usually necessary parties to a suit brought by or against his trustee or assignee. An assignment by the owners of a number of claims against the same party, to an attorney, under an agreement that he shall receive for his services a certain percentage of the amount collected, will support an action by the assignee in his own name where there is no agreement that he shall pay the costs of the litigation.15 A stockholders' agent, elected at a meeting of shareholders in pursuance of statute, may after he has qualified sue on their behalf directors to recover money by malfeasance or misfeasance upon the part of the latter.16 It has been held improper for a creditor of an estate to join with its receiver in a suit concerning it.17 A corporation need not be, although it usually is, joined as a co-defendant to a suit against its receiver to foreclose a lien upon its property where no personal relief is sought against it.18 It has been held that the Comptroller of the Currency and the Treasurer of the United States are not necessary parties to a suit to recover from the receiver of a national bank, appointed by the Comptroller, the amount of an assessment erroneously made by the Comptroller, paid by the complainant to the receiver, and paid by him into the Treasury.19 It has been held that a receiver appointed upon a creditor's bill should not be made a defendant to an ancillary foreclosure suit; 20 that a receiver of a corporation is a necessary party to a suit to enforce a corporate right of action; 21 that a receiver of a bank is a proper, but not a necessary, party to a suit in equity instituted before his appointment to recover from the bank money obtained by it through fraud; 22 that a receiver is an improper party to an action at law for a tort committed before his ap 20 Continental Tr. Co. v. Toledo, St. L. & K. C. R. Co., 82 Fed. 642. 21 Porter v. Sabin, 149 U. S. 473, 37 L. ed. 815. But see Palestine W. & P. Co. v. City of Palestine, 91 Tex. 540, 40 L.R.A. 203; s. c., 44 S. W. 814; s. c., 40 L.R.A. 203. 22 Denton v. Baker, C. C. A., 79 Fed. 189; Speckart v. German Nat. Bank, 85 Fed. 12. 25 pointment,23 but that he is a necessary party to such an action when he holds a policy insuring the corporation from loss by the tort and the plaintiff has joined the insurer with the receiver's corporation as a co-defendant; 24 and that he and the corporation may be joined as defendants to a bill to enjoin. infringements of a patent and for an accounting of the profits made by infringements before and after his appointment; that the creditors of an insolvent bank are necessary parties to a suit by a stockholder against the bank and its receiver to have his certificate cancelled; 26 and that after the discharge of a receiver and the transfer of the property to a corporation, which as part consideration for the purchase, agreed to pay all valid claims against the receiver, the purchaser is the only proper defendant to a suit to collect such a claim.27 It has been held that the treasurer of a corporation may sue his predecessor in office for an accounting of the corporate funds, without joining the corporation.28 A corporation represents its officers and agents acting in their official capacity in a suit for an injunction against unfair competition.29 Ordinarily, a corporation represents the stockholders thereof in all litigation affecting corporate rights; and liabilities; 30 but not those in which the stockholder has special interest.31 It has been held that a corporation is so far a representative of its stockholders that none of them need be joined in a suit for an accounting, under a lease which provides for the payment of dividends directly to its stockholders; 32 nor a suit to enjoin the collection of unlawful charges for the use 23 Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Heflin, C. C. A., 83 Fed. 93. 24 Moore v. Los Angeles I. & S. Co., 89 Fed. 73. But see Palestine W. & P. Co. v. City of Palestine, 91 Tex. 540, 44 S. W. 814; s. c., 40 L.R.A. 203. 25 Union S. & S. Co. v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co., 69 Fed. 833. 26 Dunn v. State Board, 59 Minn. 221, 61 N. W. 27. 27 Thompson v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 93 Fed. 384. 28 Hunter v. Robbins, 117 Fed. 920. 29 International News Service v. The Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215; Wm. A. Rogers, Lt 'd, v. H. O Rogers Silver Co., 237 Fed. 887. 30 Pacific R. of Mo. v. Atlantic & P. R. Co., 20 Fed. 277. See Witherbee v. Bowles, 201 N. Y. 427, 435; Weidenfeld v. Northern Pac. R. Co., C. C. A., 129 Fed. 305, 311; Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U. S. 531, 544. 31 Ibid., see infra, § 186w. 32 Pacific R. of Mo. v. Atlantic & P. R. Co., 20 Fed. 277. See Wither. bee v. Bowles, 201 N. Y. 427, 435; of water by them when the contract was made by the company for their benefit.33 And an incorporated association of owners and representatives of newspapers is a proper party to represent them in a suit to protect their interest in the news which it collects and distributes among them.34 When a statute imposes a tax upon shares of its capital stock and directs it to pay the same, it may sue to test the validity thereof; 35 but where a question arises affecting the respective rights of different classes of stockholders, the members of each class or representative thereof, as well as the corporation, must be joined in the suit.36 Ordinarily a corporation represents unsecured creditors who have no liens nor judgments in suits affecting the rights of the company to property and its liability.37 In a suit against a corporation to enforce specific performance of a contract made by it in behalf of subsidiary companies, which it controlled through ownership of their stock, it was held that such subsidiary companies were not indispensable, nor even necessary, parties.38 It has been held: that a State statute authorizing one or more officers of an unincorporated association to represent the others in the courts, when suing or being sued about a matter concerning their common interest, will be followed by a Federal court of equity, and the members conclusively presumed to have the same citizenship as such officers.39 The extent to which a trade union represents its individual Weidenfield v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 34 International News Service v. The Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215. 