without any act on her part. (Grant on Corp. 314, *304.) This being so, the complainants, who hold by conveyance from her made since the judgment of forfeiture and dissolution was rendered, can establish their title by showing such dissolution, without proving a re-entry or other act equivalent thereto. The title reverted to her by reason of the dissolution of the corporation. It is true that the proceeding, which resulted in the judgment of dissolution, grew out of and was consequent upon the breach of the condition subsequent. But such dissolution superseded the necessity of any re-entry, or other act equivalent thereto, on her part. (2 Washburn on Real Prop. [4th Ed.] marg. pge. 452, and cases in notes; M. & C. R. R. Co. v. Neighbors, 51 Miss. 412; Ludlow v. N. Y. & H. R. R. Co., 12 Barb. [N. Y.] 440; Phelps v. Chesson, 34 N. C. 194; Tallman v. Snow, 35 Me. 342; Nicoll v. N. Y. and E. R. R. Co., 12 N. Y. 121.)

If this was a bill, alleging that a condition subsequent in a deed had not been complied with, and praying for a forfeiture of the rights of the grantee on that account, the objection of counsel would have great force. But the bill for partition in the case at bar sets up, that the judgment of forfeiture and dissolution has already been rendered in a proceeding at law and by a court of law, and merely asks that the complainants may be declared to have become the owners of one third of the title, which passed to their grantor as the result of a forfeiture already had and declared.

For the reasons here stated, the decree of the Circuit Court is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Decree reversed."

WILKIN, J., took no part.

Accord

Presbyterian Church v. Venable, 159 Ill. 215; Miller v. Riddle, 227 Ill. 53; North v. Graham, 235 Ill. 178.

CHAPTER III

REVERSIONS, VESTED REMAINDERS AND EXECUTORY INTERESTS

2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 21, 22: Two technical terms are becoming prominent, namely, “revert" and "remain." For a long time past the word "reverti” alternating with "redire" has been in use both in England and on the mainland to describe what will happen when a lease of land expires: The land will "come back" to the lessor. We find this phrase in those "three life leases" which Bishop Oswald of Worcester granted in King Edgar's day. But occasionally in yet remote times men would endeavour to provide that when one person's enjoyment of the land had come to an end, the land should not "come back" to the donor or lessor, but should "remain," that is, stay out for, some third person. The verb “remanere" was a natural contrast to the verb "reverti" or "redire"; the land is to stay out instead of coming back. Both terms were in common use in the England of the thirteenth century, and though we may occasionally see the one where we should expect the other, they are in general used with precision. Land can only "revert" to the donor or those who represent him as his heirs or assigns; if after the expiration of one estate the land is not to come back to the donor, but to stay out for the benefit of another, then it "remains" to that other. Gradually the terms "reversion" and "remainder," which appear already in Edward I's day, are coined and become technical; at a yet later date we have "reversioner" and "remainderman."

When creating a life estate it was usual for the donor to expressly say that on the tenant's death the land was to revert to him. But there was no need to say this; if he said nothing the land went back to the donor who had all along been its lord. But the donor when making the gift was free to say that on the death of the life tenant the land should remain to some third person for life or in fee. As a matter of fact this does not seem to have been very common; but in all probability the law would have permitted the creation of any number of successive life estates, each of course being given to some person living at the time of the gift.

WILLIAMS ON REAL PROPERTY (21st Ed.) 332, 333: If a tenant in fee simple should grant to another person a lease for a term of years, or for life, or even if he should grant an estate tail, it is evident that he will not thereby dispose of all his interest; for in each case,

his grantee has a less estate than himself. Accordingly, on the expiration of the term of years, or on the decease of the tenant for life, or on the decease of the donee in tail without having barred his estate tail and without issue, the remaining interest of the tenant in fee will revert to himself or his heirs, and he or his heir will again become tenant in fee simple in possession. The smaller estate which he has so granted is called, during its continuance, the particular estate, being only a part, or particula, of the estate in fee. And during the continuance of such particular estate, the interest of the tenant in fee simple, which still remains undisposed of—that is, his present estate, in virtue of which he is to have again the possession at some future time-is called his re

version.

If at the same time with the grant of the particular estate, he should also dispose of this remaining interest or reversion, or any part thereof, to some other person, it then changes its name, and is termed, not a reversion but a remainder. Thus, if a grant be made by A., a tenant in fee simple, to B. for life, and after his decease to C. and his heirs, the whole fee simple of A. will be disposed of, and C.'s interest will be termed a remainder, expectant on the decease of B. A remainder, therefore, always has its origin in express grant: a reversion merely arises incidentally, in consequence of the grant of the particular estate. It is created simply by the law, whilst a remainder springs from the act of the parties.

ID. 342: A remainder chiefly differs from a reversion in this, that between the owner of the particular estate and the owner of the remainder (called the remainderman) no tenure exists. They both derive their estates from the same source, the grant of the owner in fee simple; and one of them has no more right to be lord than the other. But as all estates must be holden of some person,-in the case of a grant of a particular estate with a remainder in fee simple,-the particular tenant and the remainderman both hold their estates of the same chief lord as their grantor held before. It consequently follows, that no rent service is incident to a remainder, as it usually is to a reversion; for

rent service is an incident of tenure, and in this case no tenure exists. Flus

The other point of difference between a reversion and a remainder we have already noticed, namely, that a reversion arises necessarily from the grant of the particular estate, being simply that part of the estate of the grantor which remains undisposed of, but a remainder is always itself created by an express grant.

GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (2d Ed.) § 113: Reversions. All reversions are vested interests. From their nature they are always ready to take effect in possession whenever and however the preceding estates determine.

FEARNE'S CONTINGENT REMAINDERS, Vol. 1, p. 216: The present capacity of taking effect in possession, if the possession were to become vacant, and not the certainty that the possession will become vacant before the estate limited in remainder determines, universally distinguishes a vested remainder from one that is contingent.

WILLIAMS ON REAL PROPERTY (21st Ed.) 345: But, if any estate, be it ever so small, is always ready, from its commencement to its end, to come into possession the moment the prior estates, be they what they may, happen to determine,—it is then a vested remainder, and recognised in law as an estate grantable by deed. It would be an estate in possession, were it not that other estates have a prior claim; and their priority alone postpones, or perhaps may entirely prevent possession being taken by the remainderman. The gift is immediate; but the enjoyment must necessarily depend on the determination of the estates of those who have a prior right to the possession.

GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (2d Ed.) § 101: A remainder is vested in A., when, throughout its continuance, A., or A. and his heirs, have the right to the immediate possession, whenever and however the preceding estates may determine.1

LEAKE ON PROPERTY IN LAND (2d Ed.) 230, 231: If a grant be made to A, for life, and after the lapse of a day after his death to B. for life or in fee, the limitation to B. is not a remainder, because it does not commence in possession immediately on the determination of the particular estate; it is a limitation of a freehold estate to commence in futuro, which in a common law conveyance is void, and the reversion of A.'s estate remains in the grantor.

1 See definition of vested remainders adopted by Mr. Justice Cartwright in his opinion in Brown v. Brown, 247 Ill. 528, 93 N. E. 357, and that announced by Mr. Justice Baker in Etna Life Ins. Co. v. Hoppin, 214 Fed. 928, 131 C. C. A. 224, post, p. 301; also the distinction between vested and contingent remainders as announced by Mr. Justice Dunn in Carter v. Carter, 234 Ill. 507, 511, 85 N. E. 292.

The plainest case of a vested remainder is where the limitations are to A. for life, with remainder to B. and his heirs. Brown v. Brown, 247 Ill. 528, 93 N. E. 357; Deadman v. Yantis, 230 Ill. 243, 82 N. E. 592, 120 Am. St. Rep. 291; Marvin v. Ledwith, 111 Ill. 144; Knight v. Pottgieser, 176 Ill. 368, 52 N. E. 934; Green v. Hewitt, 97 Ill. 113, 37 Am. Rep. 102; Clark v. Shawen, 190 Ill. 47, 60 N. E. 116: Rickner v. Kessler, 138 Ill. 636, 28 N. E. 973. See also Vestal v. Garrett, 197 Ill. 398, 64 N. E. 345; Nicoll v. Scott, 99 Ill. 529, 548; Springer v. Savage, 143 Ill. 301, 32 N. E. 520; O'Melia v. Mullarky, 124 Ill. 506, 509, 17 N. E. 36; Barclay v. Platt, 170 Ill. 384, 48 N. E. 972.-Ed.

Also a limitation which is to take effect in defeasance of a preceding estate, without waiting for the regular determination of that estate according to the terms of its limitation, is not a remainder; and such a limitation is void at common law. But the preceding particular estate may be made determinable by a conditional limitation, and the estate limited to take effect in possession immediately upon its determination, whether that happen under the conditional limitation or by the expiration of the full term of limitation, is a remainder.

The particular estate and the remainder must be created at the same time by one conveyance or instrument; for if the particular estate be first created, leaving the reversion in the grantor, any subsequent disposition can be effected only by grant or assignment of the reversion; which is not thereby changed into a remainder, but still retains its character of a reversion, to which the tenure of the particular estate is incident.

ID. p. 33: A feoffment might be made with an express appropriation of the seisin to a series of estates in the form of particular estate and remainders, and the livery to the immediate tenant was then effectual to transfer the seisin to or on behalf of all the tenants in remainder, according to the estates limited. But future estates could only be limited in the form of remainders, and any limitations operating to shift the seisin otherwise than as remainders expectant upon the determination of the preceding estate were void at common law. Thus, upon a feoffment, with livery of seisin, to A. for life or in tail, and upon the determination of his estate to B., the future limitation takes effect as a remainder immediately expectant upon A.'s estate. (Co. Lit. 143 a; Williams, Seisin, 67, 169.) But upon a feoffment to A. in fee or for life, and after one year to B. in fee; or to A. in fee, and upon his marriage to B. in fee; or to A. in fee or for life, and upon B. paying A. a sum of money to B. in fee, the limitations shifting the seisin from A. to B. at the times and in the events specified, as they could not take effect as remainders, were wholly void at common law. (Co. Lit. 378, et seq.; Fearne, Cont. Rem. 307.) Such limitations became possible in dealing with uses and in dispositions by will, as will appear hereafter.

The exigencies of tenure required that the seisin or immediate freehold should never be in abeyance, but that there should at all times be a tenant invested with the seisin ready, on the one hand, to meet the claims of the lord for the duties and services of the tenure, and, on the other hand, to meet adverse claims to the seisin, and to preserve it for the successors in the title. (Butler's note (1), Co. Lit. 342b.)

This rule had important effects upon the creation of freehold estates; for it followed as an immediate consequence of the rule, as also from the nature of the essential act of conveyance by livery of seisin, that a grant of the freehold could not be made to commence at a future