Statement of case. 89 id. 578; Chicago L. Ins. Co. v. Needles, 113 U. S. 574; Craig v. Town of Andres, 93 N. Y. 405; Thompson v. Town of Mamakating, 37 Hun, 400; Bk. of Chenango v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467; Heckman v. Pinckney, 81 id. 211; People v. Gold and Stock Co., 98 id. 67; Turnpike Co. v. Illinois, 96 U. S. 63) When the state withdrew the privilege of operating a railroad in Broadway, from the corporation on which it was conferred, by annulling its charter, the same act terminated the right of any other corporation to use or enjoy the franchise under lease or contract from the Broadway Company. (Penn. R. R. Co. v. St. Louis R. R. Co., 118 U. S. 290; Abbott v. Johnstown G. & K. Horse R. R. Co., 80 N. Y. 27; Thomas v. R. R. Co., 101 U. S. 71; Pierson v. McCurdy, 33 Hun, 521, 522, 523; 100 N. Y. 608; Peik v. Chicago, 4 Otto, 164; Chicago v. Iowa, id. 155; N. O. Co. v. Delamore, 114 U. S. 501; Fanning v. Osborne, 102 N. Y. 441; East Ala. Co. v. Doe ex dem. Visscher, 114 U. S. 341.) The leases were void in their inception for want of power to make them, in the lessor or lessees. (T. & B. Co. v. B. H. T. & W. Co., 86 N. Y. 107; Abbott v. Johnstown, etc., R. R. Co., 80 id. 27; People v. Albany &V R. R. Co., 77 id. 232; Thomas v. R. R. Co., 101 U. S. 71; Penn. Co. v. St. Louis Co., 118 id. 290; Heckman v. Pickney, 81 N. Y. 211; People v. G. S. T. Co., 98 id. 67; Fischer v. R. R. Co., 46 id. 644; Central Co. v. Twenty-third St. R. R. Co., 54 How. Pr. 168; Woodruff v. Erie Co., 93 N. Y. 609; Excelsior Co. v. Lacey, 63 id. 422.) No special law applicable to the Twenty-third Street Railroad Company confers a franchise upon it to operate a railroad in Broadway. (People v. B. H. T. & W. R. Co., 12 Abb. N. C. 230.) No corporation can absolve itself of its public uses. Any act by which it undertakes to do so is unlawful, and a violation of its charter. (Thomas v. R. R. Co., 101 U. S. 71, 78.) An agreement to practically surrender the uses of a corporation to another is an attempt at unlawful consolidation. (Pierson v. McCurdy, 33 Hun, 521, 523; affirmed, 100 N. Y. 608.) Both the people and the receiver have a right in this action to raise the ques Statement of case. tion as to the validity of the leases or traffic contracts. (Gillett v. Moody, 3 Coms. 479; Talmadge v. Pell, 3 Seld. 328; AttyGen. v. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 77 N. Y. 272, 275; Leavitt v. Pal mer, 3 Coms. 19; Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 43, 44, 45; Laws of 1858, chap. 314.) Chapter 310 of the Laws of 1886, providing a method of procedure for winding up the affairs of the Broadway Surface Railroad Company, which was dissolved by chapter 268 of the Laws of the same year, is a constitutional statute in all its parts. Notwithstanding the fact that it became a law some days after the company was dissolved, it was intended to apply, and does apply, to the winding up of the affairs of the Broadway Surface Company. (People ex rel. F. Ins. Co. v. Davenport, 91 N. Y. 574; Ayers v. Lawrence, 59 id. 192-196; People ex rel. Cook v. Wood, 71 id. 371–374; 1 Bl. Com., 86 Esp. Pen. Act 1; 1 Kent's Com. 455; People ex rel. Collins v. Spicer, 99 N. Y. 225-233; People v. Supervisors, 43 id. 130, 132; Donaldson v. Wood, 22 Wend. 395; 1 Bacon's Ab. Stat. 5; Smith v. People, 47 N. Y. 330; U.S. v. Freeman, 3 How. [U. S.] 556; People ex rel. v. Supervisors, 70 N. Y. 228-236; Brower v. Brower, 1 Abb. Ct. App. Dec. 214; Potter's Dwarris [Postnote Case], 237; Campbell v. Evans, 45 N. Y. 356; Sands v. Kimbark, 27 id. 147; 3 R. S. [Banks' 7th ed.] 470, § 73; Id. 2400, § 73; Scott v. Williams, 23 How. Pr. 393; In re Crook, 23 Hun, 696; Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378-442; Commonwealth v. Ketchings, 5 Gray, 486.) The receiver and not the directors of the dissolved corporation is entitled to wind up the affairs of such corporation. (Lathrop v. Stedman, 13 Blatch. 