REPORT OF DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN COURT OF CLAIMS CASES CHARLES S. LOBINGIER v. THE UNITED STATES [No. 45824] [100 C. Cls. 448; 323 U. S. 709] Civilian employee of Government transferred to new official station not entitled to expenses of packing, crating and drayage of household goods unless and until transported. Decided December 6, 1943, defendant's demurrer sustained and petition dismissed. Plaintiff's motion for new trial overruled February 7, 1944. Plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari denied October 9, 1944. MAGNOLIA PETROLEUM COMPANY v. THE [No. 45678] [101 C. Cls. 1; 323 U. S. 721] Taxes on transportation of petroleum products by pipe line by privately owned facilities. Decided January 3, 1944, petition dismissed. Plaintiff's motion for new trial overruled April 3, 1944. Plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari denied October 9, 1944. JACOB DVORKIN v. THE UNITED STATES [No. 45912] [101 C. Cls. 296; 323 U. S. 730] Government salary applicable to office to which appointment is made, independent of duties performed. 102 C. Cls. Decided April 3, 1944, petition dismissed. Plaintiff's motion for new trial overruled May 1, 1944. Plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari denied October 9, 1944. ALLEN POPE, PETITIONER, v. THE UNITED STATES [No. 45704] [100 C. Cls. 375; 323 U. S. 1] Certiorari (321 U. S. 761) to review the dismissal of a proceeding brought in the Court of Claims pursuant to a special jurisdictional act (56 Stat. 1122) which the Court of Claims held unconstitutional. The judgment of the Court of Claims was reversed, November 6, 1944. Mr. Chief Justice STONE delivered the opinion of the court, stating: By the Special Act of February 27, 1942, Congress_conferred upon the Court of Claims jurisdiction to hear, determine and render judgment upon certain claims of a contractor against the Government, in conformity with directions given in the Act. The court had previously denied recovery on the claims. The Act authorized review here by certiorari. Held: 1. The Act is to be construed not as setting aside the judgment in a case already decided or as changing the rules of decision for the determination of a pending case, but rather as creating a new obligation of the Government to pay the contractor's claims where no obligation existed before. United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128, distinguished. (a) There is no constitutional obstacle to Congress' imposing on the Government a new obligation where none existed before, for work performed by the contractor which was beneficial to the Government and for which Congress thought he had not been adequately compensated. (b) The power of Congress to provide for the payment of debts, conferred by § 8 of Article I of the Constitution, is not restricted to payment of those debts which are legally binding on the Government, but ex 845 tends to the creation of such obligations in recognition of claims which are merely moral or honorary. 2. By the creation of a legal, in recognition of a moral, obligation to pay the contractor's claims, Congress did not encroach upon the judicial function which the Court of Claims had previously exercised in adjudicating that the obligation was not legal. 3. Nor did the Act encroach upon the judicial function of the Court of Claims by directing that court to pass upon the contractor's claims in conformity to the particular rule of liability prescribed by the Act and to give judgment accordingly. (a) By the Act, Congress in effect consented to judgment in an amount to be ascertained by reference to specified data. (b) When a plaintiff brings suit to enforce a legal obligation it is not any the less a case or controversy upon which a court possessing the federal judicial power may rightly give judgment, because the plaintiff's claim is uncontested or incontestable. (c) Whether the Act makes the findings in the earlier suit conclusive, and, if not, whether the evidence would establish the facts on which the Act predicates liability, are judicial questions. (d) Whether the facts be ascertained by proof or by stipulation, it is still a part of the judicial function to determine whether there is a legally binding obligation and, if so, to give judgment for the amount due even though the amount depends upon mere computation. 4. The Act authorized the claimant to invoke the judicial power of the Court of Claims and he did so. 5. The appellate jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by Art. III, § 2, cl. 2 of the Constitution extends to decisions of the Court of Claims rendered in exercise of its judicial functions, and such appellate review is not precluded by the fact that Congress has also imposed upon the Court of Claims non-judicial functions of an administrative or legislative character. 6. The Court of Claims' determination that the Act conferred upon it only non-judicial functions and hence that it had no judicial duty to perform was itself an exercise of judicial power reviewable here. Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U. S. 693, distinguished. Mr. Justice JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 102 C. Cls. DAVID MCD. SHEARER v. THE UNITED STATES [No. 41829] [87 C. Cls. 40; 101 C. Cls. 196; 323 U. S. 676] Patent for invention relating to reinforced concrete revetment. Findings of fact and opinion March 7, 1938; plaintiff entitled to recover. Judgment on accounting, opinion February 7, 1944; plaintiff's motion for new trial allowed in part and overruled in part May 1, 1944, and defendant's motion for new trial overruled; and conclusion of law filed February 7, 1944, amended. Defendant's motion, filed June 13, 1944, for extension of time under Rule 99 (b) of the Court of Claims, allowed June 13, 1944. Defendant's petition for appeal to the Supreme Court filed July 26, 1944. Defendant's petition for writ of certiorari filed in the Supreme Court September 2, 1944. On November 20, 1944, the following opinion was rendered by the Supreme Court: Per curiam: The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Act of December 17, 1930; Colgate v. United States, 280 U. S. 43; Assiniboine Indian Tribe v. United States, 292 U. S. 606. Cf. United States v. Goltra, 312 U. S. 203, 204, n. 1. The petition for writ of certiorari is denied for the reason that application therefor was not made within the time provided by law. Act of December 17, 1930. The concluding paragraph of the Act of December 17, 1930 (46 Stat. 1970), is as follows: Either party may appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States upon any such question where appeals now lie in other cases, arising during the progress of the hearing of said claim, and from any judgment in said case, at any time within ninety days after the rendition thereof; and any judgment rendered in favor of the claimants shall be paid in the same manner as other judgments of said Court of Claims. See Title 28, section 288, U. S. Code; Rule 99, 99 (a) of the Court of Claims; and Rule 41 of the Supreme Court as amended March 25, 1940. 845 THE UNITED STATES, PETITIONER, v. STANDARD RICE COMPANY, INC. [No. 45584] [101 C. Cls. 85; 323 U. S. 106] On writ of certiorari (322 U. S. 725) to review a judgment of the Court of Claims holding that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the amount, subsequently withheld by the Government from sums admittedly due to plaintiff for overpayments of income taxes, representing unpaid processing taxes claimed by the Government to be due under the contract involved. The judgment of the Court of Claims was affirmed December 4, 1944. Mr. Justice DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the court, stating: 1. A contract for the sale of material to the United States contained the following provision: "Prices bid herein include any federal tax heretofore imposed by the Congress which is applicable to the material on this bid. Any sales tax, duties, imposts, revenues, excise or other taxes which may hereafter (the date set for the opening of this bid) be imposed by the Congress and made applicable to the material on this bid will be charged to the Government and entered on invoices as a separate item." Held that the United States was not entitled to recover from the contractor processing taxes imposed by the Agricultural Adjustment Act, which taxes were "applicable" to the material within the meaning of the contract, but which, because subsequently adjudged invalid, were never collected from the contractor. United States v. Kansas Flour Mills Corp., 314 U. S. 212, distinguished. 2. Generally the United States as a contractor is to be treated as other contractors, and a contract which it draws is not to be judicially revised because it may have been improvident. Mr. Justice BLACK dissented. |