vious rents and profits there has been an intestacy-the Court does not hesitate to strike out of the will any direction that the devisees shall not enjoy it in full until they attain the age of twenty-five years."

The point seems, in the first instance, to have been rather assumed than decided. It was apparently regarded as a necessary consequence of the conclusion that, a gift had vested, that the enjoyment of it must be immediate on the beneficiary becoming sui juris, and could not be postponed until a later date unless the testator had made some other destination of the income during the intervening period.

It is needless to inquire whether the Courts might have given effect to the intention of the testator in such cases to postpone the enjoyment of his bounty to a time fixed by himself subsequent to the attainment by the objects of his bounty of their majority. The doctrine has been so long settled and so often recognized that it would not be proper now to question it.

Wickens, V. C., when this case came before him in 1871, intimated an opinion that the rule in Saunders v. Vautier, 4 Beav. 115, Cr. & P. 240, was inapplicable where the beneficiaries were charitable corporations or the trustees of charities. I have carefully considered the reasons which he adduced for this opinion with the respect due to any opinion of that learned Judge, and certainly with no indisposition to give effect to the intention of the testator if I could see my way to do so. But I am unable to find any sound basis upon which a distinction can be rested in this respect between bequests to charities and those made in favour of individual beneficiaries.

My Lords, I concur, therefore, in the conclusion at which the Courts below arrive. The Thellusson Act has, in my opinion, for the reasons given, no application to the case.

I think the judgment should be affirmed, and the appeal dismissed with costs."

[The concurring opinions of LORD MACNAGHTEN and LORD DAVEY are omitted.]

5 See Curtis v. Lukin, 5 Beav. 147, ante, p. 1191.

6 See Martin v. Margham, 14 Sim. 230 (1844), ante, page 1177.

In St. Paul's Church v. Attorney General, 164 Mass. 188, 203, 41 N. E. 231, 236, the court, by Justice Lathrop, said:

"The plaintiffs state that, in their opinion, further accumulation of income, if not compulsory, would be injurious and undesirable. They give, however, no reasons for such a conclusion. The founder of the trust, David Sears, provided that the income from the pews should be added annually to the trust fund to accumulate forever.

"As to one-half of the fund no question arises, as the plaintiffs must convey and transfer it to those entitled thereto. There will, consequently, be no further income to accumulate. All income accumulated by special deposit with the trust company will not be added to the fund, as it belongs under this decision to the trustees under the will of David Sears.

"As to the other half of the fund, the question directly arises how far a provision to accumulate for a charitable purpose is valid. In England the period within which accumulations are valid is defined by the St. of 39 and 40 Geo. III, c. 98, commonly called the Thellusson Act, and the pro

visions relating thereto apply to accumulations for charities. Martin v. Margham, 14 Sim. 230. In the absence of statute there is no definite limit to accumulations for charities, so far as the decisions are concerned. The few cases bearing at all on the subject afford little assistance. Hawes Place Society v. Hawes Fund, 5 Cush. 454; Odell v. Odell, 10 Allen, 1; Harbin v. Masterman, L. R. 12 Eq. 559; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 399; Scott on Trusts for Accumulation, §§ 74-84. In regard to this matter, one of three rules must be true: The accumulation must be valid forever; or it may be controlled by the court within reasonable and desirable bounds; or it must be subject to the same rules as an accumulation for private purposes. There is good reason to suppose that the rule last named should not apply, for, if the object is not subject to the rule against perpetuities, there is no good reason why an accumulation for that object should be. It certainly would be as much the policy of the law to favor an accumulation for charitable objects as to favor charitable objects. It often happens that the charitable purpose cannot be carried out without accumulation of a fund, sometimes for a long period of time.

"There are also good objections to a compulsory perpetual accumulation even for a charitable purpose. Much would depend on the terms under which the accumulation was to be made. There would be great public danger in allowing an accumulation indefinitely for a charitable purpose that was not to be carried out within some definite time. Such a purpose would be practically no charitable purpose at all. On the other hand, however, there are cases where the income from property might be directed to be accumulated to form a fund, the income of which fund was to be annually applied to charitable purposes, as in the case at bar. Such an accumulation, it is evident, is less objectionable. as the income from the accumulating fund is constantly being applied to the charity year by year in larger amount. There seems to be no more objection to such an accumulation than to the holding of property constantly increasing in value for the benefit of the charity.

