would have felt it in such a case as this. Nor do we think that a difficulty in stating a conclusion justifies a construction which the language used, as well as the probabilities, show to be contrary to what the testator could have meant. Undoubtedly "issue" may mean, and in this clause does mean, more than "children." If one child of Charles had died at any time leaving children living at Charles' death, we will assume that they would not have been excluded. See Ralph v. Carrick, 11 Ch. Div. 873, 882. But "issue" is a word which lends itself very easily to the expression of representation. Ross v. Ross, 20 Beav. 645; Robinson v. Sykes, 23 Beav. 40, 51; In re Orton's Trust, L. R. 3 Eq. 375, 380. The issue of Charles would have taken by way of representation in one event. If Charles had died "before the receipt of his share," his issue would have "represented" him, by the words of the will. There is no reason for "issue" (the same word) taking the same sum otherwise in the other event, which has happened. If the context of the clause which we have to construe does not of itself show clearly in what sense the testator used the word, the alternative limitation makes it plain. We are of opinion that the word "issue," as here used, means descendants taking by way of representation. What the principle of division would have been had there been no descendants alive nearer than grandchildren, we need not discuss. Possibly, in that case, each grandchild would have formed a new stirpes, after the analogy of the statutes. Pub. St. c. 125, § 1, cl. 1. See, further, King v. Savage, 121 Mass. 303; Hall v. Hall, 140 Mass. 267, 2 N. E. 700; Bowers v. Porter, 4 Pick. 198, 208, 210, 211; construction of Rev. St. c. 62, § 24, Pub. St. c. 127, § 23, in Tillinghast v. Cook, 9 Metc. 143, 148. Decree for the children.5 COATES v. BURTON. (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1906. 191 Mass. 180, 77 N. E. 311.) Bill in Equity, filed in the Probate Court for the county of Suffolk on April 27, and amended on May 22, 1905, by the trustees under the will of Gideon Skull Holmes, late of Boston, for instructions as to the distribution of a trust fund, under the provision of that will which is quoted in the first paragraph of the opinion, upon the death of Sarah T. Coates, a daughter of the testator who had enjoyed the income of the fund during her life, and who died on December 19, 1904, leaving seven children and one grandchild, Emma Burton, the minor daughter of Elizabeth Coates Burton, one of the seven children of Sarah T. Coates still living. 5 Hills v. Barnard, 152 Mass. 67, 25 N. E. 96, 9 L. R. A. 211; Jackson v. Jackson, 153 Mass. 374, 26 N. E. 1112, 11 L. R. A. 305, 25 Am. St. Rep. 643; Union Safe Deposit v. Dudley, 104 Me. 308, 72 Atl. 166; Ross v. Ross, 20 Beav. 645; In re Orton's Trust, 3 Eq. 375. See, also, Robinson v. Sykes, 23 Beav. 40. In the Probate Court Grant, J., made a decree that the fund be distributed among the children of Sarah T. Coates per stirpes to the exclusion of the grandchild Emma Burton, the daughter of a living child. Emma Burton by George L. Huntress, her guardian ad litem, appealed. The case came on to be heard before Lathrop, J., who reserved it upon the petition as amended and the answers for determination by the full court, such decree to be entered therein as justice and equity might require. KNOWLTON, C. J. The question before the court arises upon the following language of the will of Gideon S. Holmes, late of Boston, deceased: "Upon the decease of each of my said daughters Caroline or Sarah, after the decease of my wife, my Trustees hereunder shall pay over a proportion of the principal of the said fund of fifty thousand dollars and said estate on Fort avenue then in trust hereunder, for their benefit, equal to the proportion of the income thereof which such daughter so dying shall at her decease be entitled to receive, to her lawful issue, share and share alike; and in case of either or both dying without such issue living at her decease, then to my then heirs at law, in either and all cases to have and to hold to them, their heirs and assigns, to their own use and behoof forever." The daughter Sarah has lately deceased, leaving as her sole issue seven children, and a grandchild, the daughter of one of these living children. The question is whether the share of which Sarah had the income is to be divided into seven equal shares, one for each of her children, or into eight equal shares, of which the grandchild shall receive one. In Jackson