On the 15th of December, 1874, Paramore's judgment, a transcript of which was on that day filed in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of De Kalb County, became a lien on the undivided half-interest of Lindsey in section 8. Lindsay with his family at that time was residing elsewhere. In March, 1876, he first moved with his family upon the section, and then first occupied the house which he had previously built thereon as a home. His right of homestead exemption was then for the first time impressed upon the land which before that time he owned but had never occupied as a homestead. The right of homestead which he then acquired by such occupancy was subsequent and subject to the prior lien of Paramore's judgment, and could not be by him asserted against it. He had no homestead right exempt from sale under the execution issued upon that judgment which the sheriff could be required to set off before sale. The lien of the judgment, having attached to all his interest in the one undivided half of the section, could not be displaced or defeated by the subsequent occupation of it by him as a homestead: Elston v. Robinson, 21 Iowa, 531; 23 Id. 308; Thompson on Homesteads, secs. 241, 246; Finnegan v. Prindeville, 83 Mo. 517. If, however, Lindsay had been entitled to a homestead exempt from sale under execution upon this judgment and the sheriff failed to set it off, the sale would not have been void by reason of such failure: Crisp v. Crisp, 86 Mo. 630. The fee would pass to the purchaser subject to his right of homestead (Black v. Curran, 14 Wall. 463), which right would not be in any manner affected by the sale, not could the purchaser at such sale get possession of any part of the premises without setting off that homestead so long as it was occupied by him as such; and doubtless having the right to have the same set off before Bale, the failure of the officer to do so would afford the homestead occupant good ground for having the sale set aside at the return term of the execution. This right Lindsay proceeded to assert at the return term of the execution, but afterwards withdrew his claim, abandoned the premises, and there is no question of homestead in the case. The plaintiff claims that, upon the facts stated, he has a right to be subrogated to the lien which the St. Joseph Building Company had upon the land prior to Paramore's judgment lien, to the extent of the amount of money furnished by him to pay off that lien, with interest. It is not perceived upon what principle this contention can be maintained. The loan of twenty-five hundred dollars by plaintiff to Lindsay, the execution of the notes by him to the plaintiff, and of the deed of trust to secure them, the payment of the money to the building company, and its acceptance by the company, may be considered as all parts of one transaction, and it may be conceded that the money paid by the plaintiff through his agent was at the request of Lindsay. Nevertheless, at the time the money was loaned and the payment made the plaintiff had no right or interest in the property, for the protection of which it became necessary that such payment should be made. By that payment he for the first time secured any interest in the land; that the parties had previously been negotiating in regard to the loan, and to the payment of the building company's claim, cuts no figure in the case. The plaintiff thereby acquired no interest in the land, and subjected himself to no obligations in respect thereof. He was a stranger to any interest in the land up to the time he voluntarily made the payment. All the interest he ever acquired in the property he acquired by means of that payment; that was the consideration, and the sole consideration, of the notes executed by Lindsay, and the deed of trust to secure their payment. There is not a scintilla of evidence tending to show that the money paid to the company was for the purchase of their lien, and its release to Lindsay, while in the form of a quitclaim deed, states, in express terms, that it is in satisfaction of the deed of trust, and all the facts negative the idea that it was intended as an assignment. There was no evidence tending to prove any agreement that the lien of the building company was to be kept on foot for the benefit of plaintiff. On the contrary, all the facts negative the idea that such was the intention of any of the parties to the transaction. The facts proven show that the plaintiff is not entitled to the subrogation which he prays for, either as of right or by convention. "The demand