"We are of opinion, however, that the proper course is to hold that the limits of an accumulation for the benefit of a charity are subject to the order of a court of equity. By this method of solving the difficulty, on the one hand an unreasonable and unnecessary trust for accumulation can be restrained, and on the other hand a reasonable accumulation can be allowed to carry out the intention of the benefactor and to secure the accomplishment of the trust in the best manner. In Woodruff v. Marsh, 63 Conn. 125, 137 [26 Atl. 846, 38 Am. St. Rep. 346], an accumulation of a reasonable part of the income was allowed for a hundred years.

"To apply this principle to the case at bar. It seems that to authorize equitable interference with the accumulation directed by the testator, the accumulation should be unreasonable, unnecessary, and to the public injury. It is not enough that the trustees are not desirous to continue it, or that any one in behalf of the charity asks that it be not continued. The court must be satisfied that there is good cause why the testator's directions should not be carried out."

CHAPTER XLII

EFFECT ON VALID LIMITATIONS OF THE FAILURE OF OTHER LIMITATIONS FOR REMOTENESS 1

GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, §§ 247, 248: If future interests created by any instrument are avoided by the Rule against Perpetuities, the prior interests become what they would have been had the limitation of the future estates been omitted from the instrument. Thus, if an estate is given to A. for life, remainder to his children and their heirs, but, if the children all die under twenty-five, then to B. and his heirs, the limitation to B. is too remote, and the children of A. take an indefeasible fee simple. The cases illustrating this are innumerable. So when there is a devise on a remote condition, and no prior devise, the land descends to the heir who has an indefeasible fee.

If the devise of a future interest is void for remoteness, but the prior devise is for life only or other limited period,—for instance, if there be a devise to an unborn child for life, remainder to the unborn child of such unborn child,—the property after the termination of the prior interest goes to the person to whom property which has been invalidly devised or bequeathed goes. This person is generally the heir in case of realty, and the residuary legatee in case of personalty. There is no difference in this respect between a devise or bequest void for remoteness and a devise or bequest void for any other reason. [Citations in footnotes are omitted.]

BARRETT v. BARRETT.

(Supreme Court of Illinois, 1912. 255 Ill. 332, 99 N. E. 625.)

Suit by Saxton S. Barrett against Mary K. Barrett and others for the construction of the will of John R. Barrett, deceased. There was a decree adjudging paragraphs of the will void, and complainant brings error. Affirmed.

HAND, J. This was a bill in chancery filed by Saxton S. Barrett, as executor and individually, against Mary K. Barrett and the other defendants in error, in the superior court of Cook county, for a construction of the last will and testament of John R. Barrett, deceased. The

1 See Beard v. Westcott, 5 Taunt. 393, 5 B. & Ald. 801, T. & R. 25, ante, p. 887; Monypenny v. Dering, 2 De G., M. & G. 145; Gray, Rule against Perpetuities, §§ 251-257.

defendants appeared in person or by guardian ad litem, and answered the bill, and a replication was filed. The cause was tried without a reference, and a decree was entered holding the second and third paragraphs of the will void as in contravention of the rule against perpetuities, and that all of the property of which the testator died seised and possessed was intestate and passed under the laws of descent of the state of Illinois to the heirs of the testator, with the exception of the property given to the widow under the first paragraph of the will. From that decree the complainant has prosecuted this writ of error, and has assigned as error the action of the trial court in holding the second and third paragraphs of the will of John R. Barrett void.

