he shall be deemed thereby to assume an obligation for its safe carriage to such point of destination, unless, at the time of such acceptance, such carrier be released or exempted from such liability by contract in writing signed by the owner or his agent.74 In none of these cases was it thought that the regulations were unreasonable, or operated in any just sense as a restriction upon interstate commerce.75 From the foregoing it will appear that some of the state police regulations which have been sustained in their application to interstate traffic have had for their aim not the health, morals, and safety of the people of the States enacting them, but simply public convenience. In Lake Shore, etc., Ry. Co. v. Ohio,76 in which prior decisions upon this point are carefully considered, the court say: "The power of the State, by appropriate legislation, to provide for the public convenience, stands upon the same ground precisely as its power by appropriate legislation to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety. Whether legislation of either kind is inconsistent with any power granted to the General Government is to be determined by the same rules." But in Illinois Central Ry. Co. v. Illinois" a state law was held void as unnecessarily restraining interstate commerce which required trains to run out of their regular routes in order to make certain specified stops. So also in Mississippi Railroad Com. v. Illinois Central Ry. Co.78 was held void an order of a state railroad commission requiring a railway company to stop its interstate trains at a specified county seat, where proper and adequate passenger facilities were already otherwise provided. In this case the fact that the interstate trains were carrying the mails is given as one of the reasons why they should not be delayed except for substantial reasons. The court say: "The fact that the 74 Richmond & A. R. Co. v. R. A. Patterson Tobacco Co., 169 U. S. 311; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 335; 42 L. ed. 759. 75 This summary is substantially taken from that given by the court in Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Larabee Flour Mills Co., 211 U. S. 612; 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 214; 53 L. ed. 352. 76 173 U. S. 285; 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 465; 43 L. ed. 702. company has contracts to transport the mails of the United States within a time which requires great speed for the trains carrying them, while not conclusive, may still be considered upon the general question of the propriety of stopping such trains at certain stations within the boundaries of a State." Also the impairment of the ability of the road in question to compete with its rivals was considered. "A wholly unnecessary, even though a small obstacle," the court say, "ought not, in fairness, to be placed in the way of an interstate road, which may thus be unable to meet the competition of its rivals." Finally, summarizing its position, the court declare: "We by no means intend to impair the strength of the previous decisions of this court on the subject, nor to assume that the interstate transportation, either of passengers or freight, is to be regarded as overshadowing the rights of the residents of the States through which the railroad passes to adequate railroad facilities. Both claims are to be considered, and, after the wants of the residents within the State or locality through which the road passes have been adequately supplied, regard being had to all the facts bearing upon the subject, they ought not to be permitted to demand more, at the cost of the ability of the road to successfully compete with its rivals in the transportation of interstate passenger and freight." So also in Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. v. Wharton79 was held void an order made under state authority as to the stoppage on signal of certain fast mail trains, the argument being that sufficient service was otherwise provided between the points in question. In Hall v. De Cuirso the court held void as to interstate carriers a state law which prohibited any discrimination against passengers carried within the States, on account of race or color, the argument being that such a regulation in its operation would necessarily affect not merely the local portion of the interstate traffic, but the entire interstate trip.81 79 207 U. S. 328; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 121; 52 L. ed. 230. 80 95 U. S. 485; 24 L. ed. 547. 81 The statute in question, the court say, "does not act upon the business through the local instruments to be employed after coming within the State, but directly upon the business as it comes into the State from without or In McNeill v. Southern Railway Co.82 the Supreme Court held invalid an order of a state authority compelling a railway, engaged in interstate commerce, to deliver cars containing interstate shipments beyond its own right of way to a private siding. This order, it was declared, "manifestly imposed a burden so direct. and so onerous as to leave no room for question that it was a regulation of interstate commerce." However in Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Larabee Flour Mills Co.83 the court upheld an order of a state authority addressed to an interstate carrier to resume the transfer and return of cars between the railway line and the mill of a particular shipper on payment of customary charges. Two dissenting justices held that the case was not to be distinguished from McNeill v. Southern Ry. Co., but the majority held that the order in question was simply to compel the performance by the carrier of its commonlaw obligation to treat all shippers alike. goes out from within. While it purports to control only the carrier when engaged within the State, it must necessarily influence his conduct to some extent in the management of his business throughout his entire