Mr. MOLINARI. Have you sat down with the FAA officials to discuss the unique problems that

Mr. FITZGERALD. Many times. But I think that perhaps they may have been influenced by international events requiring some kind of reaction, and I think there is probably agreement among airport operators that in fact you do need an access system, that in fact it is not a bad thing to have. I think the level of sophistication and the application of technology that they are proposing has different impacts on different airports.

Mr. MOLINARI. All right, then we get back to the question I asked previously. What do you recommend?

Mr. FITZGERALD. I would recommend that we go with our pilot program and, based on the four airports that are selected-you could select large airports and small airports, and I think that you could develop a system such that at the end of the test period it would have application to all 279 airports. And then, I think, you would be able to make a sensible recommendation on commitment of resources for all of the airports. Right now I just think we're moving too quickly and not knowing exactly where we are going. Mr. MOLINARI. But it's possible, if you put in this pilot program that you suggest, that after a test maybe it would make sense to adopt this program that is not the subject of the rulemaking?

Mr. FITZGERALD. It might make sense, but I think that if we had some more time we would at least answer some questions on technology. Right now we're not even sure of the proper technology to use to implement the various requirements of the rule.

So I really think it's a question of time and it's a question of trying really to adapt the system to meet the needs of the various types of airports across the United States, and then we can all commit with a sense that we're not wasting money, that a few years from now we might have to go back in and change all over again.

Mr. LALLY. If I could add to that

Mr. MOLINARI. Yes, Mr. Lally, go ahead.

Mr. LALLY. From the standpoint of the airlines, the airlines share the concerns of the airport operators with respect to this rule, even though the rule is directed to the airport operators and not the airlines. The airlines did join with the rest of the aviation community in petitioning FAA and DOT for an approach different from the one that has taken place, namely, the pilot project.

One of the principal concerns of the airlines in addition to the cost and the operational impacts is that there is no provision stated by the Federal Government for compatibility, compatibility among airports and compatibility between airports and tenant organizations.

Now, we have a system requirement in place now that impacts every airport that comprises the National Air Transportation System, 269 airports, every airport served by a scheduled air carrier. When we undertake an impact like that without considering the desirability or lack of desirability or degree of compatibility expected, then I think we're moving a little bit too fast. I think the issue of compatibility, so that we don't have a totally fragmented National Air Transportation System when it comes to access controls, is a real danger here.

So we agree that there needs to be further study, and the airlines are willing to participate in that study effort.

Mr. MOLINARI. That's interesting. Do you think there may be a reason for not wanting compatibility throughout the system? In other words, if somebody has an access card and they are free to use it anywhere in the country, is that desirable?

Mr. LALLY. No, I don't think that's the reason. I have not heard that stated as a reason for not treating compatibility.

The problem that the airlines face, to take an extreme example, is that an airline flight crew may serve 12 airports in one day and may end up having to have 12 different types of access control cards to serve those airports, to arrive and depart. With the program going the way it is, directed to 269 airports without some guidance as to compatibility, that risk exists. Advice as to compatibility would seem to us to minimize that risk and provide for some degree of consistency.

Mr. MOLINARI. I guess what the panel is saying is that collectively you believe there is an overreaction on the part of the FAA to whatever problem is out there today. Is that a fair statement?

I see most of you nodding yes.

Mr. KOLTER. Would the gentleman yield on that point?
Mr. MOLINARI. I'd be glad to yield.

Mr. KOLTER. I listened intently to your most interesting testimony relative to lack of uniformity, and I can understand that. Now we're talking about compatibility, which is something totally different. Yet you say that if you had a pilot program for a given period of time over four airports, that uniformity and compatibility could be worked out. Is that what you're trying to say?

Mr. FITZGERALD. I would say that I think we would better understand the issues, because I don't think today that we understand them in light of the technology that is available to manage those issues. At the end of the pilot program we could very well face the same problem we face now, but I don't really believe that. I think we need to find a technology that will answer everyone's questions. We don't have that answer today.