The facts are brief, and are not in dispute. John R. Barrett died in Chicago on January 12, 1910, leaving him surviving his widow, Mary K. Barrett, and four sons-George K. Barrett, Saxton S. Barrett, Roland B. Barrett, and Arthur M. Barrett-and seised and possessed of real and personal property. On the 6th day of July, 1909, he executed his last will and testament, which was admitted to probate in the pro-bate court of Cook county on March 4, 1910, which, omitting the formal parts, is as follows:

"First-I give, devise and bequeath to my wife, Mary K. Barrett, all articles of personal property, such as books, furniture, pictures, watches, jewelry, wearing apparel and articles of virtu, owned by me at the time of my death, to be her sole and absolute property forever. "Second-I hereby give, devise and bequeath to my trustee hereinafter named, all the rest and residue and remainder of my estate owned by me at my death, consisting principally of bonds, mortgages, notes and other evidences of indebtedness, in trust for the following purposes: To hold, handle, invest, re-invest, collect the income therefrom and to pay the said income thereof to my wife, Mary K. Barrett, during her lifetime, provided she elects to take under this my last will and relinquishes all statutory and other rights that she may be entitled to, and after the death of my said wife, Mary K. Barrett, to pay the said income to my four sons, George K. Barrett, Saxton S. Barrett, Roland B. Barrett and Arthur M. Barrett, share and share alike, during their respective lives. Upon the death of Arthur M. Barrett the share of the income of my said estate paid him during lifetime shall be by my trustee paid to my grand-daughter, Mary Katherine Barrett, during her lifetime. Upon the death of my son George K. Barrett the share of the income of my said estate paid to him during his lifetime shall be by my said trustee paid to his lawful issue, share and share alike, (except in the case of his daughter, Mary Katherine Barrett,) for and during their respective lives. Upon the death of my said son Saxton S. Barrett the share of the income of my said estate paid to him during his lifetime shall be by my said trustee paid to his lawful issue, share and share alike, during their respective lives. And

KALES FUT.INT.-76

upon the death of my said son Roland B. Barrett the share of the income of my said estate paid him during his lifetime shall be by my said trustee paid to his lawful issue, share and share alike, during their respective lives. If any of my said sons shall leave no lawful issue them surviving, or in case my grand-daughter, Mary Katherine Barrett, shall not survive her uncle Arthur M. Barrett, then I direct that the share intended for such lawful issue and the said Mary Katherine Barrett be by my said trustee handled and disposed of as part of my original estate. Upon the death of all of my sons and their lawful issue named herein as beneficiaries under this will, I direct my trustee to divide the residue and remainder of my estate equally between the lawful issue and next of kin of my said grandchildren, share and share alike, to be their sole and absolute property forever, my intention being that my trustee shall pay all of the income of my estate to my wife while she lives, then to my sons while they, respectively, live, and upon the death of either or all of my sons George K., Saxton S. and Roland B., that their lawful issue, if any, shall have said income per stirpes during life; that upon the death of my son Arthur M. his share of the said income shall be paid to my granddaughter, Mary Katherine Barrett, while she lives, and after the death of all my sons and grandchildren my trustee shall divide my estate equally between. the lawful issue and next of kin of my said grandchildren.

"Third-I desire that my trustee shall permit the interest and income from my said estate to accumulate for at least twelve months and then to pay it out in quarterly installment dividends, payable January, April, July and October 1 of each year. I direct that as any part of my estate becomes converted into money by the maturity and collection of bonds, notes of hand, etc., or in case of any additions thereto by inheritance or otherwise, the same shall be re-invested in the best possible manner, preferably through Wood, Gundy & Co. of Toronto, Ontario, in Canadian municipal bonds bearing five per cent. interest per annum, payable semi-annually, and that if necessary to procure bonds bearing this interest rate a premium be paid therefor, and that bills of sale be taken, together with the opinion of a reputable attorney or attorneys as to the legality and desirability of such bonds, and that my said trustee prepare a full descriptive list, showing dates, amounts, time of maturity, rate of interest, date of interest, payment and signature of all notes, bonds, mortgages and other evidences of indebtedness, as soon as my said estate comes to his hands; that said list be revised from time to time as any changes are made by maturity and conversion of any of said securities, and that my said trustee deliver a copy of said list and revised list to all beneficiaries under this my last will, from time to time during the continuance of his duties.

"Fourth-It is my intention that the ($9,000) nine thousand dollars in municipal and other bonds in the name of my sister, Callysta Ą. Bar