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Terrorists are not likely to curtail their insidious acts while we debate and formulate this agenda. Therefore, the FAA should take more of a leadership role to insure that mature plastic explosives detection equipment like TNA is installed in major airports without unnecessary delay.

The Airport Security Technology and Research Act will put into place, through the FAA's rulemaking process, deadlines for installation of detection equipment. The FAA will have 90 days after the bill is enacted to initiate a rulemaking proceeding and 180 days to issue a final rule. The final rule will require that the detection equipment be installed in major airports no later than one and a half years after enactment of the bill.

The bill requires that the FAA administrator outline who will purchase, who will install and operate explosives detection equipment to be used at major airports, how the equipment will be purchased and, who will pay to maintain and operate that equipment. The agenda must be set quickly to insure safety for airline passengers and crews from the invisible and deadly threat of plastic explosives.

The act also calls for accelerated research and development of other technologies which may be used for explosives detection. There are about 30 contracts with the FAA for other technologies including fast neutron activation, enhanced x-ray, ion mobility spectrometry, and biotechnology. The FAA should accelerate funding for research on fast, accurate, low-cost technologies so that we can keep a step ahead of the threat that terrorists pose to commercial aviation.

Mr. Chairman, it is obvious that airport security is just a part of stopping terrorism. We must work with United States intelligence agencies and encourage cooperation with foreign governments to put an end to terrorism. But, until the threat of terrorism no longer exists, Congress, the FAA, and all those responsible for safety must use available resources to insure safe air travel. Explosives detection equipment is an extremely valuable resource and, most importantly, it is available.

I thank the gentleman and yield back my time.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I thank the gentleman for his statement.

We will now take the testimony of the gentleman from New York, Mr. McNulty.

Mr. MCNULTY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, and family members of the victims of Pan Am flight 103. Mr. Chairman, I am grateful to you for allowing me to express my deep concerns about the circumstances surrounding the tragedy which occurred on December 21st of last year.

I represent the 23rd District of the State of New York, the capital district of the State. Mr. and Mrs. Paul Hudson reside in Albany, which is in my district. Their 16-year-old daughter, Melina, was on board that flight. Mr. and Mrs. Joseph Hartunian of Niskayuna lost their 22-year-old daughter, Lynn.

In addition, other area families suffered in this tragedy. Ms. Barbara Primeau of Greenwhich lost her twin sons, Eric and Jason, who were 22. Mr. and Mrs. Anthony Nucci of Hudson lost their 22year-old son Chris. Mr. and Mrs. Rafferty of Ticonderoga lost their 21-year-old daughter, Bonnie Rafferty Williams, as well as their

son-in-law, Eric, 24, and their two granddaughters, Brittany, 2 months, and Stephanie, 19 months. Mr. Edgar Eggleston's son, Edgar III, of Glens Falls was returning to visit his mother who was terminally ill with cancer. He, of course, died on December 21st; she died two days later, on December 23rd.

We have a responsibility to those 259 people, the 11 in Lockerbie, as well as their families and friends, to do all that we can do to insure that such a tragedy never again occurs.

I have written Secretary Skinner and Acting FAA Administrator Whittington and Secretary Baker concerning the manner in which certain aspects of the tragedy are being addressed as well as the steps that should be taken to assure the future safety of airline passengers.

Specifically, Mr. Chairman, I have requested that in the future, when high level warnings are issued, the information should be given to the public. Also, the technology which is available to detect plastic explosives should be deployed with all deliberate speed. As Mr. McCurdy stated, this should be a top priority. In the interim, manual searches should be conducted on international flights whenever there is a threat suspected.

Additionally, family members are anxiously awaiting the return of the personal effects of their loved ones. All identifiable personal effects should be released immediately to victims' relatives. The United States Government must take the responsibility to implore the Scottish authorities to comply with this request without any further delay.

