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yardstick against which those plans will be measured. This will enable us to better ensure that the security precautions followed by foreign airlines serving the United States are adequate to meet the threats ascribed to those operations.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to emphasize the strength of our commitment to stop the threat of criminal actions directed against civil aviation. It is a difficult challenge, but one that we must meet. We thank this Subcommittee for its longstanding support of the FAA's aviation security efforts, and we look forward to continuing our work with you on these key issues which are so important to the traveling public.

That completes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have at this time.

Over 11.6 billion pieces of carry-on items inspected.

Over 42,800 firearms detected.

Over 19,500 related arrests.

118 hijackings or related crimes may have been prevented by airline/airport security measures.

Three explosive/incendiary devices detected by X-ray.

814 persons arrested at screening points for the unauthorized carriage of firearms or explosive/incendiary devices.

FOREIGN AIRPORT ASSESSMENT PROGRAM

Currently 250 airports meet the assessment requirements of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985.

O 335 assessments and U.S. carrier station inspection trips are scheduled this fiscal year.

o 773 foreign airport assessments have been conducted since 1985.

O Over 700 recommendations have been made to foreign governments to enhance/improve security in the following categories:

Access

42%

27%

178

5%

5%

18

18

18

Assessments are measured, as a minimum, against the ICAO standards and appropriate recommended practices.

o To participate as a team member in a foreign airport assessment, FAA Security Specialists must successfully complete the FAA Security Inspections and Reports Course, or have a minimum of three years experience in domestic

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airport inspections. FAA Security Specialists also have a thorough knowledge of ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices. Assessment team leaders ideally have participated in a minimum of four foreign airport assessments prior to serving as a team leader.

AIRPORT CONTINGENCY PLANS

O In July 1987, FAA required a Contingency Plan as part of each Airport's approved Security Program.

Contingency Plans were required to be in place effective August 1987.

O Contingency Plans are reviewed as part of regularly scheduled Airport Security Inspections and are revised as necessary.

Contingency Plans address four levels of threat,

commensurate with the size and location of the airport and must be responsive to the different threat levels defined in the Plan.

Contingency Plans contain Incident Management

Procedures, including notification of appropriate Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.

O Contingency Plan procedures are coordinated with air carriers, emergency response agencies, and airport tenants.

FISCAL YEAR 1990 BUDGET REQUEST

o The 120 additional FAA security personnel requested will increase the security workforce to 692. This is nearly three times the Fiscal Year 1985 level. Over 80% of FAA security staff is dedicated to international and domestic security inspections.

Foreign Airport Assessments will continue and there will be expanded use of Federal Air Marshals on U.S. carriers operating in high risk areas. Over 500 Foreign Airport Assessments are scheduled for Fiscal Year 1990 (a 28% increase over Fiscal Year 1989).

FAA has invested $61 Million in security research since 1980. The $9 Million requested for Fiscal Year 1990 will fund refinements to the Thermal Neutron Analysis technology and final test and evaluation of Vapor Detection Systems, as well as continuing investigations into new concepts and technology.

Testimony of

Ambassador Clayton E. McManaway, Jr.
Associate Coordinator,

Office of the Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism

Department of State

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this Committee. In keeping with the general focus of this hearing, I will limit my testimony to reviewing three broad issues:

The U.S. Government threat assessment and public notification system regarding threats to civil aviation;

The Department of State's diplomatic, research and training efforts to help prevent a repetition of the Pan am 103 tragedy;

and

The ways that we incorporate aviation security concerns into our bilateral civil aviation agreements.

The callous destruction of Pan Am flight 103 on December 21, 1988 was a terrible international tragedy. The victims were not only the passengers and crew on the plane and the villagers in Lockerbie, but also their relatives and friends and all who were touched by this horrible bombing. All of us deeply regret the loss suffered by families and friends of those on Pan Am 103 and the people of Lockerbie. Let me assure all concerned that everything possible is being done to investigate this incident, bring to justice promptly those responsible, and enhance aviation security to help prevent a repetition of this tragic event.