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our fellow citizens to travel in their countries and spend money there, to enrich their economies to the extent that they do so, then they need a lesson in economics, at least, if not in security. Ambassador McMANAway. You'll get no argument from me, Mr. Chairman, but I would point out that in—let's take both London and Frankfurt airports. They passed FAA assessments in 1988. It would be wrong, I think, and unfair in a blanket way to suggest that all foreign airports and carriers are less security-minded than we are. There are some that are, and there are some that can't afford these various measures we would like to see put in. But it's not all of them, and unfortunately, it's not the ones that we have focused on here today. Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, the State Department does have a very extensive and commendable program for security training on an exchange basis in providing assistance to countries that don't have their own resources, and some that do. Ambassador MCMANAway. Yes, sir. Mr. OBERSTAR. And the State Department has provided training in the last year to several hundred foreign nationals to take the appropriate preventive security measures. Ambassador McMANAway. Yes, sir, and we can also provide a certain amount of equipment through that program, and we do. Mr. OBERSTAR. Yes. You have heard enough testimony today from our colleagues, and questions, showing the genuine concern in the Congress for adequate security measures to be taken in other countries. Among the items identified in the foreign inspection program are problems in identification of persons, the security training programs of foreign countries, perimeter fencing which I've already mentioned, adequacy of locked doors once you get into the security perimeter, law enforcement presence, and the secure operations area.S. What actions are being taken by foreign governments in response to these points that our foreign inspection program has raised with those 107 airports? Mr. SALAZAR. If I may respond, sir, in those instances where we would find those conditions to exist there would be some form of recommendation made as to what might correct that particular deficiency. If it is one of training, the FAA works hand-in-glove with the State Department's Antiterrorism Assistance Program and has provided its facility in Oklahoma City as a training mechanism for a variety of foreign students to get the latest in civil aviation techn1Ques. If it is a matter of law enforcement presence, or access and perimeter controls, and we have concern that an aircraft on the ground may be at some risk, we would ask for the increase of law enforcement and security presence until perimeter protection could be strengthened. If these recommendations were not heeded, then in fact the legislation in the law provides for sanctions to then be applied, including ultimately—as was pointed out earlier—advice to the public about this particular airport not meeting international standards. Mr. OBERSTAR. In the Air India incident in 1985 over the North Atlantic, in the 1986 TWA incident out of Athens, and in the 1987 Korean Airlines incident over Thailand, a total of 448 lives were lost. Were any Americans among those? Ambassador McMANAway. Not in the Korean Airlines incident. There were on both the others. There were no Americans on the Korean flight, but on the Air India and on the Athens flight. Mr. OBERSTAR. I think the recent incident has tended to overshadow the fact that through 1985, there were an average of 25 to 38 skyjackings per year. Increased awareness and action on security has cut that number roughly in half, from 13 to 15, in 1986 and 1987. In 1988 there were 15 skyjackings. The point I am making is that Americans traveling abroad, 40 million trips, continue to be exposed to risk. We need to intensify these efforts that are already underway which we have been discussing this morning. There will be some aspects of that issue that I will pursue further in executive session. I understand that at JFK Airport, Mr. Belger and Mr. Salazar, there are roughly 47,000 people who have access to the airport beyond the passenger emplanement area. What security steps are taken to assure that a mechanic, or a supposed mechanic, doesn't walk on board, into the tarmac area, with what appears to be a tool chest but what in fact may be laden with an explosive? Or that a cleaning person or a cleaning van or a food service person may not be doing the same thing? Mr. BELGER. Mr. Salazar has been intimately involved in the formulation of a relatively recent FAA regulation that places requirements on airport operators to ensure that only authorized individuals have access to certain secure areas. Mr. SALAZAR. In addition to that, before I go into the description of the regulation requiring automated access, it's just that condition, Mr. Chairman, that prompted the FAA to look entirely at the access at airports. These are huge communities where, as you pointed out, 47,000 people must come and go every day. It seems to us, and it seemed to the FAA and to the industry, that this was beyond the human capability of an individual who has a ledger who can identify each individual who is authorized in an operations area. Consequently, the FAA has moved to