the subject which both undertook to explain, they at last retire from the field for very weariness.

But that verbal questions, if treated as verbal questions, and not mistaken for what they are not, may lead to the most useful results, I need not express my conviction, who have compiled the following observations for the sake of explaining the signification of political words. In pointing out their various senses, however, it is not intended to imply, that it is possible, either in scientific or popular discourse, constantly to attribute to each word only one meaning. Many of the ambiguities remarked upon, depend on causes not connected with our own language; and may be traced to historical associations and other circumstances, which have equally influenced the languages of other nations, both in ancient and modern times. Hence many parts of the following pages might be literally translated into French or German, without losing their application or truth. The links which bind together these various shades of meaning, are connected too closely with the general course of our thoughts

to be broken at the command of any individual. It is impossible to legislate in matters of language: the evils arising from its imperfections may be eluded, but can never be removed. No mischief however arises from the variable meaning of a word (except sometimes a partial obscurity), unless the argument turns on the Thus there is no harm in calling

double sense. the republican government of England and France a monarchy; there is no harm in calling the aristocratic government of the United States a democracy; only let it be remembered that they are not what they are called. There is no objection to a misnomer, so that it does not lead us astray. But if it were argued, that justice, not law, ought to be administered in courts of justice; that no man can have a right to do that which is wrong; that in a kingdom the institutions ought to be monarchical, &c.; then the ambiguity is mischievous, because it serves as an inducement to error, and confounds things as well as words.

Such verbal ambiguities generate confusion of thought in those who sincerely seek after truth, and afford an opportunity for delusion

to those whose only object is to support a party measure, or a preconceived opinion; who seek an end without caring for the honesty of the means. Still, notwithstanding the vast number of unsound arguments advanced on all great political questions, there are probably few politicians who constantly follow the rules suggested by the author of the work on Parliamentary Logic: they generally share in some degree in the delusions which they propagate, and feel some part of the enthusiasm which they kindle. It is impossible to say how much of the evils of party contention has arisen solely from interested persons making use of certain phrases as a pretext, and how much from honest mischievousness caused by the delusion of language; for it is to be remembered that political terms do not always occur singly in reasoning, and that when several are crowded together in the same proposition or argument, the chances of delusion are infinitely multiplied.*

* "The best verbal fallacies are those which consist not in the ambiguity of a single word, but in the ambiguous syntaxis of many put together," says Mr. Hamilton, in his very acute, though not very honest, maxims of Parliamentary Logic, p. 29. By best is here meant, most calculated to deceive.

The following researches, however, are chiefly designed for the use of persons engaged in political studies, especially of those beginning such pursuits, who often require some manual, some book of reference, beyond a mere dictionary, which should furnish an explanation of the terms belonging to political science. For want of this assistance, persons not acquainted with the vocabulary of a science, are sometimes unable to detect the flaws in reasoning by which they are not convinced. It often happens that an argument seems inconclusive, without our being able to comprehend why it is so we may be able to disprove the conclusion, but not to refute the argument. It serves, however, greatly to confirm and strengthen our conviction if we can perceive, not only why we are right, but why those who differ from us are wrong. Now for this purpose

This remark, which refers to ambiguities of construction (as, Aio te, Æacida, Romanos vincere posse), applies with at least equal force to such collections of equivocal words, as "Man has a natural right to his liberty."

* Οὐ μόνον δεῖ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ψεύδους· τοῦτο γὰρ συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν πίστιν· ὅταν γὰρ εὔλογον φανῇ τὸ διὰ τί φαίνεται ἀληθὲς οὐκ ἂν ἀληθὲς, πιστεύειν tolεi tý áλŋ0εî μãλλov. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. b. 6. ch. 15.

b

there is no instrument so powerful as an accurate knowledge, and a watchful observance of the different uses of words. This often affords the master-key which discloses the whole mystery, and at once resolves all difficulties by shewing that they have no existence.

Nor is it only in the detection of the fallacies of others that an attention to the different meanings of words is to be recommended: this test of correctness may be applied with at least as much benefit to our own reasonings as to those of our neighbours. And above all is this attention requisite in communicating our thoughts; for it sometimes (though perhaps not often) happens, that a man may clearly understand a subject which, nevertheless, for the want of appropriate language, he may fail to make intelligible to others. To the acute and profound Butler it might, indeed, seem that "confusion and perplexity in writing is indeed without excuse, because any one may, if he pleases, know whether he understands and sees through what he is about; "* but, unhappily, there are few

*Preface to Sermons in the Rolls' Chapel.