keenly alive to those matters requiring personal care and exertion (in which combination is of no avail), and more strongly persuaded how nearly akin godliness is to cleanliness, and how closely interwoven are our highest interests with the faithful discharge of our daily duties and responsibilities.

The Town Council of Bradford have deposited a Bill for (amongst other things) establishing a Corporation Savings Bank, based upon the scheme propounded in the foregoing letter and paper; and the town clerk will be glad to furnish copies of the clauses, with a view to obtain such suggestions as will render the measure as complete as possible, and a reliable precedent for other towns, if the scheme should be found to work satisfactorily.

Mr. Gladstone has been communicated with recently, and in reply states that he does not consider that he, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, has any title to object to the competition of the Bradford Municipality as bankers for the people; that the principle involved is an important one, but more for the consideration of the Home Office and the Cabinet than for him. He also promises to confer with Sir A. Spearman as to the proposed exemptions from taxation.

Since this opinion was expressed, the Town Councils of Manchester and Bradford have sent a joint deputation to Sir George Grey, who stated that he did not at present see any objection to the scheme, provided Parliament were satisfied in each case that there was a perfectly good security.

MICHAEL HUNTER, Jun. | SAMUEL PLIMSOLL. | R. EADON LEADER, B.A. In this Department are considered the various questions relating to Economics, Social, Political, and Commercial.

SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS.

The following special questions were discussed in the Depart

ment :

1. What are the best means of establishing a System of Authori

tative Arbitration between Employers and Employed in Cases of Strikes and Lockouts?

2. Can the Principles of Co-operation be profitably applied to Production? And if so, under what Conditions?

3. Is it desirable to Consolidate the Existing Railways of the United Kingdom into one System under Government Control ?

A Section of the Department dealt with the Licensing System. In addition to the papers printed in the foregoing pages, the following were read in the Department :

"Building Societies." By S. B. Auty.

"On Benefit Building Societies, with some Suggestions on the Desirability of Amending the Law Concerning them." By H. W. Ibbotson.

"Sheffield Savings Bank." By Frank Wever.

"On the Evil Effects of the Modern System of Usury." By George Hurst.

"Co-operation." By Henry Bach.

"On the Consolidation of Railways into one System." By Samuel Plimsoll.

"The File Trade. Its Importance, Locality, and Peculiarities." By Henry Turner.

"The Economical Use of Road Locomotives compared with Horse Labour." By Thomas Aveling.

"The House Accommodation of the People, in Relation to their Domestic and Social Condition, with Practical Suggestions as to the Further Development of Freehold Land Societies and Building Societies." By Thomas Beggs. (Printed at length in the Journal of Social Science, No. 4.)

"Facts and Fallacies in relation to Working Men's Clubs." Rev. Henry Solly.

Cheap Food." By Graham Gilmour.

"The Licensing System and the Permissive Bill."

Dawson Burns.

By

By Rev.

"On the Licensing System." By Rev. T. Hutton. "On the Amendment of the Licensing System." By Robert

Martin, M.D.

"Free Labour. The Cotton Culture." By Rev. Sella Martin. "Free Trade incompatible with the existence of Custom and Excise Duties." By C. E. Macqueen. (See the Financial Reformer, No. 90.)

"Fiscal Reform." By John Noble. (See the Financial Reformer, No. 90.)

"Effect of the Poor Law on the Morality and Habits of the Working Classes." By S. Drew, M.D.

What are the best means of establishing a system of Authoritative Arbitration between Employers and Employed in cases of Strikes Lockouts?

In addition to the paper by Mr. Wilson printed at p. 476, Mr.

Dronfield read a paper pointing out the advantages of Trades' Unions.

DISCUSSION.

Mr. FREDERIC HILL: Those who, like myself, take an active part in the Society for Promoting the Amendment of the Law, know very well that, until last session, there were statutory difficulties in the way of the amicable arrangements referred to in the paper of Mr. Wilson. Although the most important means for putting an end to strikes must be to give the employed a full knowledge of the concern in which they are engaged, and an earnest personal interest in promoting its welfare by a share of the fruits that result from their good management and economy, yet, until the Act of last session, it was at the peril of the employer so to remove the obstacles to co-operation, so to create an interest among his employés, and so to make the reward of labour depend not merely on the number of hours worked, but upon the general success that attended the establishment. All who have paid attention to the subject know that where such an interest has been created strikes have not appeared, and that where strikes did exist, and that interest has been created, they have disappeared. Several important instances, illustrative of that, are given by Mr. Mill in the last edition of his works, in the case of several working establishments in France, where the worst feeling existed between employer and employed. When this most beneficial principle was brought to bear-which, happily for France, the state of the law in that country did not prevent-a kind of war between employers and employed, a chronic state of dissatisfaction and ill-will, has been succeeded by peace, and a most happy feeling between the two parties. It is but justice to say that our law has been very defective in this respect; it is but justice that all who frame the laws of the country should take part of this blame of resulting evils to themselves, and not throw it upon the workingclasses.