now require that there be an automated access system installed, a computer-enhanced system to more rapidly Screen people and to be able to more effectively take people out of the system that no longer have a right to be in those restricted areas. Additionally, there is currently a requirement that those people who require unrestricted and unescorted access to restricted area to airports hired after a specific date contained in the regulation must have background investigations completed, as well. Mr. OBERSTAR. There are allegations that there is no requirement that the systems be uniform from airport to airport. Recognizing that there are differences—JFK is not Fort Wayne or Duluth, Minnesota. There is a vast difference in numbers and configurations of airports, but certainly there ought to be some standardization from airport to airport. Mr. SALAZAR. We have taken that into account, sir, when we address the category of airport. In other words, airports of similar size ought to have similar types of systems. But I think your issue is more about the compatibility of a particular system. We are very mindful that compatibility would be an excellent accomodation but it does not necessarily, over a national basis, buy us increased security. It is certainly more convenient for people to have an access card that would allow them access through Chicago as it would through JFK, but the fact of the matter is that that should be an individual airport operator's responsibility to establish those controls in concert and in conjunction with the air carriers that serve that airport. Mr. OBERSTAR. Next month, the passenger and checked baggage reconciliation systems will be strengthened to take into account pre-existing gaps in the system. That refers to interlining. One of the questions raised by private security providers and airport operators and the airlines is adequacy of baggage check on passengers moving from one line to another and from one unsecured airport to a sterile area in a secured airport. Are you at liberty to describe for us the steps that are being taken? Mr. SALAZAR. I believe so. The second phase of the international requirements, sir—and its origin is basically an international requirement that we also require U.S. air carriers that are operating internationally to adhere to, and foreign air carriers operating within the United States as well—is that there must be a full, positive passenger reconciliation. In other words, when a passenger goes on board, there must be a system that identifies that the bag is on board with that passenger. Now, the international requirement provides that each member state could implement this full reconciliation, or subject that bag to some other type of security control. We have defined in this country what that security control is. Specifically to your point, in April a second phase now comes in to being for checked baggage. Whereas before the airlines must have looked at what we consider online passengers—in other words, the same carrier transferring baggage to the same carrier— the second phase now must take into account interlining baggage, that is, a different carrier to a different carrier, and how they match that baggage to that passenger. And more importantly, and probably the most difficult of all, how a carrier now must be able to account for any passenger that disembarks at an intermediate point, how they can account for that individual and then be able to identify baggage and deal with it under security control. Mr. OBERSTAR. Is technology presently available to do this, to do the positive match of baggage to passenger, and determine whether a passenger may have left a flight at an intermediate point and his baggage remained on board? Mr. SALAZAR. I believe technology has been developed and explored through the efforts of the International Air Transportation Association. In particular, I believe they are fairly successful in developing administrative or computer systems that provide a carrier with reasonable assurance of those kinds of security methods. Where it becomes fairly difficult is where each airline is applying the very same standard in the very same way, so that on interlines the receiving airline has some assurance that some security control was applied to that baggage. So in fact the ideal situation would be a fully-automated system, and I am sure the carriers in the subsequent panel could describe to you in detail what their advances are in that area. Mr. OBERSTAR. Now, that matter of baggage and passengers being together on the same flight, where you have a dedicated terrorist who is willing to sacrifice his or her own life, that may diminish in significance. But in most cases the terrorists are as cowardly as they are destructive, and are willing to go to some lengths to leave a bag on board. In the most recent case, is there evidence that a bag was not associated with a passenger on board? Mr. SALAZAR. We’re not at liberty, sir, to discuss the details of the ongoing investigation. However, the requirement for full, positive passenger reconciliation does in fact have some security benefits. But we view that the greatest benefit is used in redundant systems. It is this system and other security systems, so that you build as many barriers as possible so that it will prevent just exactly what you described, an individual who can go on board, leave a device, and then merely walk away and not suffer the consequences. Mr. OBERSTAR. You said the word that I was looking for, the redundancy. Just as Federal Aviation Agency regulations build redundancy into aircraft construction and into maintenance programs to provide cushions of safety or margins of safety, as I have called them in the past, so in security there must be margins of safety and redundancy and backup systems, and doing all that we can to prevent or deter the obvious. If we can at least do that and do it effectively and credibly, then we will have taken a very large and important and effective step in the right direction. Dogs the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Lewis, have some questions' Mr. LEwis. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman. Mr. OBERSTAR. Does the Foreign Airport Security Act that was reported out of this committee and that was enacted into law two years ago require strengthening in any respects that you can think of at this point? Put otherwise, Mr. Ambassador and Mr. Belger, do you believe that from the standpoint of your respective departments you have all the authority in law that you need to take the actions necesissy, both domestically and in international trade, to assure security' Mr. BELGER. From our perspective, I think that the legislation as it currently exists is adequate. It gives us the authority and flexibility to work in a cooperative way with those governments to find a solution to improve security at those airports. It has been very effective. Ambassador MCMANAway. I would agree with that, Mr. ChairInan. Mr. OBERSTAR. Then it comes down to a matter of research and development to produce those detection devices of ever-increasing sophistication to detect explosives. Perhaps it's possible that with technology in place at the time of Pan Am 103, that device—whatever it was—might not have been detected by then-available technology and maybe something new would have been more effective. Maybe it would have been detected by available technology.
But beyond that, beyond the research and development, an are where I have criticized the FAA in the past for not devoting suf cient resources, and I have made very strong appeals to my co leagues in the Congress to appropriate the necessary research ar development funds, is the training of people who are providing s curity at airports. We know that those who attend the magnet meters are, for the most part, minimum wage people with mir mum training, that the FAA does not have extensive Federal A Regulations governing detailed training of such personnel. We know that that's a boring job. It is also a boring job lookir for cracks alongside rivets on the hull of an aircraft. It is a borin job looking for corrosion and weakening of structural membe during inspection of aircraft, but it's one that has to be done. It one that is done very effectively when you have exceptionally we trained personnel. So the training of people is the essential, indi pensible ingredient. Your machines aren't going to do this for u people are going to do it. People are going to provide securit Training our own first, and those of other countries next, makin sure that other countries do all that they can, is ultimately th guarantor of security. Mr. Ambassador? Ambassador McMANAway. May I respond, Mr. Chairman? I agree with everything you have said, but I would be remiss if didn't make a pitch for the program you have already very helpfu ly mentioned—our program in which we have trained 7,200 peop since the beginning of the program from 39 different countries. But I would like to point out that what we're talking about he are pro-active-type measures. Our Government has a very pr active counterterrorism program and policy. It involves not just th “no concessions” policy, with which we are all familiar, but w spend a lot of time and a lot of effort going after states that su port terrorism. We don't believe that terrorist organizations ca pull off a Pan Am 103 without state support from somewhere. W go after them. We are looking for ways—constantly working wit our allies and working unilaterally—to make them pay, to make too costly for them to continue to support terrorist groups. We also have a very active program that gets into law enforc ment. It really is the bread and butter of our activities, and that identifying terrorists, tracking them, getting them apprehende getting them prosecuted, and getting them punished. You ma have read last week where we captured Fawaz Younis, brougl him to this country, and prosecuted him, found him guilty and se tenced him. That's a very big part of it, as well. We have to do all the thing we've been talking about here, but we also have to make the te rorists pay. Mr. OBERSTAR. I appreciate that comment very much. Mr. Belger, do you have something further to add to that? Mr. BELGER. Mr. Chairman, I could not agree with you mor Any safety system must rely upon procedures, equipment, ar people. In many systems, it is the human element that is the wea est link that sometimes needs the most attention. We also have a very aggressive technical assistance and trainin program in the FAA. We are putting a great deal of emphasis (
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