I think the danger exists that we could select a system in response to this rule, and a year from now find out that we committed the resources to buy a computer system that doesn't have the ability to meet these other issues that will come up to us in the future. That's the concern.

Mr. KOLTER. So you think that perhaps somewhere in the future we can conclude that there will be something invented, something that we could use, which could be an answer to our problem here? You know what the problem is here and now. I don't see what further study would do. The problem is here. I can't see further study. I don't understand what you're trying to do here.

Mr. FITZGERALD. I think it's a matter of having compatibility as only one single issue, and I think there are so many issues that relate to how areas on the airport-for instance, a cargo area-are supposed to be controlled. That is really undefined today. How is a general aviation area-many of the airports in this country today have a majority of general aviation flights-supposed to be managed? When you have an airport with 500 members of a flying club who come in to use the facilities on weekends, should the airport

operator have to issue all of these people airport access control cards?

We really don't have answers to all of these questions that we have been raising. And when you get those answers, then you can select a technology that would help you to deal fairly with all of those.

Mr. KOLTER. You're talking about the larger airports. Would the smaller airports have their own distinctively different problems?

Mr. FITZGERALD. They will have them, and they do have distinctively different problems, but they're all being covered by the same rule.

Mr. KOLTER. Thank you.

Mr. MOLINARI. I just want to carry this one step further, if I could.

What I perceive from the testimony we've heard so far is that there would be huge costs incurred on the part of our carriers—I'm talking about domestic carriers-in this country. There apparently is no counterpart to this program in foreign countries.

The question I would have, then, is whether this would create an economic disadvantage to our carriers in this competitive market that they're engaged in.

Mr. LALLY. I think the obvious answer is yes. There would be higher costs.

believe that the airlines and the airport operators and the others who have testified all agree that there is a new and different and dangerous threat that exists today, and that threat is international sabotage by terrorists. The focus of that threat is overseas, and it requires Federal assistance in the person of FAA inspectors and money for equipment to detect bombs. That is the first and foremost threat today.

So I would say that if we were to put things in order of priority, that the money that would be required for this access control system would be better spent in responding to the highest priority threat. I think that going at this is a bit of an overreaction to a one-time event, as Mr. Fitzgerald indicated, the likelihood of the recurrence of which is extremely remote. There are very serious problems facing the industry today that require that kind of effort and response.

Mr. MOLINARI. Thank you very much. I appreciate your testimony.

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. OBERSTAR. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Kolter. Mr. KOLTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You know, Mr. Chairman, in the years I have been here I don't ever recall having such total agreement with a panel as I have with this panel today.

The one question I have, and it's only going to be one question, is this. You suggest that perhaps the FAA ought to assign more of its people to the high-risk airports overseas in an expanded role. My question, then, is that if we at the Government level expand our role, what will the airline companies and the other governments do in an expanded role to promote safety? What should they do that they're not doing now?

Mr. LALLY. I think on an international basis that worldwide we have to look to ICAO, which in effect is the only regulatory-type body that deals with worldwide aviation.

When it gets closer to home we can look at our Government, the United States Government, establishing requirements for all airlines; not only U.S. airlines, but for foreign carriers that serve the United States that present the same level of risk. Those requirements ought to be uniform so that certain citizens are not denied the protection of the higher levels of security.

But overseas, when we are talking about our Government reacting and providing additional presence, we think that's very important in response to today's threat. I tried to define earlier that we don't mean that the FAA assumes the airlines' responsibilities; not by any means, but that the Federal assistance there would be of great help. I would liken it to the fact that the FAA folks would be there more as a player-coach, observing and assisting and directing and coordinating, orchestrating the security; not there in the role of a traffic cop for compliance or audit purposes, but there to work shoulder-to-shoulder and in the trenches, so to speak, with the airlines in making sure that there is security.

