merce Commission. It has been frequently decided in the Federal courts that, under the act, the function of the court is to enforce, or refuse to enforce, the order of the Commission as made; that the court can not amend or modify an order to make another order; that the Federal court has no revisory power over the orders of the Commission and that it cannot undertake to decide whether the respondents have violated an order which the Commission might lawfully have made. There is ample reason for this holding, in this, that the only standing in court which the Interstate Commerce Commission has as a complainant is by virtue of the statute; that it has no general equities in its favor; and that, consequently, the court must be confined in its orders and decrees, when the Interstate Commerce Commission is a complainant, to the rights of recovery given to the Commission by the statute. "This view of the law of the case and the record renders it unnecessary to go into the question as to whether or not 30 cents per 100 pounds was an unreasonable freight charge for hay and straw. Taking into the consideration only the cost of carrying hay and straw, and their character as articles of transportation, as shown by the evidence, it is not clear at all that the rate of 30 cents per 100 pounds is an unreasonable and unjust freight charge. The contention of complainant is, rather, that charging a different freight rate for the carriage of hay and straw from the rate charged for the carriage of wheat, is unfair discrimination against wheat. These articles are so different in their character, and the conditions of traffic with respect to wheat are so entirely different from those which pertain to the carriage of hay and straw, that I am of the opinion that the fact that wheat is carried for a less rate than hay and straw is not proof that the higher rate charged for the carriage of hay and straw is unreasonable and unjust.” |