v. Jackson, 153 Mass. 374, 26 N. E. 1112, 11 L. R. A. 305, 25 Am. St. Rep. 643, where, under a will, the share of a life tenant was to be given after her death to her issue, she having died leaving children, and grandchildren who were the offspring of one of her children then living, as well as a grandchild who was the daughter of one of her deceased children, it was held that the share was to be divided among the children and the daughter of the deceased child taking by right of representation, to the exclusion of the grandchildren who were the offspring of a living child. Chief Justice Field said, after a review of the cases, "The tendency of our decisions has been more and more to construe 'issue,' where its meaning is unrestricted by the context, as including all lineal descendants and importing representation, and certainly, when the issue take as of a particular time after the death of the testator, and only the issue living at that time take, the issue of deceased issue take by a certain substitution for their ancestors." In the present case the will is like that in Jackson v. Jackson in reference to the matter referred to in the last part of the above quotation. This is not a case where the issue take as of the death of the testator, but only those take who are living at Sarah's decease. This decision exactly covers the case at bar, except that the present will contains the words "share and share alike." In Hall v. Hall, 140 Mass. 267, 2 N. E. 700, the shares of the life tenants were "to be equally divided among all such issue or children, share and share alike." It was held that the division should be among the children and the issue of deceased children, taking per stirpes. It was said, in the opinion, that the words "among all such issue share and share alike" do not "necessarily mean that each of such issue shall have an equal share with every other, or with a child. It is satisfied if all such issue share in a division which is equal as between living children and the issue of deceased children, taking per stirpes." Dexter v. Inches, 147 Mass. 324, 17 N. E. 551, and Gardiner v. Savage, 182 Mass. 521, 65 N. E. 851, are like Jackson v. Jackson, ubi supra, and Hills v. Barnard, 152 Mass. 67, 25 N. E. 96, 9 L. R. A. 211, is similar to it. Other parts of the present will indicate that the words "share and share alike" are to be construed as they were in Hall v. Hall, ubi supra. The provision, quoted above from the will, is one of several provisions contained in the ninth clause, in which, with considerable fullness of statement, the testator provided for the disposition of the remainder in the shares given for life to his three children, respectively. Each of these shares was to go to the issue of the life tenant after his decease. There are four paragraphs, providing for different contingencies as to the order of decease, etc. All of them indicate a scheme that issue shall take by right of representation. In two paragraphs it is expressly said that the issue are to take by representation, while in two others, without any apparent reason for making a distinction, these words do not appear. We think these provisions and the scheme of the will indicate that the testator did not intend, if his daughter should leave several children, and also grandchildren, who were the children of one of these living children, that they should take per capita, so that one of the children and his descendants might receive as much as all of his brothers and sisters together. We think the case should follow the decision in Jackson v. Jackson. Decree of probate court affirmed. CHAPTER XVII GIFTS BY IMPLICATION SECTION 1.—WHETHER A GIFT IS IMPLIED TO CHILDREN BOND v. MOORE. (Supreme Court of Illinois, 1908. 236 Ill. 576, 86 N. E. 386, 19 L. R. A. [N. S.] 540.) Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; G. A. Carpenter, Judge. Horace K. Tenney and Albert M. Kales, for appellants. John S. Huey, for appellees. DUNN, J. [after stating the facts, as appears ante, p. 144:] The principal question arising upon the construction of the second clause of Sarah Walker's will is whether or not there was a devise, by implication, of the remainder in fee to the children of Lester Curtis, by reason of the gift over to the nearest relatives of Sarah Walker should he die without children. The appellees contend that under this clause the daughters of Lester Curtis took a vested remainder in fee, subject to his life estate, while the appellants contend that no remainder was given, by implication, to the