the purchaser had signed it. I find that the defence founded on the alteration is sustained. I need not decide whether the other ground of defence has been sustained. By omitting to take from Brodie the promissory notes, which were to be given for the balance of the purchase money, and by his dealings with Carter, A'Beckett, J. the plaintiff may have led Brodie to suppose that he was no longer held liable. A vendor, without express release, may, by conduct of this character, waive his rights against the original purchaser: See Holden v. Hayn (i). I dismiss the action with costs as against the defendant Brodie.
Coming now to the case of Carter, the other defendant, he insists that he has not signed any contract, and that, though he has the rights of the purchaser, he has not his liabilities. He has, however, given promissory notes by which he came under a direct personal liability to the vendor. Two of those notes were overdue when the action was commenced. Treating the
action as brought upon these notes, the first defence is that there has been a total failure of consideration. The re-sale of the property for which the notes were given under the authority contained in the contract does not sustain this plea: See Moggridge v. Jones (k); Spiller v. Westlake (l); Jones v. Jones (m).
The second ground of defence is that under the conditions of sale the vendor having re-sold is precluded from suing on the notes; that he loses his remedy on the notes, and acquires another remedy in the shape of an action for difference of price; that this action can be brought against the original purchaser only, not against his assignee; and that, although the right against the original purchaser may have been lost, the assignee cannot be sued on the notes. The contract contains no prohibition in terms against suing upon the notes in case of re-sale. In whatever way the vendor's rights might have been qualified as against the original purchaser had he given his acceptances, I think that as against the defendant Carter, who has not signed the contract, and declines to be bound by it, the plaintiff can avail himself of his right of action on the notes. As against his liability at law upon the notes, the defendant Carter sets up an equitable defence founded on the
contract with Brodie, and its provisions with regard to re-sale; but I think he cannot equitably do this without assuming the liability for the difference in price, which he contends was substituted, and therefore that the plaintiff can recover on the notes, restricting the amount, as he is willing to do, to the amount which he could have recovered in an action on the contract for the difference in price on re-sale. This amounts to 435l. I give judgment against the defendant Carter for 435l., with costs, except such costs as have been occasioned by the case against Brodie. defendant Brodie, with costs, against plaintiff. plaintiff against defendant Carter for 435l., with costs, except in so far as plaintiff's costs have been increased by the case made by him against the defendant Brodie.
Judgment for Judgment for
Solicitors for plaintiff : Davies, Price & Wighton.
Solicitors for defendant Brodie: G. H. R. & A. E. Osborn. Solicitor for defendant Carter: J. E. Dixon.
-Order XVI., r. 33--Action by one next-of- kin, others not joined-Foreign administration- Foreign estate--Administrator within jurisdic- tion. The effect of Order XVI., r. 33, is to enable anyone of the next-of-kin of an intestate to maintain an action for the administration of his estate without joining the other next-of-kin as parties. Where a foreign administrator is within the jurisdiction of this Court, he is liable to be sued here by one of the next-of-kin for an account and administration. It is unnecessary that any part of the estate should be in this colony. ARMSTRONG v. NEWEY 734
2. Will construction-Costs- Fund out of which payable-Residuary devise.] A devise of real estate, though in terms residuary, is in law a specific devise, and should not be called upon to pay the costs of an action for the adminis- tration of the testator's estate any further than other specific devises. Where a will makes two devises, and an action is brought relating in part to each devise, each devise should, in the absence of a residuary personal estate, bear the costs of action relating exclusively to it. RATTEN v. DENBIGH
ADULTERY OF WIFE-Husband's con-
duct conducing to adultery-Wilful misconduct -
727 See MARRIAGE AND MATRIMONIAL. 4.
POSSESSION Infancy
Trustee of infant in possession-Tenant at will
See REAL PROPERTY ACT 1890.
AFFIDAVITS-Affidavit made by barrister
arbitrator-Reception of
See ARBITRATION. 2.
See MARRIAGE AND MATRIMONIAL.
AMBIGUITY-Parol evidence-Lodgment of
AMENDMENT-Unexplained delay in appli-
ADMINISTRATION PRACTICE--Caveat
APPEAL TO GENERAL SESSIONS- Justices Act 1890 (No. 1105), s. 128, sub-secs. (2), (9)-Notice of appeal to Court of General Sessions -Service of notice of appeal-Wairer.] By sub- sec. 2 of sec. 128 of Act No. 1105, the appellant is required to give notice of appeal within seven days after the day on which the decision of the court of petty sessions is given; by sub-sec. 9 such notice must be served on the respondent personally, or on some person at the last-known place of abode of the respondent. A decision was given in the court of petty sessions on the 29th December 1890. On 5th January 1891 the appellant served a written notice of appeal on a clerk at the detective office. The respondent, who was a detective, did not reside at the detective office, and was not accustomed to go there daily. The respondent did not see, or have knowledge of, the notice of appeal until 27th January 1891. When the appeal came on for hear- ing before the Court of General Sessions, counsel for the respondent took the objection that there had been no service of the notice of appeal within the meaning of sec. 128, sub-secs. 2 and 9, of Act No. 1105:-Held, that there had been no service of the notice of appeal, and that the respondent had not waived his right to object to such want of service by reason of his appearance. In re McRae (25 Ch. D., at p. 19) not followed. RAY JUSTICES OF MELBOURNE AND WHITNEY
ARBITRATION-Award-Practice-"Rules of the Supreme Court 1884"-Order LXIV., r. 14 -9 & 10 Wm. III., c. 15-The Supreme Court Act 1890 (No. 1142), s. 149—Application to set aside award-Reasonable time-Reference to arbitra- tion.] An application to set aside an award, whether such an award be one within 9 & 10 Wm. III., c. 15, or not, must be made within the time limited by Order LXIV., r. 14. By sec. 149 of Act No. 1142 it is provided that "in any case where reference shall be made to arbitration, the Court, or a judge, shall have power at any time, and from time to time, to remit the matters referred, or any or either of them, to the re-con- sideration and re-determination of the arbitrators upon such terms as to costs and otherwise as to the said Court or judge may seem proper." Held, that under this section an application to have the matters referred remitted to the arbitrator must be made within a reasonable time. SHIRREFS U. JOHNSON - - 225
Award made by two out of three arbi- trators-Reception of affidavit made by barrister who acted as arbitrator.] By a judge's order the matter in a dispute in an action was referred to three arbitrators. After the evidence was closed the three arbitrators met and discussed their award generally, agreed upon it, but (as the Court, con- sidered on the facts) not finally, and adjourned to a subsequent day to finally put their decision in writing. On the subsequent day one of the arbi- trators did not attend the meeting, and the other two arbitrators made an award differing from the one generally agreed upon by all three arbitrators. Upon motion to set aside the award :-Held, that the award of the two arbitrators was not invali- dated where the third arbitrator having notice of a final meeting voluntarily absented himself from it. An affidavit made by a barrister, who had acted as arbitrator, received on the ground that the barrister had thought it proper to make it. GLENNY v. THE EGLINTON LAND COMPANY LIMITED - 676
ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES-Death wrongfully caused -Assessment by jury not by judge
ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS-Execution by one partner-Implied authority of partner See PARTNERS.
[439 ASSIGNEE OF LEASE-Privity of con- tract-Mortgage-Option of purchase in - 626
mortgagee See LEASE. ATTACHMENT-Attachment of moneys found upon prisoner before conviction-Money in pos- session of police-Garnishee.] Money found upon an accused person under commitment for trial and detained by the police authorities does not, unless demanded by the accused, constitute
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