DOES NOT APPLY TO CASE THAT ÍS
AMBULATORY in its nature, and has ceased to be the same by progression.
Where, therefore, on the petition of the receiver of an insolvent corpo-
ration whose charter provided that a preference should be given to the
debts of minors, insane persons, and married women, in case of its dis-
solution by act of law or otherwise, it has been decreed that all the
assets of the corporation shall be equally distributed among all the credi
tors, on the ground that no dissolution of the corporation was shown,
such decree will not preclude all future inquiry into the matter; but in
determining whether a dissolution is now shown, the inquiry must be
confined to what has transpired in the time between the two proceed-
ings. Relief cannot be granted on what existed before the first decree;
and it is not sufficient to show a present state of things adequate to
relief. Dewey v. St. Albans T. Co., 84.

20. PRIOR VERDICT AND JUDGMENT IN ANOTHER ACTION FOR INJURIES TO
PROPERTY CANNOT BE SET UP AS BAR when the pleadings disclose the
fact that the two causes of action are for injuries to different portions of
the property. Williams v. Hay, 719.

21. ESTOPPEL. - WHATEVER IS ADJUDICATED Between DEFENDANTS has the
same effect between them as res judicata as if they appeared in the ac-
tion as plaintiff and defendant. Parkhurst v. Berdell, 384.

22. AN APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT DOES NOT SUSPEND ITS OPERATION as
an estoppel. Id.

23. REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT AFTER IT HAS BEEN RECEIVED AS EVIDENCE IN
ANOTHER ACTION cannot operate retrospectively so as to render its re-
ception erroneous. The fact of reversal cannot appear by the record in
the second action; and the only remedy of the injured party, if any he
have, is by motion for a new trial. Id.

24. JUDGMENT WILL NOT BE REVERSED FOR THE RECEPTION OF IMPROPER
EVIDENCE if the same result must have been reached had such evi-
dence been excluded.

Id.

25. FORMER ADJUDICATION IN SAME CASE MAY BE AVAILED OF BY SETTING
IT UP IN ANSWER, without putting the record thereof in evidence, where
the petition expressly makes all prior proceedings in the case a part of
itself, but omits to set them out, to avoid prolixity. Dewey v. St. Albans
Trust Co., 84.

26. DECREE IS BINDING UPON WHOLE CLASS OF SUTTORS, where the rights
of the whole class were, at the hearing, fairly represented and fully and
honestly maintained and tried. Id.

27. JUDGMENT OF ANOTHER STATE AGAINST PRINCIPAL AND SURETY, properly
assigned to the surety, bears interest in his favor as called for by such
judgment. Turner v. Johnson, 62.

Bee HOMESTEADS, 1; MARRIED WOMEN, 24; MORTGAGES; VENDOR AND
VENDEE, 7, 9, 10.

JURISDICTION.

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1. JURISDICTION OVER CITIZENS OF ANOTHER STATE. When an alien or
non-resident is personally present in any place in the state, however
temporarily or transiently in such place, whether abiding, visiting, or
traveling at the time, a process duly served upon him personally will
confer complete jurisdiction over his person; and this rule may apply in
Maine to a municipal court, although it be of limited jurisdiction. Alley
v. Caspari, 178.

2. NORTH CAROLINA STATUTE (Acts 1870-71, c. 108, sec. 1) which cures
irregularities as to the jurisdiction of the courts in respect to special pro-
ceedings begun before its enactment is valid. Brickhouse v. Sutton, 497.
8. MISSOURI CIRCUIT COURT IS One of General JURISDICTION, proceeding
according to the course of the common law, and nothing will be intended
to be out of its jurisdiction but what specially appears to be so. Adams
v. Cowles, 74.

Bee COVENANTS, 5; EQUITY; EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 5; JUDG-

MENTS.

JURY AND JURORS.

FACTS IN PARTICULAR CASE NOT CONSTITUTING SUFFICIENT GROUND of
challenge to juror, within the provision of the North Carolina code, sec-
tion 1733, that "it shall be a disqualification and ground of challenge to
any tales-juror that such juror has acted in the same court as grand,
petit, or tales juror within two years next preceding such term of the
court.” Newby v. Harrell, 503.

See ATTORNEYS at Law, 1; Libel; Negligence; SLANDER.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

1. INDEPENDENTLY OF ANY AGREEMENT, LAW IMPOSES upon every tenant,
whether for life or for years, the obligation to treat the premises in such
a manner that no substantial injury shall be done to them, so that they
may revert to the lessor at the end of the term unimpaired by any will-
ful or negligent conduct on his part. Carlin v. Ritter, 467.