children of Lester Curtis, but that the reversion in fee descended to Lester Curtis, as sole heir at law of his mother, pending the happening of the events upon which the estate given over to the nearest relatives depended, and that upon the conveyance of the life estate and the reversion to Bond the life estate merged in the reversion, and the contingent remainder to the nearest relatives was destroyed because of this termination of the particular estate before the happening of the event upon which the contingent remainder depended. The object of the construction of wills is to ascertain the intention expressed by the testator. The intention sought is not that which by inference may be presumed to have existed in the mind of the testator, but that which by the words used in the will he has expressed. Engelthaler v. Engelthaler, 196 Ill. 230, 63 N. E. 669; Williams v. Williams, 189 Ill. 500, 59 N. E. 966; Bingel v. Volz, 142 Ill. 214, 31 N. E. 13, 16 L. R. A. 321, 34 Am. St. Rep. 64. It will be presumed that it was the intention of the testator to dispose of his entire estate, and not to die intestate as to any portion thereof. Any reasonable construction will be adopted, consistent with the terms of the will, so as to dispose of the entire estate; but, where no intention is shown by the will as to the disposition of a part of the testator's property, it must be regarded as intestate. Minkler v. Simons, 172 Ill. 323, 50 N. E. 176; Craw v. Craw, 210 Ill. 246, 71 N. E. 450. Devises by implication have been recognized, but they can only be given effect in cases of such clear necessity that from the will itself no reasonable doubt of the intention can exist. Probabilities as to the testator's intentions cannot be weighed, but the implication must be so strong that an intention contrary to that imputed to the testator cannot be supposed to have existed in his mind. Barlow v. Barnard, 51 N. J. Eq. 620, 28 Atl. 597; Brown v. Quintard, 177 N. Y. 75, 69 N. E. 225. It must be such as to leave no hesitation in the mind of the court, and permit no other reasonable inference. Connor v. Gardner, 230 Ill. 258, 82 N. E. 640, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 73. Moreover, a gift by implication must be founded upon some expression in the will. It cannot be inferred from an absolute silence on the subject. In re Reinhardt, 74 Cal. 365, 16 Pac. 13; Nickerson v. Bowly, 8 Metc. (Mass.) 424; O'Hearn v. O'Hearn, 114 Wis. 428, 90 N. W. 450, 58 L. R. A. 105. The estate given to Lester Curtis by the will is expressly limited to his life. Should he die without children, the remainder is disposed of. The will says nothing as to the disposition of the remainder should Lester Curtis have children. Appellees contend that the gift over, in default of children, implies a gift to the children should any be born. This question has arisen in the English courts, and a series of decisions has established the rule there that a devise to one for life, with a remainder over if he dies without issue, does not, of itself give an estate, by implication, to his issue. Greene v. Ward, 1 Russ. 262; Sparks v. Restal, 24 Beav. 218; Ranelagh v. Ranelagh, 12 Beav. 200; Neighbour v. Thurlow, 28 Beav. 33; In re Hayton's Trusts, 4 N. R. 55; Seymour v. Kilbee, 3 L. R. Ir. 33; In re Rawlin's Trusts, 45 Ch. Div. 299; Scale v. Rawlins [1892] L. R. A. C. 342. Such is stated to be the rule of law in Page on Wills, 554, and 2 Redfield on Wills (3d Ed.) 204. In the case of Neighbour v. Thurlow, supra, it was said: "The court will give the most liberal construction to the words of a testator in order to carry out his intention, but it is contrary to every principle to introduce words into a distinct bequest in order to make the will more reasonable, or to supply a gift which is not to be found in the will. It is settled that, where there is a gift to A. for life, and, if he die without leaving issue, to B., it does not create an implied gift to the children of A. Though it is natural enough to suppose that some words may have been omitted, still the answer is that the testator has not inserted them, and the court cannot do so for them." In Seymour v. Kilbee, supra, it was said that "no such gift [to children] can be implied from the gift over only, and it could only be supported by some other matters existing in the will raising an inference in favor of the issue. I can find nothing of the kind in this will. It does not contain a single word favoring the implication of an interest in the issue beyond the mere gifts |