35 Cummings v. Nat. Bank, 101 U. S. 153, 157, 25 L. ed. 903; San Francisco Nat. Bank v. Dodge, 197 U. S. 70, 75, 113, 49 L. ed. 669; Charleston Nat. Bank v. Melton, 171 Fed. 743. 36 Baltimore, C. & A. Ry. Co. v. Godeffroy, C. C. A., 182 Fed. 525; Carpenter v, Knollwood Cemetery, 198 Fed. 297. But see Witherbee v. Bowles, 201 N. Y. 427. 37 St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. McElvain, 253 Fed. 123. 38 Texas Co. v. Central Fuel Oil Co., C. C. A., 194 Fed. 1. 39 Fargo v. Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co., 6 Fed. 787; Whitman v. Hubbell, 30 Fed. 81; Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. 566, 19 L. ed. 1029. But see Chapman v. Barney, 129 U. S. 677, 32 L. ed. 800, and supra, § 48. members has not yet been definitely decided.40 Officers of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States may represent the members in a suit to determine the property rights of the church.41 In suits by or against strangers affecting the partnership property, surviving partners need not have joined with them the personal representatives of their deceased associate.42 And firm creditors may proceed directly against the personal representative of a deceased partner without asking for judgment against the firm or the surviving partner, although the surviving partners must be made parties, since they are interested in taking the account.43 Before the Clayton Act 44 it was held: that a city and county sufficiently represents gas consumers 45 and telephone subscribers, 46 within their territory to justify, in a suit in which the former are made parties defendant, an injunction against the latter, although not formally joined; but in a suit by a carrier against the members of a railroad commission to enjoin the enforcement. of an order fixing rates under a statute which provides for awards of reparation for failure to comply with such an order, the Court will not pass upon the validity of any of such awards made to parties not before the court. The United States may sue without joining the allottee Indians, to set aside their conveyances of lands within the statutory period of restriction, and may sue upon the official bond of the clerk of a Federal court to recover deposits made by litigants as security for costs; upon the official bond of a Referee in Bankruptcy, to recover 48 49 Consol. Gas Co. v. Newton, 256 Fed. 238, affirmed by C. C. A., without opinion, 258 infra. 46 Re Engelhard & Sons Co., Petitioner, 231 U. S. 646, p. 418 C. 47 Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 300; Merchants' & Mfg. Traffic Ass'n, 231 Fed. 292. See Priest v. Las Vergas, 232 U. S. 604, 618. 48 Heckman v. U. S., 224 U. S. 413, 56 L. ed. 820. 49 U. S. v. Abeel, C. C. A., 174 Fed. 12. excessive fees which he has collected 50 and upon the official bond of a clerk in the Post Office to collect money and the value of property which he has misappropriated 51 for the benefit of all parties who have been injured by the official misconduct without joining any of them. The right of the United States to sue upon contractors' bonds for the benefit of laborers and material men has been previously considered.52 "54 53 The English rule was that "a court of equity in many cases considers the tenant in tail as having the whole estate vested in him, at least for the purposes of suit; and for these purposes does not look beyond the estate tail in a suit aiming by the decree to bind the right to the land. "Those in remainder were considered as cyphers" 54 "It appears that this rule was originally founded upon analogy to common law. As a tenant in tail might bar subsequent remaindermen,-in fact, might at any moment make himself master of the entire estate, it was considered by the court that he might be assumed to offer a satisfactory defense for all those subsequent interests. The court has, however, gone one step farther, and has treated infants as sufficient representatives of the inheritance, although they are unable, by reason of infancy, to bar remaindermen. In truth the court has gone to the full extent which is requisite for convenience in practice." 55 It has been held that a tenant for life and the contingent remainderman in fee may represent the inheritance in a bill for specific performance, if the children of the remainderman will inherit if he does not.56 But the court refused to decide whether a will conveyed a fee or a life estate, when the parties were not in existence who would take the remainder if the estate were for life only.57 Lord Eldon said that in most cases respecting trust property the beneficiaries of the trust were necessary parties.58 The expression naturally suggests the inquiry, in what cases are they not to be made parties? There are some cases in which the 50 U. S. v. Ward, C. C. A., 257 Fed. 372. See infra, $$ 638,662. 51 U. S. v. U. S. Fidelity & G'y. Co., C. C. A., 242 Fed. 16. 52 § 5a, supra. 58 Lord Eldon in Lloyd v. Johnes, Ves. 65. 54 Lord Camden in Reynoldson v. Perkins, Ambler, 564. 55 Calvert on Parties (2d ed.), 56. 56 Sohier v. Williams, 1 Curt. 479. 57 Talor v. Fisk, 94 Fed. 242. 58 Adams v. St. Leger, 1 B. & B. 182. |