Details were released last week by the FAA that an "aviation security bulletin" was released on November 18, a full four weeks before the tragedy. The Toshiba cassette recorder equipped with a barometric detonating device was described and a photo issued, referring to the anti-terrorist sweep by West German police on October 23rd, in which a similar recorder was confiscated. British authorities issued a "British air carrier only warning" on November 22nd. A phone call warning of an impending bomb attack was placed to the U.S. Embassy in Helsinki. It was dismissed as a crank.

A second warning was released on December 19, two days before the attack, referring to the "previous telex." Incredibly, U.S. airlines operating out of Britain did not receive a copy of this until sometime between January 16 and January 19. This is deplorable and must never happen again.

I share your concern, Mr. Chairman, that airline security must be improved and that future communiques' concerning possible attacks not be dealt with in the same manner.

I would like to submit for the record a copy of the statement issued by the families of the victims on February 6th. I also intend to introduce a resolution expressing the sense of the Congress about this matter and aspects of my previous testimony.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for permitting me to testify. I join you and the other members of the committee in the hope that we can prevent another such tragedy from occurring again in the future.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my formal remarks. I just wanted to add for emphasis I would hope that during the course of this in

quiry when you're speaking to members of the administration you could impress upon them the feelings of the families involved here about the return of personal effects and the seemingly endless delay in getting a response to their request for the return of those items.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I thank the gentleman. You have just done that. They are all out there in the audience listening. You've just made that request. We will emphasize it.

I have met with several groups of the families of the victims of Pan Am 103 and conveyed to administration officials their great concern about those very matters. It has been a source of continuing pain and anguish to them to have to deal with bureaucracy and frustrations in the wake of this senseless and meaningless tragedy.

I appreciate the gentleman's questions about the way in which the warning or the phone call to the U.S. Embassy in Helsinki was handled. That has been a matter of some extensive inquiry by the State Department on their own and at this subcommittee's request. Ambassador McManaway will address that matter in further detail in his testimony shortly.

The process of notification and the issuance of FAA aviation security bulletins to which you addressed your remarks have been a matter of continuing concern. They are the focus of the task force appointed by Secretary of Transportation Skinner to find out what went wrong, why action wasn't taken more decisively and why the warnings were not heeded with greater care and concern. We will take that testimony and receive that information at a later point.

We will make some preliminary inquiries today, but that will be the subject of a very in-depth inquiry by the Department. I think it's an extremely important issue. You were right to raise it, and I appreciate your doing so.

Mr. MCNULTY. Mr. Chairman, when I was making those comments, I was referring specifically to those threats that are categories as high level alerts and not every single phone call that's made to someone. I just want to make that clear.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Certainly. That matter will be further reviewed as we proceed with the testimony today.

Mr. McCurdy, with respect to explosive detection technology, and you sit on a very important committee; it has unique jurisdiction over this matter. I know you have devoted a great deal of personal time to it, both in the Science and Technology Committee and in the Intelligence Committee.

A question arises continuously: who should pay? should the cost of providing security continue to be made out of the security tax that has been folded into the aviation ticket tax? Should it come out of general revenues? Should the airlines in some fashion be required to pay for it or airports?

Ultimately, I think the consumer pays whether in ticket tax or through his or her role as a general taxpayer.

Mr. MCCURDY. Mr. Chairman, you raise probably, as we said, the key issue here is who will purchase or pay for the installation of this equipment?

As you know and are quite aware, the subcommittee I chair, the Transportation and Aviation Materials Subcommittee and Science

and Space authorized the original research and development funds for that-it's roughly $9 million-that allowed this technology to be developed and to fill the testing. The FAA, of course, had supported that.

You are well aware that this subcommittee with its jurisdiction, and Mr. Mineta's efforts as well, that there is a lot of demand on resources and those funds that are available for purchasing such equipment.

One of the reasons that in my bill we require and direct the administrator to make that determination is to provide him some flexibility and also provide some flexibility to the Congress in how those funds are-whether determined or who's going to actuallywhat pot of money is going to be used.