Mr. KOLTER. Mr. Lally, it has been stated that some of the nations overseas are not adequate in providing some support for what we're trying to do here.

Would you think we ought to consider having our airlines pull out of these countries if in fact those governments fail to give us assistance on this matter?

Mr. LALLY. I think that's a last resort. I think it's a remote and very last resort because our objective is to protect an efficient and secure and safe air transportation system worldwide. What we don't want to do is destroy the system. I think that we would look toward the authority that we think ought to be invested in ICAO as an added authority, and that would be that ICAO would have the resources and the authority to evaluate the performance of member states in how well they implement those international standards, how effective those standards are in the first place, and then most importantly, give ICAO the authority to do something about states that do not implement them properly.

Mr. KOLTER. Well, what could they do? If we're not going to pull out, what else could they do?

Mr. LALLY. Well, ICAO could be given sanction authority. Now, that is an unpleasant term in the international community. That would mean that ICAO could impose some sort of legal sanctions upon nations that failed to comply with the ICAO's standards and recommended practices.

But short of actual sanction and penalty, the mere threat or possibility of ICAO somehow publicizing or noting the deficiencies on the part of member states would in itself be a great incentive for states to achieve a proper level of compliance.

Mr. KOLTER. Thank you.

Mr. OBERSTAR. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Boehlert.
Mr. BOEHLERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Am I correct in understanding that you are estimating this whole system, if we proceed with the access control system as proposed, assuming that cool heads would prevail and you could work

out differences, it would cost about $900 million to cover the major airports in the United States?

Mr. JACKSON. That's a correct figure, sir.

Mr. BOEHLERT. All right.

Mr. Fitzgerald, could you estimate for me the cost of having thermal neutron analysis systems in all of our airports in the country? Mr. FITZGERALD. We've estimated that you're talking about $1 million for one device. I think someone testified at this morning's session on what the cost would be across the United States. I'm not sure I'm the best person to give you that estimate.

Mr. BOEHLERT. A ball park figure?

Mr. FITZGERALD. You're probably talking—as I recall, I think $66 million was mentioned this morning. I could be mistaken.

Mr. BOEHLERT. And that would cover all the airports in terms of screening the baggage?

Mr. FITZGERALD. There were airports that were viewed as major threats

Mr. OBERSTAR. If the gentleman would yield, the figures given were for 66 TNA units and 171 vapor detection analysis units at a total estimated cost of $66 million.

Mr. BOEHLERT. For both the TNAs and the vapor detectors?

Mr. OBERSTAR. The estimate was that you would not require those very sophisticated devices in all places, so the $66 million was a combination of both the vapor detectors and the TNA units. Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Lally?

Mr. LALLY. I would like to add to that. That estimate was a preliminary Air Transport Association estimate, and applies only to the 45 high-threat airports in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East. That's a combination of vapor detector equipment and TNA equipment to satisfy the requirements of eight airlines at those airports.

Now, if you wanted to project that cost to U.S. airports, and we just talked about 269 airports in the United States, to equip each of those airports with one TNA runs close to $1 million an airport. So there you have 269 airports. At most U.S. airports you would need many of those units to satisfy the requirements of all airlines.

So the number to equip all U.S. airports would be a very, very substantial number.

Mr. BOEHLERT. A billion dollars?

Mr. LALLY. Probably a minimum of a billion dollars.

Mr. BOEHLERT. All right.

Now, if we had the vapor detectors at all these airports and we had TNA systems at all these airports, and we had an access control system that satisfied you and the FAA, would you then feel a lot more comfortable about our security system?

Mr. LALLY. Yes, but

Mr. BOEHLERT. Here's what I'm getting at, Mr. Lally. If you total up all these numbers you are talking about a couple of billion dollars. That's real money, I understand, but we've got $5.5 billion sitting idle, unobligated, in the Trust Fund.

For the life of me I just can't understand how we can hoodwink the American people. We tell them that there's 8 percent tax on every ticket and that this money is going to be dedicated to improv