2. TENANT CANNOT BE HEARD TO DENY TITLE OF HIS LANDLORD, nor can
he rid himself of such relation, without a complete surrender of the pos-
session of the land. To allow him to agree and profess to hold possession
under one as landlord, and at the same time to hold covertly for himself,
or for another's advantage, would be to encourage and uphold a gross
`fraud, which the law will never do. Springs v. Schenck, 552.

3. WHEN TENANT, SUED FOR POSSESSION, DENIES THAT HE WAS TENANT, HE
THUS PUTS HIMSELF broadly in hostility to the right of the landlord,
and the latter need not prove that the term has ended, or that he made
a demand for possession. Id.

4. ADVERSE CLAIMANT OF LAND WHO GETS POSSESSION BY COLLUSIVE CON-
CERT with the tenant of another at once becomes identified with the ten-
ant, shares and stands in his place, and cannot resist the landlord's title
where the tenant cannot do so; and he may be evicted, just as the faith-
less tenant may be. Id.

5. WHERE ONE ENTERS UPON LAND BY SUFFERANCE, PERMISSION, OR CON-
SENT OF TENANT OF ANOTHER, he will himself at once be charged by
the law with the allegiance which the tenant owes the lessor, and will
not be allowed to act and assume relations in hostility to the title under
which he went into possession. Id.

6. FACT THAT ONE WAS IN JOINT POSSESSION OF LAND WITH PLAINTIFF'S
TENANT at the time action was brought, and that he had title to one
half of the land, will not prevent the recovery of a judgment by the
plaintiff against his tenant. But the plaintiff would have no warrant,
under a writ of possession issued on such judgment, to turn out of pos-
session the real owner of the title. Id.

1

LIBEL.

1. OFFICE OF INNUENDO is to aver the meaning of the language pub-

lished, and if the meaning of the language is plain, no innuendo is needed,
as the use of it can never change the import of the words, nor add to nor
enlarge their sense. Bourreseau v. Detroit E. J. Co., 320.
2. INNTENDO. - WHEN PUBLICATION CONTAINS A DISTINCT and plain charge,
in substance, of official oppression and unwarranted abuse of poor
men by officers of the law; of special instances of such abuse by other
officers; of a special instance of abuse by plaintiff; and then the general
allegation as to mistreatment of "ragged and poor men" by "these fel-
lows," which term "fellows" necessarily and manifestly includes plain-
tiff, and conveys such meaning to the average reader, — the meaning is
sufficiently plain without the aid of any innuendo. Id.

8. INNUENDO.-OFFICE OF PLEADING is to make clear and certain the
matters set forth and complained of; and when a publication claimed to
be libelous has a clear and certain meaning upon its face, there can be no
better pleading than to set out the article in terms and in full when all
of it is pertinent to the issue; and the addition of an innuendo, when
none is necessary, can add nothing to a clear perception of its meaning,
but tends rather to cumber and obscure it. Id.

4. PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION. - Publication charging plaintiff with gross
misconduct in office, with arresting and handcuffing men without
right, and oppressing the poor and friendless under color of his office
of deputy sheriff, holds the plaintiff up to the scorn and aversion of
honorable men, and the just reproach and censure of good people. Such
publication is not a privileged communication; and if untrue, makes the
publisher responsible in damages for the injury done by its publication.
Id.

5. REPUTATION OF OFFICER cannot be destroyed or damaged by publication
of false imputations upon his morality or honesty without redress. Id.
6. REASON FOR PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION, which is supposed to be the
accomplishment of the public good by a certain liberty of discussion
and publication, cannot be applied to cases where the effect of the exer-
cise of such privilege must necessarily result in public evil as well as pri-
vate injury. There are cases where the promotion of the public good,
in conflict with public evils, existing or to be feared, warrants a freedom
of speech and license in publication in good faith which may be of in-
jury to private persons without remedy or compensation to them. Id.
7. QUESTION OF LAW. WHERE PUBLICATION IS PLAINLY LIBELOUS on its
face, and needs no explanation to determine its character in that re-
spect, the court may decide and rule it to be libelous; and if its meaning
is plainly not libelous, the court may declare it not actionable, and in-
struct the jury accordingly. Id.

8. QUESTION FOR JURY. — Where any doubt exists as to the meaning of a
publication, so that extrinsic evidence is needed to determine its
character as to being actionable or non-actionable, it is then a question
for the jury, under proper instructions, to find its significance. Id.
9. ORDER OF PROOF. In libel, as in other actions, while the order of
proof is sometimes discretionary, it is not safe practice to call upon the
court to pass upon a proposed statement of fact which is irrelevant,
unless shown to apply to the party, without first laying the foundation
by showing that the witness can answer as to its application. CAMP.
BELL, C. J. ld.