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able according actions advantage appear argument arises attended beauty become belief betwixt body cause certain character circumstances common conception concerning conclusion connexion consequently consider considerable contiguity contrary depends deriv'd difficulty discover distinct easily easy effect entirely equal evident examine existence experience extension external farther feel follows force former give greater hatred human humility idea identity imagination immediately impossible impression influence instances interest judgment justice kind less manner matter means mind moral motion nature necessary never object obligation observe operation opinion original ourselves pain particular passions perceptions person philosophers pleasure points possession possible present pride principles probability proceed produce qualities question reason reflection regard relation resemblance rules Sect sensation senses sensible sentiments separate shou'd society succession sufficient suppose sympathy thing thinking thought tion tis evident transition understanding vice virtue whole wou'd
Page 405 - Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.
Page 243 - The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance ; pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations.
Page 259 - Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some avocation and lively impression of my senses, which obliterates all these chimeras. I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends ; and when, after three or four hours...
Page 243 - The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind ; nor have we the most distant notion of the place where these scenes are represented, or of the materials of which it is composed.
Page 459 - So that •when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it.
Page 459 - In every system of morality which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a god, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find that instead of the usual copulations of propositions is...
Page 162 - A CAUSE is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other.
Page 259 - Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return? Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? What beings surround me? and on whom have I any influence, or who have any influence on me? I am confounded with all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, environed with the deepest darkness, and utterly deprived of the use of every member and faculty.
Page 449 - Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they cannot be derived from reason; and that because reason alone, as we have already proved, can never have any such influence. Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.