The FAA has given no guidance as to how this can be accomplished. Without proper guidance, the access rule cannot be imposed.

In the spring of 1988 the Airport Operators Council International was joined by the American Association of Airport Executives, the Air Transport Association, the Regional Airlines Association, and the Air Line Pilots Association in unanimously voicing our concern for the proposed rule. We stand together today for all of the same reasons as herein enumerated.

We jointly urge the Federal Aviation Administration to delay the access control rule and instead commission a fully-funded pilot program for four airports, install computer-controlled access systems at the four selected airports, and operate them for 18 to 24 months in order to glean answers to the many unresolved questions of today. We believe this is a prudent approach to a very important program.

May I emphasize that a security control access system is an outstanding management tool and a great addition to any good airport security program. The access system does not make an airport secure; it is only one building block in the overall security program.

Let me hasten to point out that much good is being done and accomplished every day by the Federal Aviation Administration and the Federal Government. AOCI endorses the current FAA securityrelated research and development program, and we urge this subcommittee to give its full support to those efforts.

The FAA is encouraged to continue their R&D work to emphasize thermal neutron analysis devices as well as vapor detection equipment. As has been said, both of these have great promise.

AOCI would also like to compliment the FAA for commissioning work at Baltimore-Washington International Airport to find areas where security can be improved and enhanced beyond current levels. This underscores our point, made earlier, that pilot programs are effective in developing procedural and equipment improvements to reduce security risks, without the expenditure of large sums of money.

Only the Federal Government can provide the leadership and funding needed for effective aviation security. AOCI firmly believes that the nature of today's threat requires a much greater role for the Federal Government in aviation security. The U.S. Government must accelerate efforts to strengthen international agreements and establish strong security standards for all nations of the world, along with sanctions against those governments that fail to live up to international standards.

Along this line, the aviation community as a whole applauds Secretary Skinner for his very positive action in reviewing the security plans of all foreign airlines.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the Federal Government must define and continually redefine the nature of the threat to aviation. They must consult with and assist the airports and the airlines in implementing new and better security systems to address the ever-changing threat. We must get on with the full assessment of current and future risks and make decisions today as to where our limited resources can be most effectively deployed.

Mr. Chairman, I stand ready to respond to any questions that you or your committee may have.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much.

Do any of the other witnesses have prepared statements, text, or remarks to make? I don't want to overlook anyone or have anyone misunderstand the invitation that was issued earlier.

[No response.]

Mr. OBERSTAR. I would like to repeat a caution I stated earlier. And Mr. Lally, on behalf of ATA I would like you to submit the amounts spent by carriers on security, and to present that information both as dollar amounts and as percent of operating expenses. I would like to have that information on behalf of airports from Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Jackson.

[Information, when received will be retained in subcommittee file.] Mr. OBERSTAR. Clearly, the dollar amounts that you are referring to, both in the procurement of new detection devices and in providing security at airports, are very sizable amounts of money. And I fully agree they ought to be coming out of the Aviation Trust Fund; after all, a portion of the ticket tax was originally dedicated to security and was included as a separate item in subsequent years. After that initial designation, it was folded in as a single tax, but it was intended by Congress at the outset-and fully concurred in by the airlines and the traveling public-that there should be a certain amount of that tax set aside for security purposes. Now that money is being tied up in the Trust Fund, which is being held in reserve for other purposes, principally, along with the Highway Trust Fund and the Social Security Trust Fund, to cover up a certain amount of deficit.

This Member, and I think all Members on this committee, feel very strongly that the Aviation Trust Fund should be freed to do the purpose for which it was intended, and that is to provide for the facilities and equipment needed for safety and security at our airports and our airlines.

So we will continue to work in that direction, but I think we need some help from the public to make it clear to this Administration, as we tried with the previous Administration, to set free the Trust Fund. You can help immensely in that regard. As I said, we fell short by five votes on the House floor of passing the amendment offered by Mr. Mineta. I think we need to continue that effort in this Congress, and we will do so at the first opportunity to count 218 votes. That's one more than the half that we need to pass it.

The access issue that you have discussed, those are big numbers-$18,000 per door for 1,500 doors at JFK, 750 at LaGuardia, and 1,000 doors at Newark, plus all the other airports in this country that adds up to a very big ticket.

Now, I'm sure you responded to the FAA's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking when it was issued last September. What response did you get from the FAA when you questioned those numbers and proposed a test initiative?

Mr. FITZGERALD. I think there has always been some dispute on the numbers. When FAA estimates that the average access doors are 128 and we wound up with 1,500, you obviously are viewing the problem from such different perspectives.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Are you saying that the FAA based its rulemaking on a grossly smaller number of doors?

Mr. FITZGERALD. I think that they just miscalculated the number of doors that they felt would have to be included in any kind of a program. When we went out and actually investigated the airports, we found many, many more doors.

I think there was a dispute right from the beginning on the physical problems that we would all be facing, and I think Mr. Jackson's testimony summarized the fact that all of the aviation groups were together in their position that this rule should not go forward as it was originally proposed because we needed time to measure the implications and to see where the differences really were in our two positions.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I think my colleagues from New York would want to pursue further the matter of counting doors. But it is a matter of concern, because this very same issue is one that was identified by the Federal Aviation Administration in its international survey of foreign airports as a point of security lapse, and a recommendation was made by the FAA and the Department of Transportation to the other participants in the ICAO conference that more security be provided for doors in the airports. If that isn't being done, then you have a number of people who can obtain access to what should be secured positions or points in the air operations area.

