the community, is not removable to a District Court of the United States as one arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States; since, even assuming that the bill shows upon its face that the relief sought would be inconsistent with. the power to regulate commerce, or with regulations established by Congress, or with the Fourteenth Amendment, such an assumption only demonstrates that the bill cannot be maintained and not that the cause of action arose under the Constitution or laws of the United States.63

A suit by the owner to enjoin the destruction of a telegraph line is not within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court, because such destruction would interfere with interstate commerce.6 64

It has been held that a suit for an injunction 65 or a receiver 66 does not arise under the constitution of the United States because of a State statute forbidding such injunction or receivership which plaintiff contends to be a violation of the Federal Constitution.

An issue whether full force and effect has been given to the judgment of a State court has been held not to involve the construction of the Constitution of the United States.67 The question whether a party to proceedings in a State court continued such after a certain judgment in his favor, and the estate represented by him as administrator became bound by proceedings subsequent to the judgment; is not dependent for solution upon any construction of the Constitution or laws of the United States, so as to give the right of removal to the Federal Court.68 A mortgagee may sue in a court of the United States to prevent contracts pledged by the mortgagor from impairment by State legislation, irrespective of the citizenship of the mortgagor.69

63 Arkansas v. Kansas & T. Coal Co., 183 U. S. 185, 46 L. ed. 144; reversing 96 Fed. 353.

64 Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Nolan, 240 Fed. 754.

65 Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. Hobart, C. C. A., 244 Fed. 385.

66 Orr v. Allen, C. C. A., 245 Fed. 486.

67 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Wiggins' Ferry Co., 108 U. S. 18, 27

L. ed. 636; affirming order Wig-
gins' Ferry Co. v. Chicago & A. R.
Co., 11 Fed. 381, 3 McCrary, 609;
Merritt v. Am. Steel Barge Co., C.
C. A., 75 Fed. 813.

68 Gibbs v. Crandall, 120 U. S. 105, 30 L. ed. 590.

69 City and County of Denver v. New York Tr. Co., C. C. A., 187 Fed. 890; City of Denver v. Mercantile Tr. Co., C. C. A., 201 Fed. 790; when it was held that the

Where the matter in dispute exceeds the jurisdictional amount and the requisite diversity of citizenship exists, the district court may enjoin an infringement of a State Constitution in a proper case.70

§ 26. Suits arising under treaties of the United States. A suit arises under a treaty of the United States when its decision depends upon a construction or the determination of the validity of the same.1 It was held: that an action by a tribal Indian for false imprisonment under process of a State court, because of the violation of a State law from which he claimed exemption, arose under the laws and treaties of the United States, 2

A suit to protect rights claimed under a treaty does not arise under the treaty when the validity of the latter is not disputed and its construction is not involved. It was held: that where both parties claimed under Mexican grants, confirmed and patented in accordance with a provision of a treaty, the plaintiff claiming certain water rights thereunder, which the defendant disputed; the suit did not arise under a treaty of the United States. Where a complaint in ejectment against private individuals alleged that plaintiff was ousted in violation of the provisions of the treaty with France, of October 21, 1808, for the protection of the inhabitants of the ceded territory in the enjoyment of their property, it was held: that it did not show a case arising under a treaty of the United States, there being no assertion of any right, title, privilege or immunity, derived from such treaty as against the defendants, and no charge that they took possession by direction of the Government of the United States.5 A suit was maintained in a District Court of the United States by the consul of Austria and Hungary, to

mortgagor was not an indispensable party and might be omitted when his joinder would oust the jurisdiction. See Central Tr. Co. v. Wheeling & L. E. R. Co., 211 Fed. 515; infra, $$ 117-120.

70 See infra, §§ 40-44.

$ 26. 1 Muse v. Arlington Hotel Co., 168 U. S. 430, 42 L. ed. 531. See infra, § 688.

2 Peters v. Malin, 111 Fed. 244.

Fed. Prac. Vol. I-7

3 Borgmeyer v. Idler, 159 U. S. 408, 40 L. ed. 199; Muse v. Arlington Hotel Co., 168 U. S. 430, 42 L. ed. 531. See Gill v. Oliver, 11 How. (U. S.) 529, 545, 13 L. ed. 799, 806.

4 Crystal Springs Land & Water Co. v. Los Angeles, 177 U. S. 169, 44 L. ed. 720; affirming 82 Fed. 114.

5 Filhiol v. Maurice, 185 U. S. 108, 46 L. ed. 827.

restrain a beneficial association from using the name of the Emperor of Austria and Hungary, as a part of its corporate name, and the use of his portrait as a part of its advertising literature, in order fraudulently to induce his subjects, resident in the United States, to believe that the association was conducted under the customs of their own country, and that their Emperor was identified with the same and a patron thereof.

