Such were the opinions of the most distinguished law lords.

It is an equivocal apology for the meditated clause, that "whatever be its merits or demerits, it is innocent of all the mischief which has been laid to its charge. It was not contrary to the law of God; it did not afford encouragement to the seducer; it did not derogate from the sanctity of marriage or the dignity of the priesthood." The innocence of the clause was quite unexceptionable; it never had legal existence or power in England; it was but a thesis for the trial of polemical skill, conducted with the most unblemished liberality. Some of its negative merits may claim the consideration of a moment.

The clause of voidability was "not contrary to the law of God." There is a distinction which no careful writer will overlook, between nullity and voidability of marriage. The advocates of the former contend, that when a marriage is null it never for one moment has existence as a marriage; and so far their doctrine is clear from the imputation which may attach to the dissolution of marriage: but voidability implies the validity of the marriage until such time as it is actually voided; in other words, its permanent validity, unless it is voided by a court of competent jurisdiction. This interpretation is confirmed by a clause in the proposed Bill; in which, in dependence upon the clause of voidability, it was provided, "that notwithstanding any such marriage. shall be declared null and void... the husband shall nevertheless continue liable for all the charges and expences... incurred in maintaining the wife during the coverture, and until the avoidance of the mar

riage by the judgment of the court, and for all such just debts as she may have lawfully contracted during that period; and he shall be answerable for the maintenance of any child or children born of such marriage, in the same manner as if the said marriage had continued valid"." Here the parties are called husband and wife; provision is made for the maintenance of the child or children born of the marriage; and there is an hypothetical view of the continued validity of the marriage. Now the essence of marriage by the law and institution of God is, that the man shall cleave unto his wife, and they two shall be one flesh it is impossible to conceive how the voidability of a marriage of acknowledged validity can be compromised or shewn to be "not contrary to the law of God."

It is further insisted, that "of all the grounds that were ever taken for condemning the voidability clause, the religious grounds are the most unsubstantial and treacherous . . . . the arguments from Scripture rested upon a most extraordinary misapprehension of our Saviour's words: Those whom God hath joined together let no man put asunder. They refer to the institution of the marriage state, and not to the celebration of the marriage ceremony."

See Bill, intituled, An Act for amending the laws respecting the solemnization of marriage in England. Ordered to be printed 13th of May, 1823. Another clause enacted, "that if either of the parties shall die before the institution of a suit, no suit of nullity shall be commenced; and if any suit hath been commenced, the same shall be discontinued, and the issue shall be legitimate." So decidedly was the original validity of the marriage affirmed.

As the words stand in the Gospels they refer originally and generally to the institution of marriage; as they stand in the Liturgy, and are accompanied with the significant act of the minister, they have a reference to the celebration of a particular marriage: and so far is this from being a new or incorrect exposition of the liturgical application of our Saviour's words, that it is sanctioned by the most eminent ritualists, Comber, Wheatly, and Shepherd. Under this construction, or indeed under any construction, it is very readily conceded, that the words " prohibit us from annulling any marriage vow," and that "the promise in the sight of God is irrevocable and irreversible." It is not however meant to concede that under this interpretation they "lead to the conclusion, that neither licences nor banns, or altar or priest, can be required as indispensable to a valid contract," or that our laws, “in requiring them, are a monstrous system of impiety and injustice." Our Saviour's words, in prescribing the permanence, preclude the voidability of marriage: but they have no reference to the circumstances alleged, which are not indispensable to a valid contract, but are proper and useful in preventing clandestinity, in procuring a public attestation of the marriage, and adding new solemnity to the vow and covenant. It is again asked, "Even supposing that God joineth those and those only who are married by a priest, what right has the Church to restrict the priest's privilege to certain hours of the day, to certain consecrated places, and to a certain prescribed form of words? Why may he not solemnize matrimony without banns or licence?" The answer which the objector

returns to his own question is, "For this single reason; he is forbidden by the law:" and he might have added, that in these requisitions the law is not partial or arbitrary, as in enacting the nullity of marriage in a particular case, but directed generally to the public good; and he should have shewn that the public good forbids, and that the law of the country forbids, the priest to marry minors, or there is no analogy in the cases which he pretends to compare. The marriage of minors was annulled, not forbidden; marriage out of the church and the canonical hours was forbidden, not annulled, and might be sanctioned by special licence.

The objector asks, "What shall constitute lawful marriage? What degree of notoriety shall be given to its solemnization? What consents shall be obtained, and what ceremonies observed, in order to give certain civil rights to the parents and their issue?" With the exception of the rule of consent, the questionist knows that the agreement of the parties to live together till death shall part them, declared in the face of the congregation, according to the ritual provided, constitutes lawful marriage in England. "These points are to be," and have been, "determined by the law of the land, and it may employ effectual means to enforce its decision." Let this be granted; the question still remains: Is the necessity of parental consent, or the right of nullity, founded on such clear authority of the Scriptures as to render void or voidable the marriage which is contracted without consent? Is the necessity of consent so indispensable to the public goodas to justify the legislature in putting restrictions

upon the law of marriage in order to prevent it; in disannulling a religious vow administered without any reference expressed or implied to that consent; in counteracting the truth of a public declaration of the marriage, delivered without any exception or reserve? It is but begging the question to contend, "that the parties who are married by licence, and have obtained that licence by perjury, cannot well claim the privilege of being joined together by God," whose providence nevertheless gives in many instances a successful issue to very unlawful means; and it is the excess of misrepresentation to assert, that "the priest, who has been deceived by a solemn lie deliberately asserted in the most holy place, can hardly complain that his ministrations are dishonoured." It is notorious that this solemn lie is never asserted at all, or at least in no place more holy than the office of the surrogate, and never by the woman, who has no part in procuring the licence. When it is argued, that "children are prohibited from entering into a variety of temporal engagements, on the mere account of youth," and when it is asked, "What pretence is there for saying, that it is unjust, unchristian, and improper to postpone their capability of forming an indissoluble engagement until they are arrived at years of discretion?" it might have been remembered, that the age of discretion and capacity of marriage legally arrives before the expiration of the minority, and that the validity of a minor's marriage, if it be by banns, is expressly recognized in Lord Hardwicke's Bill. Is there then, after the disapproved precedent of the Irish law, any thing in the condition of the