of a creditor which is paid with the money of a third person, without any agreement that the security shall be assigned or kept on foot for the benefit of such third person, is absolutely extinguished, but the doctrine of subrogation will be applied when the person claiming its benefit has been compelled to pay the debt of a third person in order to protect his own rights or to save his own property": Sheldon on Subrogation, sec. 3. The decisions in this state, as elsewhere, will be found in harmony with the principles here laid down: Wade v. Beldmeier, 40 Mo. 486; Wolff v. Walter, 56 Id. 295; Wooldridge v. Scott, 69 Id. 669; Price v. Courtney, 87 Id. 387. The debt due by Lindsay to the building company, and the lien given to secure it, were absolutely extinguished by the payment. Such was the intention of all parties to the transaction. The plaintiff relied for security for the money he advanced solely upon the deed of trust which he took at the time, and the sole ground upon which a court of equity is asked to intervene in his behalf in this case is the assumption that he would not have parted with his money to make the loan and payments if he had known in January that Paramore's judgment lien had attached to the premises in December. Why didn't he know it? That judgment was spread upon the public records in order that all who might deal with the property might know of its existence. He was not prevented from examining the record, or lulled into security by any representation of Paramore, Lindsay, or anybody else. He didn't know, simply because neither he nor his agent looked that he might see and know. That plaintiff's security was less valuable than he expected it would be when he made the loan was the result of his own negligence, and not of the fault, wrong, or mistake of any other person. Against the consequences of that negligence, for which he has no one to blame but himself, a court of equity cannot relieve him by interfering with the legal rights of others who are without fault. The authorities cited by appellant, and many others, have been examined in vain to find any recognized equitable principle which would warrant the court in so doing. The relief which courts of equity are authorized to administer is to be measured by established and well-recognized principles, and not by the "chancellor's foot." This case has been treated as though the only real defendant in the case, Leisenrig, stood in the shoes of Paramore,- a position, however, which is far from being sustained by the evidence. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. HOMESTEAD IS NOT GENERALLY SUBJECT to a judgment lien while occupied as such homestead: Ketchin v. McCarley, 26 S. C. 1; 4 Am. St. Rep. 674; Bliss v. Clark, 39 Ill. 590; 89 Am. Dec. 330; Blue v. Blue, 38 Ill. 9; 87 Am. Dec. 278; Cummings v. Long, 16 Iowa, 41; 85 Am. Dec. 502; McDonald ▼. Badger, 23 Cal. 393; 83 Am. Dec. 123; note to Filley v. Duncan, 93 Id. 351; but see Hoyt v. Howe, 3 Wis. 752; 62 Am. Dec. 705. When, for any reason, the property ceases to be occupied as a homestead, the lien attaches and may be enforced: Tillotson v. Millard, 7 Minn. 513; 82 Am. Dec. 112; Bliss v. Clark, 39 Ill. 590; 89 Am. Dec. 330; and see the notes to the cases above cited. HOMESTEAD IS NOT SUBJECT TO SALE under execution: Sampson v. Williamson, 6 Tex. 102; 55 Am. Dec. 762; Ackley v. Chamberlain, 16 Cal. 181; 76 Am. Dec. 516; note to Blue v. Blue, 87 Id. 273. But when it covers more land than is allowed by law, the surplus may be sold: McDonald v. Badger, 23 Cal. 393; 83 Am. Dec. 123; note to Blue v. Blue, 87 Id. 276. SUBROGATION WILL NOT ARISE IN FAVOR of a mere stranger or volunteer, but only in favor of one who, on some sort of compulsion, discharges an obligation against a common debtor: Mosier's Appeal, 56 Pa. St. 76; 93 Am. Dec. 783, note 788, 789; Price v. Courtney, 87 Mo. 387; 56 Am. Rep. 453; Neely v. Jones, 16 W. Va. 625; 37 Am. Rep. 794. JUDGMENT LIEN IS NOT DIVESTED by subsequent occupation of the land as a homestead: Freeman on Judgments, 3d ed., sec. 355, citing Elston v. Robinson, 21 Iowa, 531. SALE OF HOMESTEAD ON EXECUTION, AND RIGHT TO HAVE HOMESTEAD SET OFF AT SUCH SALE: See note to Blue v. Blue, 87 Am. Dec. 278 et seq. STATE v. HІСКАМ. 