§ 27. Suits where the parties are Federal corporations. In general. When either party is a corporation chartered by Congress, the case is one arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States; and except in the case of national banks, the former rule was that a District Court of the United States might take jurisdiction of the same, either originally, or by removal.3

The statutes now provide: "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction of any action or suit by or against any railroad company upon the ground that said railroad company was incorporated under an Act of Congress." 4

Some of the following decisions may still be of use to the practitioner. The court will take judicial notice that a party to the action is incorporated by an act of Congress, although the pleadings are silent upon the subject.5 It was not the domicile of a corporation created by an act of Congress which conferred jurisdiction on the Federal courts of suits to which it was a party, but

6 Von Thodorovich v. Franz Joseph Beneficial Ass'n, 154 Fed. 911.

$ 27. 1 See infra, § 28.

2 Osborn v. U. S. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, 823, 6 L. ed. 204, 224; Male v. Atchison, etc., Ry., 240 U. S. 97; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Amato, 144 U. S. 465, 36 L. ed. 506; U. S. Freehold Land & Emigration Co. v. Gallegos, 89 Fed. 769, 32 C. C. A. 470.

3 Pacific R. R. Removal Cases; Union Pae. R. Co. v. Myers, 115 U. S. 1, 29 L. ed. 319; reversing Myers v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 16 Fed. 292, 3 McCrary, 578; Knights of Pythias v. Kalinski, 163 U. S. 289, 41 L. ed. 163, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047; Matter

of Dunn, 212 U. S. 374, 53 L. ed.
558;
Cruikshank V. Fourth Nat.
Bank, 16 Fed. 888, 21 Blatchf. 322;
Allen v. Texas & P. R. Co., 25 Fed.
513; Supreme Lodge of Knights of
Pythias of the World v. Hill, 76
Fed. 468, 22 C. C. A. 280; Union
Pac. R. Co. v. McComb, 58 How.
Prac. 478; Texas & P. Ry. Co. v.
Watson, 43 S. W. 1060.

438 St. at L. 583, Comp. St. Bankers Trust Co. v. Tex. & Pac. Ry., 241 U. S 295.

5 Matter of Dunn, 212 U. S. 374, 53 L. ed. 558; Knights of Pythias v. England, 94 Fed. 369, 36 C. C. A. 298.

the fact that it was so created. It was held, that by the consolidation of a Federal with a State corporation, the former did not lose any of its rights or franchises as such, and was not estopped from removing suits brought against it in the State courts to those of the United States, notwithstanding that the laws of the State in question provided: "If any railroad company, organized under the laws of this State, shall consolidate by sale or otherwise with any railroad company organized under the laws of any other State or of the United States, the same shall not thereby become a foreign corporation, but the courts of this State shall retain jurisdiction in all matters which may arise as if said consolidation had not taken place. 776 When a party is a corporation, which derives its charter from a Territorial statute, that fact does not make the case arise under the laws of the United States, although it was organized in pur

6 Allen v. Texas & P. R. Co., 25 Fed. 513.

7 Adams Express Co. v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 16 Fed. 712; Maxwell v. Federal Gold & Copper Co., C. C. A., 155 Fed. 110. An act of Congress provides: that the Oregon Short Line Railway Company, a corporation of the Territory of Wyoming, "is hereby made a railway corporation in the Territories of Utah, Idaho and Wyoming," under the same limitations, and with the same rights that it previously had under its articles of incorporation in Wyoming, and with all the rights and privileges within these Territories secured to railway companies by a previous act of Congress granting to railroads the right of way through public lands. other act of Congress provides: that the Utah & Northern Railway Company, a corporation organized under the laws of Utah, "is hereby made a railway corporation in the Territories of Utah, Idaho and Montana," under the same limitations, and with the same rights that it

An

then had under its articles of incorporation. It was held on a petition of the Oregon Short Line & Utah Northern Railroad Company, a corporation formed by a consoli dation of these two companies: that the statute gave no powers or rights to be exercised outside of the Territories named therein, and therefore did not give such corporations a Federal character; and that petitioner and its several constituent companies were Territorial organizations, and not entitled to a removal to the Federal court of an action brought against it in the Supreme Court, as a suit arising under the laws of the United States. Oregon Short Line & U. N. R. Co. v. Skottowe, 162 U. S. 490, 40 L. ed. 1048; affirming Skottowe v. Oregon Short Line & U. N. Ry. Co., 22 Or. 430, 30 Pac. 222, 16 L.R.A. 593; approving Conlon v. Oregon Short Line & U. N. Ry. Co., 21 Or. 462, 28 Pac. 501. In an elaborate opinion, 32 Wash. Law Rep. 758, 761, Fred Dennet, Esq., of D. C. bar argued that organizations in

suance of the corporation laws of Arkansas under an act of Congress, which directed that they should be enforced in that Territory with the same effect as if enacted in haec verba. An action by a shipbuilding company against the Emergency Fleet Corporation organized under the laws of the United States founded upon an alleged breach of a contract for ship building could be removed to a Federal court.10 A corporation manufacturing munitions for the United States out of supplies furnished by the National Government was permitted to sue in the Federal courts to enjoin labor unions from interfering with its prosecution of work for the Government.11

When the Federal corporation was actually interested in the controversy, 12 the joinder of another defendant, even if he was the receiver of the other, did not prevent the removal.1 It was held that proceedings for the condemnation of a right of way could not be removed into a Federal court by a Federal corporation joined as a defendant, when it did not appear that such