Mr. FISHER: The question that is put forward seems to me to admit of rather more discussion than would appear on the face of it. In some countries it has been found to be the interest of the State to act as arbitrator between employers and employed. I may allude particularly to Prussia. There are very large coal fields being worked in Prussia, and the Government of Prussia has estimated the proper sum per ton to be paid to those who raise the coal; and that sum the employers must pay, and the workmen must receive. I hold that it is the duty of the State to watch over the interest of each individual, and to prevent the oppression of one class by another. No one can deprecate strikes more than I do, but if men feel that they are not getting a fair proportion of the profit of their trade, if beforehand they put by from their wages to support them when they are idle, and say-" We will not work unless we get a certain amount of wages," I do not see upon what principle of law you can control them. Then comes the question, should the State come in and arbitrate? I think it ought, because the idleness of the men is a source of loss to the State. It is on that ground the State should come in, and therefore, whenever this state of things arises, that the employed, from an increase in the price of food or any other cause, are led to say-"We are not getting a fair proportion, as wages, of the profit made on this particular article," there should be some tribunal to settle the question, without having myriads of people thrown out of employment, without having them fall back upon the wages they have saved, or upon the wages of others who are at work; and thus an end might be put to the inconvenience that arises from the loss of a large mass of human labour.

Professor FAWCETT, M.P.: I would not have ventured to speak on this subject, which I know involves such vital interests between employers and employed, did I not feel that if I have not, perhaps, all the practical experience which employers and employed possess on the subject, yet I can discuss the question calmly and with an unprejudiced mind, because I am not in the least degree pecuniarily interested in these disputes. Therefore I am sure both employers and employed will think that the opinions I am now about to express are the result of a calm and dispassionate investigation. With regard to the opposite opinions which are generally expressed on the subject of combinations. One

class confine themselves solely to the abuses connected with them, and so confining themselves entirely condemn them. Another class, like Mr. Dronfield, dwell, and dwell with truth, upon the advantages connected with combinations, and therefore entirely approve of them. But I think I can put one or two points which Mr. Dronfield and Mr. Wilson would alike agree to adopt. I think they would agree with me in thinking that occasionally this power of combination has been abused. When it has been abused it has produced great misfortunes both to men and masters, and I am sure Mr. Dronfield must hope with me that these abuses may in future become less frequent. Now, with regard to these abuses, Mr. Wilson alluded to some of them. I at once say that I think the working men have a most indisputable right to combine, if they can support that combination without practising any coercion upon those who object to their proceedings. If men enter into a voluntary combination, and say "Here are so many of us combined to work or not to work according as certain conditions are granted or denied"-I believe they have a most indisputable right to combine in such a way as that. But if, on the other hand, they say "We will support these combinations by exercising coercion and pressure upon those who refuse to join us," then, I say, they are attempting that which cannot be tolerated. But now let us see whether the labourers have a chance of obtaining advantages by entering into those combinations which Mr. Dronfield has described. When I speak of combinations, remember I wish it to be understood that I imply those combinations which are voluntary, and which do not resort to force. Now, I think that in the existing economic relations between employers and employed, which I think I shall presently show are not satisfactory, these combinations are necessary in order to give the labourer the greatest possible price which he can obtain for his labour. The labourer is anxious to obtain the highest possible price for his labour; the employer is anxious to purchase that labour at the lowest possible price; and thus employers and employed become parties to a keenly contested bargain. I do not say that this is a satisfactory state of things; but it is the state of things which exists at the present time. Now, are the labourers more likely to be placed in a favourable position in arranging the terms of their bargain if they combine, or if they do not combine? I think they are more likely to obtain a satisfactory bargain if they do combine. There is undoubtedly among employers either a tacit or an open combination. Look at any trade-take the iron trade; what do we constantly see? The masters hold a meeting; they unanimously agree either to advance or to reduce their wages. A combination is formed amongst them; and these rates of wages are those which from that time will be offered to all the men who are employed in that particular branch of industry in that locality. Ought not the labourers to meet that combination by a similar combination of their own trade? Suppose, after this combination amongst the employers has been formed, the labourers do not combine-I will take the case of an individual labourer-suppose he goes to his master and makes this appeal. He says to him-"Your trade is prosperous. You have agreed to advance our wages 10 per cent.; I think that this advance is not sufficient. I believe that you could afford to advance our wages 20 per cent." The master's reply to him would be this-"I differ from you. We have agreed to advance your wages 10 per cent. If you like, you can remain in your employment, but if you throw up your employment, you cannot get higher wages in the district, for our decision as to the advance is unanimous." But suppose a combination is formed amongst the labourers, and they go with the power and authority of a great combination-suppose the delegates of this combination were to go to the masters, and say "We have formed ourselves into a combination. Here are 10, or 15, or 20,000 of us. We have decided that we will not work unless 20 per cent. of an advance is granted to us." Why, then, the power of combination on the one side would be met by a corresponding power on the other, and the masters would have this issue placed before them, and they would say "Well, this combination has been formed, and if we do not grant the request, we shall have to close our works, and bear a heavy and serious loss." Therefore, I think, in arranging the terms of the bargain, the labourers have placed themselves in an equal position with their masters, for they have exercised their equal right with their masters to enter into a voluntary