voyage. His disposition of passengers taken up and put down within the State, or taken up within to be carried without, cannot but affect in a greater or less degree those taken up without and brought within, and sometimes those taken up and put down without. A passenger in the cabin set apart for the use of whites without the State must, when the boat comes within, share the accommodations of that cabin with such colored persons as may come on board afterwards, if the law is enforced. It was to meet just such a case that the commercial clause in the Constitution was adopted. The river Mississippi passes through or along the borders of ten different States, and its tributaries reach many more. . . No carrier of passengers can conduct his business with satisfaction to himself, or comfort to those employing him, if on one side of a state line his passengers, both white and colored, must be permitted to occupy the same cabin, and on the other be kept separate. Uniformity in the regulations by which he is to be governed from one end to the other of his route is a necessity in his business; and, to secure it, Congress, which is untrammeled by state lines, has been invested with the exclusive legislative power of determining what such regulations shall be." As to the constitutionality of state laws fixing rates for interstate carriers as to the portion of the traffic within the States, see Section 343. 82 202 U. S. 543; 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 722; 50 L. ed. 1142 83 211 U. S. 612; 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 214; 53 L. ed. 352. In Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co. v. Central Stock Yards Co.84 was held void a provision of the Constitution of Kentucky so applied as to compel a railroad company to receive live stock tendered to it outside of the State, to be delivered to a certain point not its own terminus but in physical connection therewith. State laws regulating the prompt delivery of interstate telegraph messages, have generally been upheld. In Western Union Tel. Co. v. James the court say: "The statute in question is of a nature that is in aid of the performance of a duty of the company that would exist in the absence of any such statute, and it is in nowise obstructive of its duty as a telegraph company." § 313. State Inspection Laws. 86 State inspection laws in their application to interstate conimerce are sustained in so far as they are reasonable regulations in behalf of the health, safety, and morality of the inhabitants of the States enacting them, or for their protection against fraud, and do not conflict with existing federal statutes. In Gibbons v. Ogden the court say: "The object of inspection laws is to improve the quality of articles produced by the labor of a country; to fit them for exportation; or, it may be, for domestic use. They act upon the subject before it becomes an article of foreign commerce, or of commerce among the States, and prepare it for that purpose. They form a portion of that immense mass of legislation which embraces everything within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the General Government; all of which can be most advantageously exercised by the States themselves." It will later be seen that when Congress has specifically or inferentially recognized a commodity as a legitimate article of interstate commerce, it may not be excluded by a State from its borders whether by an inspection or other police regulation. And even as to all other articles with reference to which there has been no federal pronouncement, the requirements of a state inspection 84 212 U. S. 132; 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 246; 53 L. ed. 441. law must be reasonable in its provisions. "The only question within the competency of the state authorities, is," as Prentice and Egan say, "whether the article examined is, according to commercial usages of the world, in a fit condition for commerce. It does not belong to the State to decide what articles shall be considered legitimate subjects of trade, nor to make an examination of imported articles for any other purpose than that of protecting the market."87 An examination of a few of the more recent cases will sufficiently illustrate the established doctrines of the Supreme Court as to state inspection laws! In Turner v. Maryland 88 a state inspection law with reference to tobacco was upheld, which prescribed the dimensions of the hogshead in which tobacco raised in Maryland should be packed, that the hogsheads should be delivered to one of the state tobacco warehouses for inspection, and that there should be a charge of outage to reimburse the State for the inspection expenses incurred. To the contention made that the law could not properly be termed an inspection law because no provision was made for the opening of the hogsheads and examination of their contents, the court say: "Recognized elements of inspection laws have always been: quality of the article, form, capacity, dimensions and weight of package, mode of putting up, and marking and branding of various kinds, all these matters being supervised by a public officer having authority to pass or not pass the article as lawful merchandise, as it did or did not answer the prescribed requirements. It has never been regarded as necessary, and it is manifestly not necessary, that all of these elements should coexist in order to make a valid inspection law. Quality alone may be the subject of inspection, without other requirement or the inspection may be made to extend to all of the above matters. When all are prescribed, and then inspection as to quality is dropped out, leaving the rest in force, it cannot be said to be a necessary legal conclusion, that the law has ceased to be an inspection law." 87 The Commerce Clause of the Constitution, p. 155. 88 107 U. S. 38; 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 44; 27 L. ed. 370. |