NATO's gamble: combining diplomacy and airpower in the Kosovo crisis, 1998-1999
The author reveals that from the outset, the military leaders set to execute the campaign had no clear strategic guidance on what the operation was to achieve, and he further argues that the airpower community's general focus on high-intensity wars hampered them from developing strategies to fit the political complexities of the Kosovo crisis."--BOOK JACKET.
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Setting the Stage for Operation Allied Force
and the Use of Force
Lessons from Bosnia
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