combination. But let the labourers not be mistaken as to what they will get by these combinations. They may make, and they have made, unjust demands; and when they make an unjust demand, depend upon it that if they punish their employers, they inflict a far greater punishment upon themselves. For suppose they make a demand for an advance in wages when the state of trade does not justify that advance, what is the result then? The masters cannot concede the request-the advance is refused; the employment is closed; the labourers suffer terrible hardships. It is no compensation to them to think that they inflict corresponding loss upon the employers, for the loss which they inflict upon the employers will ultimately, to a great extent, fall upon themselves; for, if they diminish their masters' resources, they diminish that fund from which their wages are paid. It is, therefore, highly desirable for themselves, that if these combinations exist amongst labourers, they should feel that they have a great responsibility to discharge, and that they should be certain as to the justice of their demands before they press them upon their employers. Now, with regard to strikes, it is almost a truism to remark upon the evil consequences which flow from strikes. Still, I consider that they are a necessary evil, arising from the present unsatisfactory relations which exist between employers and employed. What does a strike imply? It is this-if labourers think they are not paid sufficient for their work, they say-" We will refuse to work." It is exactly the same feeling which prevents the merchants selling their goods, if they think they cannot realise a sufficient price for them. Therefore, I believe that so long as the regulation of wages is simply a matter of pecuniary bargain, it will frequently happen that employers and employed will not be able to arrange between them the terms of that bargain; and if they cannot come to an arrangement, then, the necessary and unfortunate result is, a cessation of work, or, in other words, a strike. But there was one remark in Mr. Wilson's paper, of which I was previously aware, but which always, to my mind, throws a ray of hope over these melancholy disputes. He said, that in no trade in which a great strike has once taken place has a strike ever taken place again. Now, what is the moral which we can draw from that important fact? Why, the moral which I draw, is simply this-when this great battle between employers and employed in a trade has been once fought out, employers and employed both learn to recognise the other's power. The employers, on the one hand, know that if the employed are driven to it, they will refuse to work rather than accept wages which are unjust; and the employed, on the other hand, also come to know that if they make demands upon their masters which they consider are not just, and ought not to be conceded, then the employers, rather than submit, will close their works, and at once throw thousands out of employment. Therefore, having been taught this lesson by sad and severe experience, they learn to recognise the power which each class possesses; and, in the future, the demands which the employed occasionally make upon the employers are more just and reasonable, and the employers, also, fearing the consequences which a strike entails, are ever anxious immediately to concede to their labourers what they can justly and fairly grant to them. In that way, out of all this evil, we see a ray of hope. A strike is like a conflict between two nations. When nations have once contended with each other, they learn to respect each other's power the more. They know the consequences of such a conflict, and therefore in the future, they are more anxious not to do anything which shall lead to another international rupture. Now, is there any hope that henceforth strikes will cease by an improvement in the economic relations between employers and employed? I think there is. I think if the industrial supremacy of this country is to be maintained, that the production of wealth in this country must not be so sadly interfered with as it is at the present time by the frequent recurrence of those unfortunate disputes between employers and employed. How is wealth produced? It requires a joint effort between capital and labour; and if that work is to be efficiently done, ought not the people who make this joint effort to be connected by some other feeling than that of pecuniary interest? I believe that this truth will gradually dawn both upon employers and employed; and I hope that the day is not far distant when every labourer in this country shall become attached to his employer by being made to participate in his prosperity. I am advocating no