134-150.) Denis O'Brien for the receiver. The People have a right to maintain this action. (Laws of 1886, chap. 310.) In construing a remedial statute, which has for its end the promotion of important beneficial public objects, a liberal construction is to be given when it can be done without doing violence to its terms. (Wolcott v. Pond, 19 Conn. 597; Potter's Dwarris, 203, 204, 231, notes; Weed v. Tucker, 19 N. Y. 422.) The suit falls within the scope of the jurisdiction of equity, and Statement of case. the statute, both directly and by implication, indicates the procedure whereby the powers of equity may be invoked in regard to the affairs of the dissolved corporation. (Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 312; Lathrop v. Stedman, 42 Conn. 583, 599; Parker v. Browning, 8 Paige, 388, 390; 40 Hun, 34; People v. O'Brien, 103 N. Y. 657.) The statute annulling the charter of the Broadway Surface Railroad is constitutional and valid. The legislature is the sole judge of the propriety of such repeal, and its discretion therein may not be reviewed. (1 R. S., tit. 3, chap. 18, § 8; People v. Lacombe, 99 N. Y. 43; People v. Flagg, 46 id. 401; People v. Comstock, 78 id. 356; Smith v. People, 47 id. 330; Erie v. Casey, 26 Penn. St. 301; Penn. College Cases, 13 Wall. 190; McLaren v. Pennington, 1 Paige, 101; Miners' Bank v. United States, 1 Greene [Iowa], 553; Crease v. Babcock, 23 Pick. 335; Lathrop v. Stedman, 13 Blatchf. 134; Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 17; State v. Curran, 12 Ark. 321; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 88; De Camp v. Eveland, 19 Barb. 81; Rumsey v. People, 19 N. Y. 41; R. R. Co. v. Maine, 96, U. S. 499; Sinking Fund Cases, 99 id. 700; R. R. Co. v. Georgia, 98 id. 359.) With regard to the time at which a statute takes effect, no divisions of a day are allowable; a statute goes into effect from the first moment of the day on which it receives the executive sanction, unless some other day is specified therein or by general statute for its taking effect. (Tomlinson v. Bullock, 4 Law Rep. [Q. B. D.] 230; Lapeyre v. United States, 17 Wall. 191, 198; Mallory v. Heles, 4 Metc. [Ky.] 53; In re Welman, 20 Vt. 654; Krone v. Levy, 60 N. Y. 126; Marvin v. Marvin, 75 id. 240; Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U. S. 381; Arnold v. United States, 9 Cranch, 104; Richardson's Case, 2 Story, 571; United States v. Norton, 97 U. S. 164; People v. Clark, 1 Cal. 406; Kennedy v. Palmer, 6 Gray, 316; Blydenburg v. Cotheal, 4 N. Y. 418; Small v. McChesney, 3 Cow. 19; Clute v. Clute, 3 Denio, 263; Rogers v. Beach, 18 Wend. 533; Bellassis v. Hester, 1 Ld. Ray. 281; Field v. Jones, 9 East, 154; Note in 26 Am. Dec. 234.) The SICKELS-VOL. LXVI. 2 Statement of case. repeal or alteration of an act creating a corporation does not, in any proper sense of the term, interfere with vested rights or impair the obligations of the contract between the state and the persons on whom the franchise was conferred. (Sen. Doc., 1882, No. 8, Opins. of the Atty's-Gen. 42; In re Orville Lee's Bank, 21 N. Y. 9; In re Reciprocity Bank, 22 id. 9; Erie v. Casey, 26 Penn. St. 287; Tomlinson v. Jessup, 15 Wall. 454; Turnpike Co. v. Illinois, 96 id. 63.) Where the legislature or the state terminates the existence of a corporation, its contracts cease. (People v. Globe Ins. Co., 91 N. Y. 174, 179, 180; People v. A. & V. R. R. Co., 77 id. 232; Jones v. Judd, 4 id. 411; Heine v. Meyer, 61 id. 171; B. S. T. Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 78 id. 524; R. R. Co. v. Georgia, 98 U. S. 359; Shields v. Ohio, 95 id. 319; Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 id. 13; 1 Bl. Com. 484.) The franchise to construct and operate a railroad in Broadway, and to take tolls from the public, was the gift of the state, and not the result of any contract with the city or the property owners. (3 Kent's Com. 458; 2 Bl. Com. 37; Danville v. Comm., 73 Penn. St. 38; In re Thirtyfourth St. R. R. Co., 102 N. Y. 343; People v. Kerr, 27 id. 188; People v. Sturtevant, 9 id. 263; Davis v. Mayor, etc., 14 id. 506; Milhau v. Sharp, 27 id. 611; Mayor, etc., v. Second Ave. R. R. Co., 32 id. 261.) The franchise granted by the state to operate a railroad in Broadway, and which was to terminate upon the death of the company, cannot be augmented or extended by the power to mortgage the same. (B. S. T. Co. v. Brooklyn, 78 N. Y. 524; 26 Penn. St. 301; R. R. Co. v. Georgia, 98 U. S. 359; Worcester v. N. & W. R. R. Co., 109 Mass. 103; N. Y., P. & O. R. R. Co. v. Parmelee, 15 Week. Law Bul. 239; W. W. R. R. Co. v. Board, 35 Wis. 271; affirmed, 93 U. S. 595; Silliman v. F. O. & C. R. R. Co., 27 Gratt. 119.) The mortgages and leases were given subject to the law and the determinate character of the franchises. The liability to terminate them at the pleasure of the legislature. was part of the contract. (Mumma v. Potomac Co., 8 Pet. 286; People v. Globe Ins. Co., 91 N. Y. 179; N. R. R. Co. v. Miller, 10 Barb. 282; Read v. Frankfort Bank, 23 Me. Statement of case. 320; C., B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155; Peik v. C. & N. W. R. Co., 94 id. 164; People v. A. & V. R. R. Co., 77 N. Y. 232.) The grant of a perpetual and indefeasible franchise to make use for private profit of the public highways of the state is inconsistent with legislative control of the streets, and, therefore, legally impossible. The power of the state to control the streets is for the public benefit, and is, therefore, inalienable. (Smith v. City of Rochester, 92 N. Y. 463, 484; People ex rel. Bristol v. Supervisors, 20 Mich. 95; People v. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 188; Goszler v. Georgetown, 6 Wheat. 593; Town of East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How. [U. S.] 511; Clark v. Corp. of Washington, 12 Wheat. 54.) Even if it were within the legislative power to create an indefeasible and perpetual street railway franchise in lower Broadway, it is not to be supposed, in the absence of such declaration, that such a franchise was intended. (People v. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 188.) The reserved right to repeal corporate charters, construed with respect to street railroad corporations, includes the power to abrogate or withdraw a franchise held by such corporations to use the public streets for private gain. (Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 644; Tracy v. T. & B. R. R. Co., 38 N. Y. 433, 437; Dwarris on St. 690; Santa Clara Case, 118 U. S. 394; Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 id. 13; Turnpike Co. v. Illinois, 96 U. S. 63; Chicago v. Iowa, 94 id. 155; Peik v. Chicago, Id. 164; Ruggles v. Illinois, 108 id. 527; Fanning v. Osborne, 102 N. Y. 441.) Persons dealing with corporations, or purchasing their bonds in the markets, must take notice of the limitations upon their powers to issue the bonds, and are deemed to contract with reference to those limitations. (Savings Bank Cases, 84 N. Y. 403; Cagwin v. Town of Hancock, Id. 532; Town of Lyons v. Chamberlain, 89 id. 578; Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Needles, 113 U. S. 574; Craigv. Town of Andres, 93 N. Y. 405; Thompson v. Town of Mamakating, 37 Hun, 400.) The power to mortgage, and through a mortgage to transfer a franchise, not being one inherently necessary to a corporation for the purpose of enabling it to carry out the |