195 MISSOURI, 822.] -- Where party Where ac CRIMINAL LAW— Assault, FORCE NECESSARY TO REPEL. assaulted believes, and has good reason to believe, that great bodily harm is about to be done him, and acts in a moment of seeming impending peril, he need not nicely gauge the quantum of force necessary to repel the assault; but in such case, when the plea of self-defense is set up, the question is, whether, under all the circumstances, the accused had reason to believe, and did believe, that the force exercised was necessary to protect him from impending danger of great bodily harm. CRIMINAL LAW-ASSAULT TO KILL-ERRONEOUS CHARGE.. cused is on trial for an assault to kill, and pleads self-defense, a charge which instructs that if defendant made the assault charged with a pistol he must show that he made it under circumstances which justified it, is erroneous, for the reason that it casts the burden of proof on defendant, requires a higher degree of proof than the law demands, and submits question of law to the jury as to what facts would justify the assault. ASSAULT TO KILL-PROOF TO ESTABLISH. In trial of an assault with intent to kill, where the plea of self-defense is interposed, the state must establish, not only by a preponderance of evidence, but beyond a reasonable doubt, that the assault was committed with intent to kill, in malice, and under such circumstances as not to be justifiable as self-defense. CRIMINAL LAW-ASSAULT TO KILL-ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTION. — In trial for an assault with intent to kill, where the plea of self-defense is set up, it is error to instruct the jury to find a verdict of guilty unless the accused showed some satisfactory grounds for making the assault, as it leaves them to determine what facts would satisfy the law and constitute a good defense, a question which they are not competent to determine. CRIMINAL LAW-ASSAULT TO KILL-REASONABLE DOUBT. - Where defendant, on trial for assault to kill, pleads self-defense, an instruction that, upon the facts stated, the jury must find defendant guilty unless they have a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt, and if so, they must give him the benefit of the doubt, but not telling in what way or to what extent, is erroneous. They must be told that if they entertain such doubt, it is their duty to acquit. CRIMINAL LAW— Assault to KILL-DEFENSE OF RELATIVE. When the accused finds his mother and sister engaged in a difficulty with others, he has a right to interfere in defense of his mother, and whether any act he does afterwards can be justified on the ground of self-defense depends on the motive prompting the act, and the circumstances under which it was done, and not as to whether he voluntarily entered into the difficulty. CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS.—INSTRUCTION that if the jury believe that any witness has knowingly testified falsely to any material fact they may disregard the whole of his testimony, should not be given as a matter of course in any case; but whether it should be given or not always rests in the sound discretion of the court. CRIMINAL LAW-ACCESSARIES. - Where, in prosecution for an assault to kill, parties are indicted as accessaries, they cannot be convicted unless there was a common purpose, both in the mind of the principal and themselves, to kill, and the assault was committed in an attempt to accomplish the common purpose, or unless it was made by the principal with the intent to kill, of which such accessaries had knowledge, and committed some act in furtherance of the attempt mentioned. Draffen and Williams, for the appellants. B. G. Boone, attorney-general, for the state. BRACE, J. The defendants were jointly indicted under section 1262, Revised Statutes, 1879, for assaulting and shooting one Harrison Davenport, "on purpose, and with malice aforethought," with the intent him, the said Davenport, to kill,— the defendant Samuel Hickam as principal, and the other defendants as present, aiding, helping, abetting, etc., the said Samuel in the felony and assault as aforesaid. They were all found guilty under section 1262, supra, the punishment of Samuel Hickam assessed at five years imprisonment in the penitentiary, and that of the other defendants at fines in different amounts. The defendant Susan is the mother, and defendant Nancy Lamm is the sister, of said Samuel, and defendant Edie Bell was a colored servant of the said Susan. As ground for reversal of the judgment in this case, it is urged that the trial court committed error in giving for the state instructions 4, 5, 8, 9, and 10, which are as follows: "4. The court instructs the jury that even though the defendant Samuel Hickam may have had good reason to believe, and did believe, that the witness Harrison Davenport was about to do him some great bodily harm, yet that would not |