Mr. FITZGERALD. I think that same problem would exist overseas if they used the same criteria, so I think you are absolutely correct in the difficulties involved in trying to secure the doors.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Yes, but the foreign operators don't seem to consider the threat as serious a matter-that is, controlled access doors-as the United States does.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Well, I would have to consider the security today generally to be adequate, but it can be improved. I think where you have a major airport, like Kennedy International Airport, we certainly are committed to doing that. I think when you start viewing the entire country, however, and 270 airports, you do a disservice by treating them all the same way without somehow trying to understand the level of the threat at the various levels of airports.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Certainly, at maximum safety the threat of terrorism can literally shut down all American airports. Even if you tried to restrain yourself to do only those steps that prevent the obvious, you could so hamstring American airports that they would not be operative. I can understand that, so again we are looking at balance.

Haven't airport operators and the airlines been able to agree with the FAA on which are critical access doors and which ones are not?

Mr. FITZGERALD. I would say no.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Is there no standardized approach to this?

Mr. FITZGERALD. We have been talking about this rule for some time, and I don't think we've really made a lot of progress in terms

a

of trying to get at all of the definitions and what is meant. Even now, with the rule having been issued, we have so many questions on definitions that would impact on the number of doors to be covered that it is still very, very confusing, and that's what concerns us. We certainly are committed to the idea of improving access doors, but we are troubled by the extent of this rule.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Of course, it was not the question of a door in the case of PanAm.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Not at all.

Mr. OBERSTAR. It was a legitimate, open point of entry through the ordinary conduct of business, putting baggage and passengers on board the aircraft, that was the conduit for that destructive device. And apparently that was so in other cases as well. But you do have-and I will conclude, as I am exhausting my time, which I want to reserve for others as well-you do have some 47,000 persons who work on the airport premises. That's a massive undertaking. That's more than some cities, the people who just work there who have access and who need security clearance to access that airport.

Mr. FITZGERALD. And who need the opportunity to be productive. Every time you put a barrier in their way you must pay a price, not only in the capital investment but in lost productivity of people being unable to reach their work locations. That concerns us greatly.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I have seen some very, very secure systems, such as computer reservation systems of certain airlines, where the security is extraordinary. There are numerous kinds-fingerprints, weight identification, eye retina scanning systems. There are at least three or four steps that must be pursued before one person can gain access. That's the ultimate in security. At that rate, we would probably have 15 people a day getting into an airport.

Short of that kind of security at its extreme, for a very legitimate purpose and needed-and, of course, there aren't as many people who need access under those conditions to a secure place— how do you prevent a mechanic, for example, bringing a mechanic's tool box onto the premises that might not have tools but instead might have plastic explosives that can be placed on board an aircraft?

Mr. FITZGERALD. I would say that threat that has never been an area which we were concerned about. That doesn't mean that we might not be concerned about it in the future, but both in the background checks that we do now on airport and airline employees, the kind of supervision that is provided in aeronautical areas, the kind of airlines security systems that they have in place, I feel comfortable that we are doing enough already to keep the likelihood of that at such a small amount that I really feel we need to devote our resources into other areas where there is a much greater threat.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I thank you. My time has expired.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. Molinari.

Mr. MOLINARI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think some very good points have been made by this panel in questioning the feasibility of the rule. These are intriguing questions, listening to those of you who are experts and run airports.

I would like to ask this question. With limited resources, what do you recommend as an alternative which would be a better use of money than these computerized access card systems?

Mr. JACKSON. I'd like to address that if I may, sir.

Mr. MOLINARI. Please, Mr. Jackson.

Mr. JACKSON. We are not saying that the computerized card access system is not a good use for the security aspect of an airport. My airport has had it since 1972. It is an outstanding management tool, but it is very different for every airport. We are all built different. It's just like no two people look exactly alike; no two airports are built alike.

Mr. MOLINARI. Okay. Excuse me if I interrupt. So you're saying that at your airport it is functional, is reasonable, and should be implemented, but not for other airports.

My question then is to the other airports where they wouldn't have the same physical makeup. What would be a better alternative?

Mr. JACKSON. There are a number of systems in use throughout the country. Some do have card access. Šome just have identification badges which must be shown to an individual before they pass through a gate going onto the airside. Some must be funneled through their company operations and use their cards to punch in on a time clock. There are many different methods used to keep individuals out who are not supposed to be in, and to make sure that those people who work inside the AOA are permitted access to that area.

A card access system is just an automated system to do that same sort of thing.

Mr. MOLINARI. I guess I would like to pick up where the Chairman left off. I think his question was, is it your impression that when the FAA proposed this rule they weren't aware of the fact that there are as many access doors at some of the airports that we in fact have?

Mr. JACKSON. Absolutely. They have no conception of the number of doors, or the problems which you may have with certain doors which also have to be fire-life safety doors. They must be openable from the inside but not from the outside. They must be alarmed. The physical cost of $18,000 per door includes all of these costs, plus a base to take care of the major computer that runs the whole system.

As I mentioned, each airport is built differently and the number of doors with access to the AOA is entirely different and must be considered, and was not.

Mr. MOLINARI. Let me turn to New York if I may, Mr. Fitzgerald.

We heard it was 1,500 at Kennedy, 1,000 at Newark, and 750 at LaGuardia. During the hearing process have you brought these figures out? Did you testify at the hearing, or someone on your behalf?

Mr. FITZGERALD. I did not personally testify, but all of these figures were brought out.