My personal preference all along has been to use the trust fund, but I have been one of those, I guess, within the numerical minority in this body who thought that that trust fund ought to be separated from and brought out of the budget, so that we could use it for its designated purpose in the first place, which was safety equipment, installation of equipment, and other measures to ensure the safety of the flying public.

But the Congress has spoken and the majority has spoken. In this case the trust fund is not separated from the budget. Therefore, we are always squeezed here in trying to find the funds even though there's a surplus of funds sitting over there in the separate fund. I think that's unfortunate.

We basically finessed it in this bill, to be honest, and are directing the administrator to try to find and direct who best will pay for it and who can do most expeditiously and how it can result in the installation of this equipment.

Mr. OBERSTAR. If we had only had five more votes, or a switch of three votes just a couple of years ago, we would made the differ

ence.

Mr. MCCURDY. I see some new votes, Mr. Chairman. There are a number freshmen here this year. I think we may be closer.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Then-Chairman Mineta led the charge to remove the trust fund from the unified budget of the Federal Government, and when we can count to 218 again, we will make that effort once more. I appreciate the gentleman's response and his interest and

concern.

A question for both colleagues, very briefly. What has occurred in security over the two phases I described at the outset has been an attempt to balance convenience and security, convenience of the air traveling public. Even now, as we'll learn later on, there is an effort to shorten the time for screening of one of the more advanced detection devices from 30 seconds to 6 seconds or less.

I guess the families of 103 would say, "We don't care what that time is. Take your time.'

What is the proper balance between convenience and security? Mr. MCCURDY. There is no simple answer there, but I think safety is the key. The public has to be aware-as long as the public is unaware of a threat, as long as the public is accustomed to the sheer convenience of being able to rush to the airport at the last minute, get your bags through and get on the airliner and you're

safe, and you're going to get to your destination, then they'll say we want more efficiency.

But once the public realizes that this terrorist threat is for realand I think the flight 103 is the classic example of that threatthey, at least in the international arena, are going to have to sacrifice some of their convenience and time.

The TNA devices are a little slower. It does take more time than the conventional devices used today. But the enhanced security is such that I think the traveling public should welcome that device. If you fly El Al, for instance, and many of us have, to Israel, they have been under terrorist threat for years, for decades. They tell you, quite frankly, if you're flying on that airline, you have to go a couple of hours early and you're going to be physically searched. Every piece of luggage, every handbag, everything on that airliner is searched physically. That's why they've not had the accidents or the incidents that have plagued other airlines, but that's a tradeoff.

You know full well what the threat is. I think we have to make it clear to the traveling public that there is a threat, that it's not just off in some other country, some other party; they are attacking Americans today; they're attacking American air carriers. As long as we continue to play the role of being involved in foreign policy actively throughout the world, we are going to be a target. I think it's important that the American public be aware of that.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I think it's important we understand we're in for the long haul, that it's not just one incident, but a long period of time.

Mr. McNulty?

Mr. MCNULTY. I would agree with that sentiment generally, Mr. Chairman. I stated in my testimony that until such time as we have deployed the technology to detect the plastic explosives, that I think whenever we think that there's a reasonable threat, that there should be manual searches.

If you're going overseas, Mr. Chairman, the amount of time you're investing in that flight, I don't think too many people would think it would be unreasonable to tack an extra hour or so onto either end of that journey to insure safety.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much. My time has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.

Mr. MOLINARI. Mr. McCurdy, welcome.

I would like to just mention that, with respect to the issue of moving the trust fund off budget, this committee was solid in support of it. We didn't lose a member.

Your legislation is very interesting. What is the cost of the TNA system per unit?

Mr. MCCURDY. It's less than $1 million per unit. I think Mr. McArtor testified it's about $800,000 for the unit. But the importance there is—and, again, I'm putting my armed services hat onall that is dependent upon the amount of production, what the total buy is going to be, and the quantities produced each year.

If we go out and make a determination that this is the equipment that we're going to actually install, I think the per unit cost will decline over time and actually there may even be some competition developed over time as well.

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