country, its effects, as towards individuals or the whole community, would of course be unaltered, although its legal complexion would be changed.

In like manner, political rights are not distinguished from private rights by their tendency,— for all rights either tend, or are supposed to tend, to the public good,-but by the purpose for which they are exercised. A private right is a right exercised for the immediate and peculiar benefit of the individual who possesses it: a political right is a right exercised not for the immediate or peculiar benefit of any individual, but for the good of the whole community. Thus the right of property may tend equally to the public good with the right of voting for the election of members of a representative body; but the one is exercised for the direct and separate benefit of the proprietor, though indirectly it tends to the benefit of the community; the other is not exercised for the direct and immediate benefit of the voter, though ultimately it may tend to his good.

From a comparison of the remarks made in a former place on the subject of vested rights,*

* Above, p. 24. Since the remarks here referred to were printed, it has been suggested to me that the phrase vested rights is in fact devoid of meaning; that it is never applied generally to any class of rights; but that, when certain rights are attached, it is used as a specious and delusive.

it results that no political rights can belong to the class of vested rights, which must necessarily

phrase, by persons who think that those rights ought to be preserved, vested having merely an intensive force, and being equivalent to sacred or inviolable. According to this interpretation, the use of the particular word vested would be explained by supposing, that those who invented or employ this expression, have wished to represent, that a right so vested or lodged cannot be divested or taken away by the legislature. If this explanation is correct, the phrase vested rights would be a mere absurdity, and would belong to the same class of expressions as natural, indefeasible, inalienable, indestructible, &c. rights, examined above, p. 23. Now, there is no doubt, that the phrase vested rights is often used in a dishonest manner, merely for the sake of raising prejudice, and creating a vague and unfounded alarm, by persons who attach to it no definite meaning. But, if it were laid down that all political expressions, which are sometimes, or even frequently used in a senseless manner, are therefore in their origin unmeaning and absurd, the political vocabulary would be contracted within very narrow limits. I am very far from feeling confident that the explanation which I have just mentioned may not be correct, and that the explanation which I have proposed may not be wrong: but, on considering the peculiar kind of rights to which, when they are called in question, the term vested is usually applied, it seems to me probable, that the notion and epithet of vested, as applied to rights, have been derived from the investment of capital: that, when a man has invested his capital in a certain manner, with a reasonable assurance of the permanency of a law, the right of property which by this investment he has acquired is called a vested right; and it is considered as conferring on him a moral claim upon the legislature for such a delay or compensation, as will enable him either to withdraw his capital, or to reimburse himself for his loss. If this view of the subject is correct, vested rights would be an admissible phrase, signifying a limited

be rights of property, for the peculiar advantage of their possessors.

Civil is sometimes used in nearly the same sense as political, as when we speak of civil society, civil liberty; and, in fact, these two are the corresponding words of the Latin and Greek languages, civilis standing in the same relation to civitas as πολιτικός to πόλις. Civil, however, has, in our language, obtained two additional meanings; 1. When, as a division of laymen, it is opposed to military and naval; civil service, for example, being any service, not ecclesiastical, which is not concerned with the army or navy: * and, 2. When it is opposed to criminal, i. e. civil and criminal law,-a distinction which has just been explained.

Municipal is commonly used in reference to a corporate town, or some body politic subordinate

and definite class of rights: if the other view is correct, vested rights would be a dishonest and deceitful expression, improperly applicable to all rights, but properly applicable

to none.

He

* Blackstone first divides the people into the clergy and laity (1 Com. 376); and the laity "into three distinct states, the civil, the military, and the maritime” (Ibid. 396). then proceeds to say, that "the civil state consists of the nobility and the commonalty." Now, as a nobleman or a commoner may be either a clerk, a soldier, or a sailor, it is quite clear that either the division is incorrect, or the last statement is false. Blackstone indeed admits this inaccuracy but he should have avoided his error, as well as confessed it.

to the sovereign; in which sense we speak of municipal institutions, regulations, &c. The municipia of the Romans were provincial cities, which retained certain privileges and exemptions, and possessed an independent subordinate jurisdiction and authority. Blackstone, however, has perverted this term and made it synonymous with civil or national; for which perversion he assigns a most singular reason, viz. that he calls the law of a state municipal law in compliance with common speech, and then proceeds to say, that in common speech it has not that meaning. "I call it municipal law (he says) in compliance with common speech; for though, strictly, that expression denotes the particular customs of one single municipium, or free town, yet it may, with sufficient propriety, be applied to any one state or nation which is governed by the same laws and customs."*

* 1 Com. 44. See Bentham on Morals and Legislation, vol. 2. p. 263, n.

R

XIX.

PROPERTY.-POSSESSION.-ESTATE.-
ESTATES OF PARLIAMENT.

It does not fall within the scope of the present inquiries to investigate the legal meaning and incidents of property and possession: but, for the sake of many political questions, it is desirable to give a general outline of the notions conveyed by these two terms, and of the distinction between them.

Without, then, attending to the peculiarities of any one legal system, possession may be described as the actual use or occupation of any thing for a man's own convenience, pleasure, or profit. Thus a man is possessed of the clothes which he wears, of the house which he inhabits, of the goods in his premises, of the horses which he rides or drives, of the farm which he cultivates, &c.

Property, or the right of property, is the right of ownership of any object, without regard to the actual use of it; and it implies the right of obtaining possession, at some time or other.